bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
9-15-2018

It's a dangerous world in there : leadership methods and actions
of school administrators during emergency situations and times
of crisis
James J. Drake

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
Drake, James J., "It's a dangerous world in there : leadership methods and actions of school
administrators during emergency situations and times of crisis" (2018). NIU Test. 221.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/221

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

ABSTRACT
IT’S A DANGEROUS WORLD IN THERE: LEADERSHIP METHODS AND ACTIONS OF
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS DURING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
AND TIMES OF CRISIS

James J. Drake, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology,
and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Patrick Roberts, Director

Over the past twenty years, shootings and other violent incidents, acts of terrorism such
as the attacks of September 11, 2001, and natural disaster events such as hurricanes or floods
have occurred with increasing frequency. Situations like these pose significant challenges for
school administrators when a normally-peaceful educational environment is quickly transformed
by significant acts of aggression from within, or by external threats that impact the educational
domain with little or no advance warning.
Contingency-based, situational leadership has proven to be effective when used in both
educational and non-educational settings during normal, non-emergency periods. The purpose of
this study is to determine if a contingency-based leadership style can also be effective during
school-related emergency situations and crisis events.
The leadership methods and actions of school presidents and school district
superintendents were studied in the context of leading their school(s) or school district before,
during, and after emergencies or times of crisis. Information concerning the leadership style
preferences and perceived valuation of identified leadership components was obtained through
written surveys, and oral interviews during which school administrators described their
leadership philosophy and actions during a major emergency or crisis event.

The results obtained show that each chief administrator made extensive use of
contingency-based, situational leadership principles while working with subordinates to devise
and implement a coordinated emergency or crisis event response.
The primary leadership concept that allowed administrators to carry out a successful
crisis event response was delegation of authority. Effective delegation of authority was
supported by five major themes: Communication, Competence, Credibility, Decision-Making,
and Planning. These themes allowed subordinates to utilize and implement guidance contained
within comprehensive written crisis response documents; coordinating efficiently with school
and school district staff, students, outside response agencies, and each other; both during and
after the crisis event.
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CHAPTER ONE – A DANGEROUS NEW WORLD
On April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in unincorporated Jefferson County,
Colorado, two high-school seniors enacted a horrific assault during the middle of the school day
during which they hoped to kill hundreds. They planted large propane bombs in the school
cafeteria, and planned to set these off during a lunch period when there would be a large number
of students present. The perpetrators positioned themselves just outside of the cafeteria moments
before the bombs were set to explode. They hoped to shoot any remaining students not killed by
the bombs as they ran out of the cafeteria in the aftermath. Although this element failed when
the bombs did not go off as planned, the pair continued on by shooting people indiscriminately
as they brazenly walked the halls and hunted for potential victims. When the day was done,
twelve innocent students and one staff member had been killed, and twenty-one more people
were injured. (Columbine Review Commission Report, 2001.)
School administrators at Columbine had no prior knowledge or indication that such a
horrific event was about to happen at their campus, and thus were unable to prepare for it. An
attack on this scale was unprecedented at the time. (Shen, 2012). Even now it remains one of the
most deadly shooting attacks in an American public high school, second only to the events of
February 14, 2018 at Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida (NBC News, 2018).

On the morning of September 11, 2001, a series of four coordinated attacks on the United
States by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda killed 2,996 people and injured over 6000 others
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while causing at least $10 billion dollars in property and infrastructure damage, and over $3
trillion dollars in total costs (Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2004.) Four passenger
airplanes operated by two major U.S. passenger air carriers were hijacked by nineteen al-Qaeda
terrorists. Two of the planes were crashed into the North and South towers of the World Trade
Center in New York, causing both of the towers to collapse with debris and the resulting fires
causing partial or complete collapse of all other buildings in the World Trade Center complex; as
well as significant damage to ten other large surrounding structures.
A third plane was crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the fourth
plane was initially was directed toward Washington, D.C., but went down near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania after brave passengers tried to re-take the plane from its hijackers (Morgan, 2009.)
9/11 was the single deadliest incident for firefights and law enforcement officers in the history of
the United States, with 343 and 72 killed respectively (United States Congressional Record,
2002, p. 9909.)
Although the 9/11 attacks did not directly strike any public or private schools, students,
staff, and school administrators across the country were impacted by the confusion, stress, and
trauma that resulted from this event. As news reports of the attack started to appear, many
people did not understand what had happened. Some schools sent students home early,
especially those in the immediate New York City area (Morgan, 2009).
In the days, weeks, and months afterward, a substantial number of students, staff, and
administrators across the entire nation continued to struggle with the emotional devastation and
psychological effects caused by thousands of deaths, injuries to friends and relatives, the loss of
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family members or other loved ones, as well as by the shocking nature of the attack itself (United
States Department of Health & Human Services, 2002).
An event such as this, a direct non-military attack on civilians resulting in the loss of
human lives, had never before been seen on such a scale. It affected people not just in America,
but around the world (Morgan, 2009.) The 9/11 attacks posed unique challenges for school
administrators in the immediate New York City area, who had to suddenly overcome logistical
issues caused by loss of subway, bus and other means of transportation; outages of electrical,
gas, water, and internet service; as well as disruption of city infrastructure and other mechanical
systems used by students and staff on a daily basis (United States Department of Transportation,
2002.)
The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in serious problems for school administrators in other
states and cities across the country, who suddenly had to deal not only with immediate emotional
reactions of students and staff to the horrific narratives, photos, and images being reported
through the news media, but also the longer-term psychological effects that this event had upon
significant numbers of children and adults, many of whom suffered varying degrees of emotional
trauma and post-traumatic stress (Schechter, Coates, & First, 2002.) In this instance, school
administrators were once again confronted with a situation the likes of which had never been
seen before (Klein, Devoe, Miranda-Julian, & Linas, 2009.)

Hurricane Katrina was the eleventh named storm, and fifth hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic
Ocean hurricane season. At the time, Katrina was the most expensive natural disaster, as well as
one of the five deadliest hurricanes in the history of the United States. The storm is currently
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ranked as the third most intense United States tropical cyclone to reach land, trailing only the
1935 Labor Day hurricane and Hurricane Camille in 1969 (National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration - National Hurricane Center, 2005.) Overall, at least 1,245 people died in the
hurricane and subsequent floods of Katrina, making it the deadliest United States hurricane since
the 1928 Okeechobee hurricane. Total property damage was estimated at $108 billion (2005
USD), roughly four times the damage caused by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (National Oceanic
Atmospheric Administration - National Hurricane Center, 1993.)
Hurricane Katrina originated over the Bahamas on August 23, 2005. After very briefly
weakening to a tropical storm as it passed over Florida, Katrina emerged into the Gulf of Mexico
on August 26 and strengthened to a Category 5 hurricane over the warm gulf waters before
making its second landfall as a Category 3 hurricane on August 29 in southeast Louisiana.
Katrina caused severe destruction along the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas,
much of it due to the storm surge and levee failure. Severe property damage occurred in coastal
areas. Although advance warning allowed time for most people to evacuate, some forecasts did
not give an accurate assessment of just how strong the storm would be when it reached heavily
populated areas such as New Orleans.
Additionally, many people mistakenly believed that the city’s system of levees would
protect them from any storm surge that might result from Katrina. Because of these factors, they
did not evacuate the New Orleans area. However, the levees did not hold. Over fifty breaches in
New Orleans' hurricane surge protection caused of the majority of the death and destruction
during Katrina on August 29, 2005. Eventually 80% of the city and large tracts of neighboring
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parishes became flooded, where the floodwaters remained trapped for weeks afterward
(Anderson et al. 2007.)
Because of the flooding caused by Katrina and failure of New Orleans’ levee system,
administrators at many public and private schools had to suddenly deal with stranded students
and staff, shortages of food and water, inoperable restrooms and other school facilities which
could not be used, all during a period when there was no electrical power, natural gas, or
municipal water and sanitation (National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration - National
Hurricane Center, 2005).
These conditions posed not only critical immediate human health problems, but also
long-term issues as administrators were forced to consider how they could continue to provide
educational and social services for children even as their schools were still under water (Ladd,
Marszalek, & Gill, 2006).

Impact of Crisis Events

These three events are vastly different, yet they all share a common theme and pose
similar basic challenges for school administrators who are forced to deal with crisis/emergency
situations: A sudden, disruptive event of great magnitude that poses a grave threat to life and
property. What makes these events so challenging is that while dangerous things are happening,
important decisions must be made; usually under severe time constraints and on the basis of
limited information.
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Besides the situations already described, school administrators may face other external
natural disasters such as earthquakes, fires, tornados, and biological attack or pandemic disease.
Within the school setting, students or staff may be exposed to violence and death caused by
suicide, gang activity, snipers, hostage-taking, or sexual assault. Afterward, some students and
staff can experience a severe emotional response: fear, grief, or post-traumatic stress syndrome
(United States Department of Justice, Office for Victims of Crimes – USDOJ/OVC, 2002).
When a significant portion of a school’s population is affected by crisis and intervention
efforts are non-existent, too little, or ineffective, the aftermath can interfere with the ability of
students to focus on their studies, and may compromise the professional job performance of staff
members. In these cases, long-term psychosocial and educational problems may ensue. This
will impact a school’s ability to function long after the emergency has passed. Prompt, effective
crisis intervention following such a situation can help individuals cope with the impact of natural
disasters and other harmful events (USDOJ/OVC, 2002).

Preparing for Crisis Events

Both during and immediately after a crisis, the first priority is to ensure physical safety of
students and staff; responding quickly and effectively in order to gain control of the situation
thereby minimizing the impact of the emergency for all concerned (Kamien, 2006, p.665). In
order to provide an effective coordinated response, many schools and school districts have
prepared crisis response plans that attempt to anticipate various types of crisis events which
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could occur, and then provide an organized coordinated plan that will give school administrators
an effective response to implement in such a situation.
Such a crisis plan will typically include contingencies for multi-hazard emergencies,
procedures for contacting and working with first responders and other community organizations,
guidelines for communicating with parents and the media during a crisis, instructions for use of
school facilities for non-school community emergencies, crisis team and staff roles during
emergency situations, a structured incident command system, advance preparation of critical
facility information, preparations and drills for practicing various lockdown, evacuation, and
hazardous material situations, and placement of emergency supply kits at appropriate locations
(Kamien, 2006).
According the U.S. Department of Education, 95 percent of public schools and public
school districts report the existence of a written crisis plan for natural disasters; with 94 percent
of schools reporting that they have a written plan for bomb threats or other similar incidents
(United States Department of Education – School Survey of Crime and Safety: USDOE-SSOCS,
2010).
However, it is less clear to what extend students, staff, and school administrators are
familiar with their school’s written crisis plan, or if they understand what is to be done during
various emergency situations. Although 82.3 percent of public schools claim to conduct drills
for natural disasters such as fire, tornado, or hurricanes, only 58.6 percent report holding drills
for bomb threats or incidents, with 51.9 percent, 41.4 percent, and 30.7 percent of schools
drilling students and staff on shootings/armed intruders, hostage taking, and biological attack
situations respectively (USDOE - SSOCS, 2010.)
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According to the USDOE-SSOCS study, a higher percentage of suburban schools (58
percent) drill students on their crisis plan procedures in case of a shooting than urban schools (49
percent), even though incidents involving guns and gun violence may be more pervasive in an
urban setting.
What these figures serve to illustrate is that while many schools and school districts
maintain written crisis management plans, it is unclear as to how much time school leaders
actually spend rehearsing and considering how they might react to and manage various types of
crisis situations. The number and percentage of school administrators who have prepared
detailed instructions, with specific action steps designed to carry out their written plans in the
event of an actual emergency, is also uncertain.
Additionally, the crisis management plan can only give general guidelines for emergency
scenarios. Each particular crisis situation may unfold somewhat differently, with a unique
dynamic and trajectory. Being able to anticipate possible problems and make adjustments on the
fly can have a significant effect on how the crisis ultimately impacts staff, students, and the
community.
Over the past fifteen years, other serious incidents of violence have occurred in public
schools. This has happened at places such as Sandy Hook Elementary, where on December 14,
2012, a gunman in Newtown, Connecticut fatally shot 20 children aged between 6 and 7 years
old, as well as six adult staff members; and on April 16, 2007 at Virginia Tech University in
Blacksburg, Virginia when a student there shot and killed 32 people and wounded 17 others in
two separate attacks.
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These incidents, as well as others, have shown that a normally-peaceful educational
environment can be quickly transformed by significant acts of aggression from within, or by
external threats that enter the public school domain; often with little or no advance warning.

Crisis Response Leadership and Actions

Wenger (1975) exposed several myths related to crisis situation response: Wenger and
his associates found that in natural disaster situations, the majority of initial search-and-rescue
activity is done by the victims themselves, rather than by the people and organizations most often
thought of as first responders. What this indicates is that in a crisis or emergency situation
scenario, most of the initial response will be taken by those who are directly affected. It follows
then, that during such an emergency situation in a public school, much of the initial reaction and
response will depend upon the school’s leader, school staff, and students.
The elements that make up a district’s crisis response plan are all important, needed
components. However, what may be even more important is the order and timeliness with which
these components are introduced, and the effectiveness with which each of these elements is
employed during the crisis situation. It is imperative then, that students and staff have effective
leadership and direction to guide them until emergency responders can come to assist.
Typically, the first notification of an emergency situation is a call to 911. The public
safety answering point (PSAP) is then responsible for sending the right personnel to the scene, so
they may start to control the event. Agencies normally involved in this response may include
fire departments, police, and EMT/medical service providers. First responders use standard
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incident command procedures so that their efforts are coordinated, and decisions follow a
predetermined emergency system protocol (Kamien, 2006, p. 670).
But minutes, hours, or even days may elapse between the time a crisis begins, the period
during which authorities are made aware of what is happening and then decide how to respond,
and the moment that help actually arrives. The decisions and actions of a school administrator
during this initial period may have a significant effect on the course and the ultimate outcome of
the emergency situation. And even after first-responders arrive, the leader of a school or school
district cannot simply hand over responsibility for crisis response operations. Throughout the
duration of a crisis event and for some time afterward, the leader still has an important role to
play (Kamien, 2006).
Effective leadership from school administrators during a crisis can have an immediate
and significant impact on the progression and outcome of a crisis situation. It may prevent and
reduce incidents of violence against students and staff, reduce security risks and liability, and
improve school-community relations in the area of safety and emergency situation preparedness
by implementing practical risk-reduction measures that can be taken to ensure a physically and
psychologically secure school environment (SSOCS, 2010.)
Schools are well-organized systems that function with great efficiency under normal
conditions. School districts usually have both short- and long-term plans for regular initiatives
such as the improvement of curriculum and instruction, capital improvement projects, renovation
and construction of district facilities, acquisition, budgeting, and expenditure of district finances,
the implementation of technology, and organization of extra-curricular programs and activities.
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These plans are often created through school and district committees, with input from
many individuals operating within a well-defined structure; guided by administrators who work
within the parameters of clearly-outlined job responsibilities. The way in which school
administrators organize and guide these regular school initiatives is a direct reflection of their
personal leadership philosophy, and their preferred leadership style.
However during a crisis, schools and school leaders face very unusual demands. There
may be little or no time to solicit ideas and input from students, staff, or community members.
Decisions must often be made quickly, and with a limited amount of relevant information. This
may require a much different leadership approach, and different leadership methods and tactics
than the administrator would use under normal conditions.

Purpose of the Study

Many public school administrators today practice an inclusive form of leadership,
communicating with colleagues and staff frequently to obtain their input and ideas on a wide
variety of issues while encouraging followers to be creative, and contribute actively to problemsolving (Bass, 1998.) However, during a crisis situation when decisions must be made quickly,
school administrators may have to alter their leadership approach, sometimes quite drastically.
We understand that a crisis or school emergency situation may require a much different type of
response than more ordinary, everyday problems. If these atypical situations require an
extraordinary response, then perhaps very different leadership methods are needed in order to
effectively deliver such a response.
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The Hippocratic Oath requires first and foremost that medical doctors shall do their
patients no harm. Similarly, one of the most fundamental duties owed by school administrators
to students and staff members is to provide a secure learning environment, while shielding them
from danger. This principle applies at all times, under normal conditions as well as during
emergency situations. To fulfill this duty, it is incumbent upon school administrators to be
knowledgeable and well-versed in effective emergency response procedures; capable of leading
and protecting staff and students during crisis events by keeping them physically safe and
emotionally secure.
To successfully handle school emergency and crisis events, school administrators need a
thorough knowledge of effective crisis response procedures, and the ability to quickly formulate
a specific, detailed action plan that will be effective in that particular situation. For this, we can
study the actions of school administrators who have actually dealt with school emergencies and
crisis situation events.

Significance of the Study

Valuable knowledge may be gained from leaders who have experienced school crisis
events firsthand. We can learn how these administrators first became aware of and analyzed a
crisis situation, then planned and carried out an organized, coordinated emergency response. By
doing so we may determine precisely which leadership principles, qualities, or characteristics
were most important in order for them to effectively direct subordinates while interfacing with
first-responders and other emergency services personnel.
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Emergency and crisis situation leadership has been studied as it relates to fields such as
the military, police science, or hospitals and medical personnel. An initial survey of the
literature shows that some articles and books have been written on this topic as it relates
specifically to planning for emergency scenarios in public schools, and re-building school
communities after an emergency or crisis situation has passed: These sources include works by
Beabout et al. (2008), and Hintz, (2013). A few studies have been done on school crisis plans
and school administrators’ preparation for implementing such plans: Aspiranti, Pelchar,
McCleary, Bain, & Foster, (2011).
However, no research was found specifically focused upon the leadership actions,
principles or leadership style employed by school administrators during a crisis or school
emergency situation, or the mindset of school administrators regarding their approach to
formulating and implementing a school or school district crisis response during an actual crisis
event. Because of this gap, it is proposed that research be undertaken to study the leadership
actions, principles, and methods that school administrators have actually used during crisis and
emergency situations; comparing these are to the leadership methods, style, and approach
typically employed by the same school administrators for major school and school district nonemergency projects and initiatives.
Ascertaining the leadership methods and styles preferred by school district
superintendents and school presidents during normal, non-emergency periods and determining
the extent to which these administrators regularly used various types of situational, contingencybased principles or other specific leadership constructs prior to facing actual emergency and

14
crisis situations may allow the researcher to assess and better understand how these school
superintendents and presidents transitioned into their chosen emergency/crisis leadership modes.
This will be discerned by learning whether it was their familiarity with situational,
contingency-based leadership principles, experience with other leadership methods they had
typically utilized during non-emergency periods, or a combination of various leadership factors
and styles that these superintendents, CEOS, and/or school presidents relied upon for guidance
when confronted with an unexpected school-based emergency situation or crisis event.

Research Question

The research study proposed seeks to answer one key question:



Are contingency-based leadership principles evidenced in the actions and leadership
styles of school district superintendents, CEOs, and school presidents when formulating
and implementing a response to school-related emergency situations and crisis events?

Study Delimitations

Participants in the proposed study will be public or private school administrators; school
district superintendents, or school presidents with supervisory responsibility for public or private
elementary schools or high schools, or public/private elementary, high school, unit (K-12) school
districts, or colleges/universities. In order to obtain candidates for inclusion in this study, a call
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will be made for school district superintendents or school presidents who self-identify as having
been actively employed by a school, school district, or college/university during a time of
significant crisis or emergency.
For the purpose of classifying participants in this study, a significant crisis or emergency
situation is defined by the following characteristics: A situation that posed an imminent, serious
hazard including a grave threat to life and property. For the purposes of this study, a qualifying
crisis/emergency situation will be further defined to include the following: Tornado, hurricane,
tropical storm, flood, winter storm/blizzard, armed intruder, bomb threat, bombing, kidnapping,
terrorist attack, shooting, hostage-taking, automobile/bus/train accident, as well as unexpected
death of a student or staff member.

CHAPTER TWO – LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS EVENTS
Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to provide both historical overview and perspective
concerning emergency situations that have occurred over a wide range of various noneducational contexts and settings, and to examine the leadership methods and styles that have
been used in response to these crisis events. In doing so, I will also outline the development of
both Transactional and Transformational leadership theory, discussing their relative strengths
and weaknesses while touching upon a number of other leadership theories that make use of
various transactional and transformational elements.
The conceptual framework for my proposed study will also be introduced and explained.
Finally, I will give an overall summary of findings from my review of literature concerning
emergency situation and crisis event leadership, while providing further justification for the
study proposed.

Contingency Leadership Theory

The conceptual framework for this proposed study is Contingency Leadership theory.
The Contingency Theory of leadership, first developed through the work of Fred Fiedler, is
based upon the premise that leaders will respond to various situations by employing different
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leadership styles and methods, depending upon circumstances and conditions in existence at that
time.
According to Fiedler (1967), the specific style and methods employed by a leader using
the contingency-based approach depends first upon whether the leader prefers to be more taskoriented, or more relationship-oriented in accomplishing workplace assignments. The other
primary consideration for a contingency-based leader is situational favorability. This consists of
three factors:



The relationship that the leader has with subordinates – the levels of trust and respect that
exist within the group, and how much confidence subordinates have in their leader.



Task structure – whether low or high.



The leader’s position of authority, and degree of influence and control over subordinates.

In a study involving the application of contingency theory, Forsyth (2006) found that
situational control is critical to leadership efficacy, and that when leader-member relationships
involving a high degree of mutual trust, respect, and confidence were found to exist, this allowed
groups to function more effectively. When leader/member relations were poor, groups were not
as effective and the leader was required to devote significant attention to regulating behavior and
controlling conflict among group members.
Fielder’s research (1967) showed that even in situations where the group’s goal was
clear, group efficacy was compromised when members did not know or understand specifically
how the goal should be achieved. In these cases, the leader’s competence and credibility was
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essential to successful group performance. This has particular application for crisis and
emergency situations, where people may have a clear understanding of what needs to be done,
yet do not know or understand the specific actions required to reach their goal.
The school leader’s knowledge and understanding of crisis leadership, and his/her
competence in handling crisis events through the application of effective leadership actions and
techniques can make the difference between success or failure in such cases; ultimately
determining whether the crisis is minimized or averted, and if lives are saved or lost.
Fiedler (1967) and Forsyth (2006) both found that leader position power is a determining
factor in contingency-based leadership, and that leaders with well-defined positions of authority
are most effective in motivating followers. School district superintendents and school presidents
have direct authority and power over subordinates, which may facilitate compliance with their
orders and instructions.
However, school district superintendents and school presidents must themselves answer
to school board members, as well as federal, state, and local government officials. They are also
held accountable to members of the public. Could there be instances in which school
superintendents or presidents hesitate or decline to use the full range of their authority, knowing
that their actions and decisions will ultimately be scrutinized and judged? If so, this
consideration might impact a district superintendent’s or school president’s leadership style and
effectiveness, particularly during an emergency or crisis event where the stakes are high and the
consequence of failure will be severe.
Contingency theory requires that leaders understand their own strengths and weaknesses,
as well as the strengths and weaknesses of followers. In order to improve their ability to handle
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school emergencies and crisis events, it would be helpful for school administrators to acquire as
much knowledge as possible about crisis event management. School administrators may also
benefit by acquiring a more thorough understanding of their own leadership philosophy and
preferred leadership styles; as well as the leadership styles, actions, and methods that have
previously been shown as most effective in successfully managing a range of non-school crisis or
emergency situations.
Contingency-based leadership requires that emergency response directors must have the
ability to change between leadership styles when necessary, adapting their approach to the
particular crisis or emergency situation that presents itself; adjusting their leadership style and
methods accordingly. In order to effectively use this situational leadership style in their own
districts, school administrators may wish to consider their own responses to the following
contingency-based leadership questions (Fiedler, 1967), (Forsyth, 2006):



In my own approach to work, am I primarily task-oriented, or relationshiporiented? (Based on LPC survey results.)



During either non-emergency or emergency situations, what is my level of
influence and authority over subordinates, staff, and students? (Leader position
power.)



Will subordinates, staff members, and others promptly follow and implement my
directives?



Do I have the trust and respect of staff members?



Do high levels of trust and respect exist among staff members for each other?
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How might my staff members perceive and respond to various task-oriented or
relationship-oriented leadership styles that might be employed during a time of
crisis or emergency?



What is my level of knowledge and competence regarding possible school-related
emergency situations and crisis events that could occur?



What leadership training or support do I need; in order to be prepared to deal
more confidently and effectively with potential emergency or crisis event
situations?

For many public school administrators, their primary leadership orientation may be
situational for both emergency and non-emergency events. This involves gathering and
processing information, and then using this information and subsequent analysis to make
decisions about how to direct their staff, students, parents, and community members in a
customized response tailored to that particular event.
Using a contingency theory leadership model, the administrator’s analysis and decisionmaking process will ordinarily take into account the specific conditions associated with a current
project, problem or event; as well as available resources and the characteristics of his or her staff,
and his or her own preferred leadership style (Fiedler, 1967). Such a contingency-based
approach provides a flexible framework that can be adjusted and then applied to the meet the
conditions and demands of a certain set of circumstances. Contingency leadership models make
use of both transactional and transformational leadership principles and elements as well as
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derivations of these constructs, combining these elements in varied proportions according to the
situation at hand and personnel involved (Forsyth, 1996).
Although little has been written specifically on the topic of leadership in schools or
educational systems during actual times of crisis or emergency, others have studied
crisis/emergency leadership principles and methods in other situations, and in different settings.
The purpose of this literature review is to examine the methods and techniques various leaders
have used to handle a wide variety of emergency situations and crisis events; looking to see if the
leadership actions and styles that these individuals have employed across a broad range of nonschool emergency and crisis scenarios are consistent with the basic elements and principles of
contingency leadership theory.
Upon completion of research proposed for this study, the information obtained through
this review of the literature will then be examined to determine if the leadership actions,
methods, and styles demonstrated in these cases are consistent with the leadership actions that
school district superintendents and school presidents have taken, and the leadership methods and
styles they have employed when faced with emergencies and crisis events in their own schools
and school districts.

Types of Leadership

There are numerous types of authoritarian and democratic leadership. However, most
modern leadership constructs are variations on, or combinations of two fundamentally opposing
styles: Transactional Leadership, and Transformational Leadership. I will now provide a
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theoretical overview of both Transactional Leadership, and Transformational Leadership. I will
also include a description and analysis of three other styles – Participative Leadership Situational
Leadership, and Contingency Leadership; each of which may incorporate varying degrees of
both Transactional and Transformational leadership elements and forms.

Transactional Leadership

The origins of Transactional leadership theory can be found in the research of German
sociologist Max Weber.
Weber (1921, 1947), having studied a broad spectrum of leaders and leadership
scenarios, defined three legitimate sources of authority on which leadership could be based. He
claimed that Charismatic authority derived from followers’ belief in the superior or
‘supernatural’ powers of a particular leader, thus justifying the investment of trust and power
with that individual.
What Weber (1947) defined as Traditional authority is placed with certain leaders
because of a particular status they may have inherited or been given by custom, birth, precedent,
or usage. Weber described Rational-Legal authority as power exercised through a system of
rules and procedures attached to a particular job or ‘office’ that a person holds.
Rational-Legal leadership involves the concept of a bureaucracy: An organization
structured around official functions that are bound by rules; each area of which has its own
specialized function. These functions are then structured within a hierarchy that follows
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technical norms and protocols (Weber, 1947). What Weber described as Rational-Legal
leadership forms the basis of what later came to be known as Transactional Leadership.
The Transactional leadership style outlined by Bass (1960) involves motivating and
directing people by appealing to their own self-interest through a system of tangible, extrinsic
rewards and punishments. Transactional leaders tend to be highly directive and action-oriented.
Their relationship with subordinates may be very transitory; based on immediate needs or desires
of leaders and/or followers.
Transactional leadership theory (Bass, 1960) assumes that subordinates are motivated
primarily by the rewards and punishment that a leader may provide, that subordinates must obey
the directives of their leader, and that the activity of subordinates must be closely monitored and
controlled.
Transactional leadership theory implies that leaders are focused mainly on clearlydefined, short-term objectives and that a standardized system of rules and procedures governing
subordinates is in place. Transactional leaders do not seek creativity from subordinates, and they
tend to ignore or provide no reward for ideas that cannot be used to meet existing plans and goals
(Bass, 1960).
In earlier times, transactional leadership was often used in government, business, and
military organizations. It was also commonly employed by school administrators, and by
teachers in their classrooms.

Theory X and Theory Y

Douglas McGregor (1960) created the X and Y theories of management and motivation.
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According to Douglas’s theory X, people generally have little or no ambition for work, and must
be closely monitored under strict supervision. In this situation, a system of rewards and penalties
is necessary to motivate workers to perform required tasks.
Theory X maintains the average workforce is more efficient under a "hands-on" approach
to management. The Theory X manager believes that all actions should be traced to their source,
and the responsible individual given a direct reward or a reprimand according to the action's
outcomes. In this way, McGregor’s theory X aligns closely with Max Weber’s transactional
leadership theory.
According to McGregor (1960), there are two opposing approaches to implementing
Theory X: The "hard" approach, and the "soft" approach. The “hard” approach depends on close,
aggressive supervision, physical and/or verbal intimidation, and the threat of imminent
punishment or reward, depending upon whether objectives and goals are met.
The “soft” alternative relies more on suggestions and encouragement to do what the
leader wants and less on direct orders or threats; yet keeps the possibility of negative
consequence or positive reward ever-present as a motivational device.
McGregor’s Theory Y stands in stark contrast to his Theory X. Theory Y workers are
assumed to be internally motivated, to enjoy their labor and their place within the organization,
and to work without financial or other tangible reward as their primary motivation (McGregor,
1960).
Many years ago, school administrators and teachers were held to a strict standard in
fulfilling their professional responsibilities; their manner of dress, physical appearance, and
lifestyle choices were closely scrutinized and regulated. Students were expected to comply with
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the demands of their teachers without question; they could be subject to various types of
discipline including corporal punishment for failing to do so. As time went by, societal norms
and values changed. It came to be seen that this type of hard, transactional approach could be
ineffective and often counter-productive; especially in educational settings.
Theory Y employees consistently attempt to better their own personal standards of
performance; taking responsibility for their work without the need for constant oversight or
supervision. Because of this orientation, Theory Y managers may relate to workers on a more
personal level; facilitating their personal and professional growth while encouraging
independence and creativity (McGregor, 1960).
Today, teachers and other educational personnel are assumed to be intrinsically motivated
by a desire to help children and improve society. School administrators are expected to support
the professional growth and development of staff members, while providing an environment in
which teachers are allowed to utilize the full range of their talents and skills.
Studies done after McGregor by Stogdill (1974) and Avolio (2007) found that using a
Theory Y approach can create a greater sense of worker unity, and promote a more positive
atmosphere in the work place. Other subsequent studies, including those conducted by Aydin
(2011), have found that academic and research professionals perform best when managed
primarily with a Theory Y style.
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Transactional and Transformational Leadership

James MacGregor Burns (1978) built upon the ideas of Max Weber, Douglas McGregor,
and others in developing his interpretation of the two distinctly different Transactional and
Transformational leadership types.
Similar to Weber and McGregor, Burns saw transactional leadership as a style in which
leaders focus on the relationship between the leader and follower using rewards, punishments,
and clearly-defined authority.
Following Douglas McGregor’s Theory Y, Burns conceptualized transformational
leadership as a style in which leaders focus on the beliefs, needs, and values of their followers in
order to inspire, uplift, and motivate them.

Characteristics of Transactional and Transformational Leadership

Burns (1978) described and outlined the differences between transactional and
transformational leadership: Transactional leadership is responsive, and workers are expected to
adapt to the established organizational culture. Transactional leaders accomplish objectives by
appealing to workers’ own self-interest; their desire to receive tangible rewards and avoid
various forms of punishment. Burns described this as management-by-exception; the primary
goal being to maintain the status quo and avoid problems while using corrective action to
improve performance.
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According to Burns (1978), Transformational leaders are those who engage with
followers, focusing on higher order intrinsic needs, and raising consciousness about the
significance of specific outcomes and new ways in which those outcomes might be achieved.
Transformational leadership involves demonstrating active behaviors that provide a sense of
unity and mission; raising leaders and followers alike to higher levels of motivation and
morality. Transformational leaders encourage creativity and innovative thinking, while
supporting the personal and professional growth of followers.
In this sense, Transformational leadership is proactive; changing and improving
organizational culture by implementing new ideas. Under such a system, objectives are achieved
primarily through the application of widely-held ideals and moral values throughout the
organization; followers put the interests of the organization before their own. Organizational
improvement comes from individualized consideration; the organizational climate created by this
approach encourages people to work together toward common, shared goals and stimulates them
to find innovation solutions for problems.
This is the approach used today in most successful organizations (Bass & Avolio, 1994.)
Business leaders have found that productivity increases when workers are given a voice in
determining how company goals should be reached, and more autonomy in doing the work
needed to attain these goals. Military commanders understand that missions have more
successful outcomes when subordinate officers and personnel have greater latitude in planning
them, and in determining how to allocate and utilize the personnel and materials needed for these
actions to be carried out (Daniels, 2016).
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Educational leaders know that teachers and support staff will be more engaged, and more
effective in facilitating the learning and development of children when they are encouraged to
use their own initiative and creativity in helping to shape educational content and practice in
their schools.

Bernard Bass and Transformational Leadership

Bernard Bass (1960, 1965, 1979, 1983, 1985) did extensive research in the area of
Transformational leadership, along with Ralph Stogdill, and Bruce Avolio.
Bass & Stogdill (1990, p. 319) describe leadership as “a social exchange that is
established and maintained as long as the benefit to both sides is perceived to be greater than the
costs.” Bass & Stogdill cite Hollander (1978, p.16) in further describing this relationship as a
“psychological contract between the leader and follower, which depends upon a variety of
expectations and actions on both sides.” At schools, staff members expect administrators to
provide a secure environment in which children may learn. They also look to their educational
leaders for guidance and direction; particularly during times of emergency or crisis.
Bass (1990, p. 339) states that Transactional leaders may contribute to enhancing the
performance of workers by clarifying what is expected of them, explaining how to meet these
expectations, providing specific criteria for performance evaluation, telling workers if they are
meeting performance objectives, and allocating rewards contingent on meeting these objectives.
Bass cites Locke, Latham, Saari, and Shaw (1981) when stating that performance
feedback is the most common contingent reinforcement provided by a leader (1990, p. 339).
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Bass also cites Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) while claiming it is important that
workers accept and agree with the performance feedback their supervisors provide, or believe
they have given (1990, p. 340). However, Bass also states that contingent reinforcement given
through a system of rewards or punishments has serious limitations, and that there are similar
constraints on what can be accomplished simply through leader-worker feedback (1990, p. 379).
If workers do not believe the feedback they receive from their supervisor is legitimate,
they may choose to ignore it; especially if there is no immediate penalty or “cost” to the
individual for doing so. In a school setting, teachers may ignore the feedback and suggestions of
their principal if this individual is seen as uninformed, uncaring, and/or incompetent.

The Charismatic Leader

Bass (1960) explored the concept of the charismatic leader; someone people are drawn to
because they are found to be personally inspiring or dynamic. Bass believed that charisma was
an essential component for Transformational leadership.
McClelland (1975) recognized that charismatic leadership could be used in negative
ways, and differentiated between self-aggrandizing charismatic leaders who are primarily
concerned with establishing and maintaining a mystical, distant psychological presence from
followers in order to manipulate and direct them toward self-serving goals, contrasting these
individuals with socialized charismatic leaders who desire to serve others; developing shared
goals with followers and inspiring followers toward the attainment of these goals.
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Bass (1985) has identified four factors generally used to define and describe
transformational leaders: Charisma, Inspiration, Intellectual Stimulation, and Individualized
Consideration. Bass believes that true transformational leaders serve to strengthen and develop
the talents and abilities of their followers. In a study of military personnel, Seltzer & Bass
(1990) found that charismatic leadership correlated highly with the transformational leadership
measures of individualized consideration and leaders’ orientation toward development of
subordinates.
Studies conducted by Bass and Avolio (1989), Avolio, Waldman, and Einstein (1988),
and Bass, Avolio, and Goodheim (1987) all found that subordinates who had leaders they
identified as having transformational qualities consistently rated their organizations as being
highly effective.
While Burns (1978) saw transactional and transformational leadership as opposing,
mutually exclusive ends of a single continuum, Bass (1985) suggested that transactional
elements often play a role within the practice of transformational leadership and that
transformational leadership qualities could augment a transactional leadership approach. This
idea was confirmed in studies conducted by Waldman and Bass (1988) as well as Howell and
Avolio (1989).

Augmentation Theory

The Augmentation Theory is based upon the idea that transformational leadership does
not replace transactional leadership, but adds to it by encouraging followers to take “buy in” and
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take ownership of organizational philosophy and goals (Bass, 1985). This concept was further
explored and confirmed in studies done by Hater and Bass (1988), and Yammarino, Spangler,
and Bass (1993). In these cases, transformational leadership in a pure form was not observed.
Rather, it was seen that a particular individual could simultaneously demonstrate a number of
different leadership behaviors - each containing transformational, transactional, and even laissezfaire elements in varying degrees.
An example of this augmentation principle involves a study of workplace safety from
Great Britain. Clarke (2013) found that active transactional leadership is important in ensuring
employee compliance with safety rules and regulations, while transformational leadership
methods produced greater employee participation in workplace safety programs and support for
job-related safety concepts and protocols. As a result, a combination of both transformational
and transactional leadership styles appeared to be most beneficial for worker safety.
Because transformational leadership typically exists in combination with other leadership
methods and forms, questions have been raised about whether followers and leaders are able to
recognize and accurately discern transformational leadership practice and its associated
elements.
Lievens, Van Geit, and Coetsier (1997) studied follower perception of charisma,
inspiration, individual consideration, and intellectual stimulation provided by transformational
leaders, finding these four key transformational elements to be very closely correlated. They
discovered that one of the challenges inherent in analyzing transformational leadership practice
lies in followers being able to accurately identify and differentiate between these four key factors
when looking at transformational leadership behaviors.
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This has serious implications for educational settings. Followers may decide not to
follow the advice or directives of a competent leader who uses an augmented approach that is
primarily transactional; becoming less energetic and less engaged simply because they perceive
the leader as “hard”, insensitive, or uncaring.
Conversely, followers may willingly adopt suggestions and eagerly take direction from a
leader who employs an augmented transformational-laissez-faire style and gives them more
independence, even if the leader is not particularly knowledgeable or competent. In this
situation, followers might enjoy having greater professional autonomy, and mistakenly believe
that this freedom indicates a greater degree of sensitivity, concern, and caring on the leader’s
part.

Discerning Transformational Leadership Elements and Behaviors

Bass and Avolio’s (1995) Multifactor Leadership Questionaire (MLQ) is widely used to
assess both transactional and transformational leadership qualities. However, even Bass and
Avolio (1989) recognized that the MLQ results may be subject to bias. One type of MLQ bias
that has been identified is the halo effect.
When respondents attempt to identify strengths and weaknesses of a leader, they may
have trouble differentiating between various transformational behaviors, causing them to
attribute separate, specific transformational characteristics to the same leadership domain. This
has been seen in the results of studies conducted by Bycio, Hackett, and Allen (1995), Tepper
and Percy (1994), and Den Hartog, Van Muijen, and Koopmen (1994); all of whom reported that
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on the four transformational leadership scales of charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation,
and individual consideration; scores were consistently highly correlated.
It has also been proposed that leadership assessment scores may often be biased by social
desirability. Avolio, Bass, and Jung (1995) stated that ratings of leaders might not reflect their
actual leadership behavior, but may be influenced by social response bias. Avolio and Bass
(1991) reported that descriptions of “ideal” leaders typically contain primarily transformational
characteristics. If transformational characteristics are viewed as more socially desirable, then
there may be a bias on the part of followers to “see” these traits in leaders they consider good or
ideal, regardless of whether leaders actually possess these desirable qualities.
There is considerable evidence that transformational leadership is effective. However,
Yukl (1999) identified some conceptual weaknesses in earlier transformational and charismatic
leadership theories. These include ambiguous constructs, insufficient description of explanatory
processes, a narrow focus on dyadic processes, omission of some relevant behaviors, insufficient
specification of limiting conditions (situational variables), and a bias toward heroic conceptions
of leadership.
A leader’s influence on followers is often described in terms of the leader’s behavior and
actions that affect mediating variables relevant to task performance, such as arousal of motives
or emotions, increased self-efficacy or optimism, modification of beliefs about reward
contingencies, and increased task commitment. Yukl (1999) states that transformational
leadership theory would be stronger if the essential influence processes were identified more
clearly, and then used to explain how each type of influence behavior affects specific mediating
variables and performance outcomes.
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Most theories of transformational leadership are conceptualized primarily at the dyadic
level (Yukl, 1999). The major interest is to explain a leader’s direct influence over individual
followers, not leader influence on group or organizational processes. In general, leadership is
viewed as a key determinant of organizational effectiveness. However, the causal effects of
leader behavior on the organizational processes that ultimately determine effectiveness are
seldom described in any detail. According to Yukl (1999), how leaders influence these group
processes is not explained very well by the various transformational leadership theories.
Yukl further states that in regard to ambiguity about transformational behaviors, the
identification of specific types of transformational behavior (in research up to that point in time)
seems to be based mostly on an inductive process (factor analysis), and that the theoretical
rationale for differentiating among the behaviors is not clearly explained. Each transformational
behavior includes a number of diverse components, which makes definition of these behaviors
even more ambiguous. The partially overlapping content and the extremely high inter-correlation
found among the transformational behavior factors on leadership assessment instruments such as
MLQ raises doubts about their construct validity (Yukl, 1999).

Moderators of Transformational Leadership

Bass (1996, 1997) has proposed that transformational leadership is beneficial for
followers as well as their organization, regardless of the situation. In support of this position,
Bass (1997, 1998) has shown a positive relationship between transformational leadership and
organizational effectiveness at different levels of authority, in various types of organizations.
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However, Bass (1985, 1996) and others such as Pawar and Eastman (1997) and Pettigrew
(1987) have proposed that situational variables may increase the likelihood of transformational
leadership, or moderate its effect on followers. Conditions causing this may include an unstable
environment, an organic corporate structure (rather than a mechanistic bureaucracy), an
entrepreneurial creative culture, and dominance of boundary-spanning units over the technical
business/organizational core.
An important consideration when evaluating transformational leadership is whether a
leader applies transformational principles equally and consistently, with all followers. The
underlying principle of multi-level leadership is that leaders adapt their behaviors to the
individual subordinate, rather than treating everyone the same. Thus, leaders may tailor their
interactions, utilizing a somewhat different style with each follower.
Graen and UhlBien (1995) described this in terms of a leader-member exchange (LMX,)
whereby the leader influences the motivation of followers by establishing a more intimate,
“warmer” relationship with certain individuals, and a more distant, less-involved relationship
with others. This can be seen in schools where the principal allows some staff members great
latitude because they are highly effective, friendly to administration, or useful “spies”, while
other “less cooperative” staff members are managed very closely using direct orders or threats.
Yammarino and Bass (1990), and Waldman and Yammarino (1999) have advocated the
multi-level analysis perspective as an alternative approach to understanding transformational
leadership. Their suggestion that leaders may use transformational behaviors to a different
degree with their various followers contrasts with the universal perspective of the
transformational leader as one who inspires all followers by way of a common vision. The
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multi-level analysis view proposes that leaders use transformational behaviors with those
subordinates who are receptive; and within those relationships and conditions that are supportive
of these behaviors
Transformational leaders are more effective in some environments than they are in
others. More recent research indicates that this may be due, at least in part, to individual
follower differences based upon the fact that some followers are more receptive and responsive
than others to the efforts of a transformational leader. This has serious implications for school
leadership, particularly during emergency situations.
In times of crisis, teachers and other school staff may decide whether to follow, modify,
or ignore directives from their leaders depending upon their own perceptions of the leader’s
credibility and degree of concern for staff members’ well-being, based upon previous experience
working under that person and their perception of that individual’s prior non-emergency
leadership style.
Misunderstandings that result from this may have dire consequences; particularly during
crisis events when inaction, failure to act promptly, or inappropriate action by staff members
may subject themselves and children under their control to the possibility of serious injury or
death.
Nahum-Shani and Somech (2011) studied the relationship between leadership styles of
Israeli school principals and the organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) of their teachers. In
their study, it was seen that followers’ individual cultural-based differences as reflected in
teachers’ idiocentrism (self-interest) and allocentrism (group interest) orientation moderated the
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relationship between principals’ transformational and transactional leadership methods, and
followers’ OCB.
Under transformational leadership, followers’ allocentrism increased while idiocentrism
decreased. Under transactional leadership, followers’ idiocentrism increased while allocentrism
decreased. This demonstrates that the leadership style employed by school administrators can
have a powerful effect upon follower values and beliefs. Thus, depending upon their personal
organizational citizenship orientation and behaviors, teachers may then react differently during
times of crisis depending upon the leadership style of their administrator(s).
More recent research has focused on specific elements that comprise transformational
leadership practices, and the role of moderators in the relationship between transformational
leadership and performance; factors that may strengthen or weaken this connection.
Zhu, Avolio, and Walumbwa (2009) studied the effect of follower characteristics as a
moderator on the link between transformational leadership and employee work engagement. It
was seen that positive follower characteristics such as taking initiative, and being proactive,
independent, and responsible improved the effect of transformational leadership by strengthening
followers’ work engagement. This agrees with earlier research done by Ehrhart and Klein
(2001), who found that employees with these positive traits tend to have higher initial
expectations for their own performance, and often prefer to work for a transformational leader.
Chi, Lan, and Dorjgotov (2012) studied science research and development professionals
in Mongolia, finding that knowledge management had a moderating effect on transformational
leadership in relation to overall organizational effectiveness. Here, it was seen that managing
prior knowledge in a way that leads to the formation and sharing of new knowledge, through the
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use of transformational leadership principles, is very effective in specific research and
development settings.
Sheng-Min and Jian-Qiao (2013) studied the moderating effects of power distance
(difference in job function level) and structural distance (degree of organizational separation
between employees on different job function levels) on employee voice behavior as
demonstrated by employee willingness to question current workplace policy, or give constructive
workplace suggestions. Transformational leadership encourages employees to make suggestions
for improvement. However, speaking up in this way also carries a degree of risk. New ideas
that benefit others and the organization may generate appreciation and raise morale, but
proposals that are unsuccessful and hurt others may damage relationships; causing resentment
and distrust.
Liu and Liao (2013) found that structural distance was a significant moderator in the
relationship between transformational leadership and employee voice; when employees are in a
position of high structural distance between themselves and leaders they are more willing to
speak up or make suggestions regarding company goals, policies, or procedures when
encouraged to do so through transformational leadership.
Conversely, it was seen that power distance was a negative and stronger moderator than
structural distance. With increasing disparity between job position/job function levels, workers
became more reluctant to offer input or suggestions; believing that they should defer to their
superiors. In situations involving a high power distance, transformational leadership was seen as
a paradox; weakening the relationship between employees and leaders.
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Similarly, Triana, Richard, and Yucel (2017) found that status incongruence (differences
in age, education, work experience, and organizational tenure) between superiors and
subordinates affects a transformational leader’s ability to generate task and organizational
commitment among workers. In their study, low status incongruence (smaller difference)
strengthened the positive relationship between transformational leadership practices and
subordinate affective organizational commitment for both male and female leaders. The
relationship between transformational leadership and subordinate affective organizational
commitment was less positive when status incongruence between leaders and workers was high.
In a study of Spanish military units, Garcia-Guiu, Moya, Molero, and Moriano (2012)
found that group identification and group cohesion were moderating variables affecting the
impact of transformational leadership on the effectiveness of these units.
Yuan, Hsu, Shieh, and Li (2012) studied technology workers in Taiwan and found that
emotional intelligence played a moderating role in the effectiveness of transformational
leadership on work task performance and the development of positive organizational citizenship
behaviors.
Herrmann and Felfe (2013) examined the field of management consulting and found that
task novelty and personal initiative had moderating effects on transformational leadership and
worker creativity, determining that the influence of transformational leadership in this setting
depended upon both task and follower characteristics.
Knowledge management, power distance, structural distance, status incongruence, group
identification, group cohesion, emotional intelligence, task novelty, and personal initiative
factors all exist within educational systems and schools. The way in which these factors are
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developed and managed by principals and other administrators will likely impact and have a
moderating effect on the effectiveness of leadership styles and methods that these individuals
employ in their daily professional relationships with teachers and other staff members.

Psychological Aspects of Transformational Leadership

It has long been assumed that satisfying higher-level emotional and psychological needs
is a central mechanism through which transformational leaders influence their followers. This
assumption was confirmed by Kovjanic, Schuh, and Jonas (2013), who established causality
between transformational leadership practices, satisfaction of followers’ emotional/psychological
needs, and worker engagement. Their study found that transformational leadership satisfied
workers’ need for competence, relatedness, and autonomy, with leaders’ competence and
relational abilities directly influencing their followers’ work and workplace task engagement.
Kumako and Asumeng (2013) studied transformational leadership and followers’
psychological safety, finding a positive relationship between team psychological safety and team
learning behavior, with transformational team leadership moderating this relationship. They
found that transformational team leadership facilitated psychological safety among workers.
This was seen to be important in creating a climate that enabled team members to ask questions
and express opinions more freely, while engaging in more advanced learning behaviors; leading
to improved team performance and greater overall effectiveness.
Transformational leaders who successfully bridge the power and status differentials
between leaders and followers are more likely to have a team that feels psychologically safe and
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is better prepared to meet team and organizational goals. This is the challenge for educational
leaders, particularly in those school systems where principals or district administrators are
perceived to be “distant”, “out of touch” or unapproachable.
Team leaders’ transformational behaviors that provide idealized influence, intellectual
stimulation, individualized consideration and inspirational motivation for followers are more
likely to facilitate an organizational structure and environment that is conducive for employee
learning and professional growth.
As seen in the research cited thus far, workplace teams are more productive when team
members believe that their leader sincerely cares about their safety and well-being. The
development of trust among followers is what allows leaders to function effectively in critical
situations when success often depends upon the willingness and ability of subordinates to carry
out the leader’s directives quickly and efficiently.
When leadership authority is extended to subordinates, this may facilitate the
development of organizational trust if these subordinates also come to be seen as caring and
competent.

Contingency and Situational Leadership Models

Fiedler (1967) developed a contingency model of leadership, based upon the premise that
the most effective behavioral style of leaders is one that varies, depending upon the situation.
This theory states that task orientation (a more transactional approach) works best for leaders in
situations where the leader is viewed either extremely favorably or extremely unfavorably by
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followers, or when the leader has either a very high or a very low level of control. Conversely, a
relations-oriented method (transformational approach) is more suitable in situations where the
leader is viewed only moderately favorably, or has only a moderate level of control over
followers.
Building upon the work of Fieldler (1967), Korman (1966), and Argyris (1962), Hersey
and Blanchard (1969) also constructed a situational leadership model based on their belief that
the most effective behavioral style of leadership is one that varies with the situation, and that the
task to be accomplished and psychological maturity of the followers is crucial to determining
which behavioral style of leaders will be most effective in each particular case.
Situational Leadership as described by Hersey and Blanchard has been promoted by some
as the preferred approach for administrators in many private and public settings, including
schools and educational institutions. Indeed, principals and other school administrators may find
that they need to use different leadership methods and styles with various staff, students, parents,
and community members in order to achieve their goals.
However, questions remain as to whether leaders are able to accurately gauge the
“readiness” of followers or constituents with consistency, and whether leaders are able to meet
the needs of followers in various situations by effectively shifting their own leadership style from
one approach to another; in order to deliver the “appropriate” type of leadership under changing
internal or external conditions (Bass, 1990.)
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Directive and Participative Leadership

In distinguishing between directive and participative leadership, Tannenbaum and
Schmidt (1958) proposed that the amounts of leader direction and worker participation in
decision-making comprise opposite ends of a spectrum; between which there may be many
possible variations.
Berlew and Heller (1983) stated that directive leadership and participative leadership can
each take many different forms, depending upon how the meaning of these terms is defined.
Participative leadership implies that workers have freedom to participate actively in problemsolving and decision-making; the leader may remain an active part of this process.
Participation may also consist of delegating responsibility for decisions. However, Bass
(1985) says that this should not be confused with a laissez-faire approach. Leaders who delegate
their authority are still responsible for ensuring that workers accept and utilize the powers they
have been given. One of the risks of delegating authority to subordinates is that some
individuals may misinterpret this action of the leader’s part, and believe they have been given
more power than they actually have. This may cause problems; if followers make decisions or
take actions that are outside of their personal domain of responsibility.
However, a participative leadership style has been found to be beneficial in many
situations. Other researchers such as Coch and French (1948), Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore
(1968), and Likert (1977) all found that when workers had a voice in decision-making,
workplace productivity increased significantly, and job-related errors were reduced. Similar
positive results have been seen in studies of transformational leadership, finding that followers
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are more persistent and engaged when experiencing the sense of inclusion and autonomy that the
more participative transformational leadership style provides.

Transformational Leadership in Education

Transformational leadership has become a widely-accepted and preferred method of
leadership in schools and other educational environments. Researchers such as Popper and
Lipshitz (1992) have documented the supposed shortcomings of transactional leadership,
claiming that this style leads to short-lived, limited interactions between school administrators
and teachers that soon fade or disappear after the immediate need for these interactions has
passed.
In contrast, transformational leadership is seen to be more complex and potent because
of its potential for producing mutually-reinforcing and mutually-sustaining relationships between
teachers and their administrators that are more likely to form and persist when the motives and
goals of leaders and followers merge together (Popper & Lipshitz, 1992).
Leithwood and Jantzi (2006) found that transformational leadership styles of school
administrators had direct and indirect positive effects upon the progress of school improvement
initiatives and on teacher expectations for student achievement, by creating an expectation of
success.
Bass (1999) and Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) have stated that transformational
leadership may be more effective than transactional leadership in schools and educational
organizations, by creating a more positive and supportive climate for teachers and students alike.
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Waters, Marzano, and McNulty (2003) claim that the transformational style is the most
effective form of leadership in schools and educational institutions if the leader’s value system is
aligned with that of his or her staff, because a transformational style facilitates the creation of
shared goals and objectives that can be actively supported by all.

Summary of Leadership

Today, Transactional leadership is generally seen as heavy-handed and undesirable
whereas Transformational leadership is viewed much more favorably; particularly in educational
settings. Transformational leadership is considered enlightened and effective because it
encourages followers to become invested as active participants in the organization, rather than
passive subjects simply following orders from their superiors.
Transformational leadership may provide many benefits, particularly within the school
setting. However, it has been established that transformational leadership in a pure form is seen
rarely, if ever. Transformational practices ordinarily augment and balance transactional
leadership methods. Additionally, other participative or laissez-faire leadership methods may be
used in combination with both transactional and transformational styles.
Transformational leadership practice consists of many inter-related elements. Research
has shown that it may be difficult for both leaders and followers to accurately identify and
distinguish between these elements. There are also many components (moderators) that may
affect outcomes of transformational leadership. Situational factors and individual follower
preferences are known to play a role.
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We should be careful not to assume that transformational leadership is the best leadership
style for all places, or in all cases. Schools and educational systems are complex organizations
that may employ a very diverse group of individuals; people who perform a wide variety of
different jobs and functions. Some people are more receptive to transformational leadership
methods, and respond more positively to transformational practices than others.
Just as differentiated instruction and varied instructional methods and materials in our
schools may be provided to meet the unique needs of students, it should be recognized and
understood that different situations and unusual circumstances in schools, especially those
situations which occur during times of unusual stress such as a crisis situation or emergency
event, may call for a different leadership approach as well.
However, if followers trust and believe in their leader, then that individual may use a
different leadership style during times of emergency or crisis and still be effective, because of the
bond of respect and trust that has been created, and the credibility that has been established
through previous positive interactions with followers.
The literature related to leadership and leadership methods used during general
emergency situations and times of crisis will now be examined, as well as literature concerning
leadership during times of crisis and emergency in educational institutions and schools.

Definition of a Crisis/Emergency

In order to accurately research the topic of crisis or emergency situation leadership,
operational definitions of the terms “crisis” and “emergency” must be established. For the
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purpose of this study, “crisis” or “emergency” is determined to be an imminent situation or event
that poses great danger, and a grave threat to life and property. Examples of crisis or emergency
events include natural disasters such as tornados, hurricanes, floods, fires, blizzards, volcanic
eruptions, tsunamis, or earthquakes. Man-made events may include kidnapping, physical assault,
shootings, bombings, and terrorist attacks.
Klann (2003), states that a time of crisis is generally characterized by a high degree of
instability, and carries the potential for an extremely negative outcome. Klann further says that
because a crisis may bring the threat of physical danger such as death or serious injury or the
large-scale destruction of property, these factors can be psychologically devastating because of
the shock and terror created in those who are affected by such an event. For these reasons a
crisis or emergency typically exerts a high impact on human needs, emotions, and behaviors.
In some cases there may be forewarning of an impending crisis, while an emergency
generally occurs unexpectedly. However, a crisis and an emergency situation as defined here
each involve difficulty and danger, both of which may pose a grave threat to life and property.
Because their meanings are so similar, the terms “crisis” and “emergency” are used
interchangeably from this point forward.

Overview of Disaster Response

What was seen universally in every major disaster analysis study included for the purpose
of this review is that effective crisis response involves a highly-coordinated interaction between
a number of different agencies and individuals, across a variety of response categories and job
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functions. It was further observed that effective leadership during crisis and emergency
situations does not occur in isolation. Rather, it is the product of intensive cooperation and
interaction with others; within as well as outside of the organization.

Major Themes in the Literature

As a result of the literature review, five major themes common to all emergency/crisis
situation leadership have emerged. These are: Communication, Understanding/Sense Making,
Psychology, Decision-Making/Competence, and Response/Operations. The literature related to
each will be explained and examined in more detail.

Theme #1 – Communication

Communication is the first, and perhaps the most basic element of crisis leadership,
judging from a study of the literature related to disasters and emergencies. An effective crisis
management plan provides an organized framework for the steps and actions that may be taken
during a particular type of emergency.
However, an effective crisis response requires a coordinated effort from many different
individuals and agencies. Because of this, dependable communication systems and clear
communication protocols are essential so that leaders and support personnel from various firstresponder teams and emergency service agencies can coordinate and carry out an effective
response (Gallagher, 2007).
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Leaders must be able to gather information quickly and efficiently before, during, and after
a crisis situation. They must also be able to communicate with outside emergency response
leaders as well as with others within their own organization. The ability to adapt to changing
conditions during a crisis and execute appropriate strategies in response is widely acknowledged
as an essential component of effective leadership (McCall & Hollenbeck, 2002). Leaders must
know what is happening in order to make good decisions, and they must be able to communicate
with others in order to have their strategies and directives carried out quickly and efficiently.
Hurricane Katrina, which struck the Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana gulf coast area
in August of 2005, was one of the strongest storms in the recorded history of this region; it
proved to be a severe test for communication systems there.
In their analysis of how two different colleges in Louisiana responded after hurricane
Katrina, Collins, Savage, and Wainwright (2008) state that when Katrina hit the Pearl River, LA
Community College (PRCC) campus in the early morning hours of August 29, 2005, it wiped
out all communications, power, and municipal water service. PRCC had a traditional emergency
plan in place at the time that the campus learned of Hurricane Katrina. The plan included a
calling tree, as well as a process for communicating with staff both during and after a storm or
other natural disaster. But because electronic computer and telephone systems were down, the
college president could not send information or request help from outside agencies.
Additionally, strong winds, torrential rain, and objects such as fallen trees and concrete
benches blocking roads and pathways made it difficult for people and vehicles to move across
the large college campus. As a result, little could be done during the actual emergency. It was
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not until Katrina had passed that the PRCC president met with his leadership team and
community members (Collins, Savage, & Wainwright, 2008).
In their post-Katrina emergency response analysis, one of the primary conclusions
reached by the PRCC Emergency Response Assessment Committee is that the near-total
breakdown in communications throughout their school campus was a serious issue: They
determined that there needed to be a more reliable way to locate and communicate with faculty,
staff, and students as well as emergency responders during crisis/emergency situations such as
this.
When communications methods are not synchronized, or if communication systems fail
altogether during an emergency, then leaders of response agencies may become isolated from
each other, or even from others within their own organization. When this happens, it is not
possible to acquire, share, or transmit information and instructions as needed. Leaders are then
unable to consult with others, learn of changing conditions, create an effective response strategy,
or put a coordinated crisis response plan into effect (Koven, 2007).
Having an effective, reliable communications system is an important consideration for
schools and school districts. School buildings are often large structures; the campus of some
schools may consist of multiple buildings spread out over a wide area. Other large structures
such as athletic fields and stadiums, maintenance and storage buildings, or physical plants that
regulate HVAC and electrical services may also exist nearby. Without a robust communications
system, it may be difficult to communicate with individuals in each of these locations quickly
and effectively. This can have serious consequences during times of crisis.
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Another issue related to communication systems is compatibility. If communication
systems between response agencies do not “talk” with each other, their ability to mount a
coordinated disaster response may be severely restricted.
Interoperability is a term used to describe the ability of first responders to communicate
with each other before and during a disaster or crisis situation (Weiser, 2007). Interoperabilty
has been identified as a significant problem in many crisis situations, and failure of the
communications systems used by police officers, firemen, and emergency medical personnel has
been cited as a primary cause of injury and death during crisis events (Peha, 2007).
Writing after the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina, Brito (2007) confirmed that
interoperability issues had been a major contributing factor to the destruction caused by this
storm; numerous communication breakdowns had prevented government and local entities from
carrying out their responsibilities because critical voice and data information could not be shared.
One example of this occurred when the Shreveport, Louisiana fire department was unable
to communicate with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supervisors, as well as
with police and fire department personnel in New Orleans when they went there to assist after
Katrina. Brito found that incompatibility of the Shreveport fire department’s communication
systems with those used by FEMA and the New Orleans police and fire departments meant that
service agency personnel from each of these organizations were then forced to exchange
information through written documents and face-to-face meetings. A similar situation occurred
between local first responder personnel, both during and after Katrina. This factor caused a
significant delay in many emergency responses (Brito, 2007).
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First-responder problems with communication systems technology have been known and
acknowledged for many years. Austin and Callen (2008) studied public and government
response agencies at all levels, finding an urgent need to improve levels of interoperability and
strengthen technology systems used for this purpose.
Faulhaber (2007) states that poor communication among first-responders leads to
emergency situation events that are more deadly; because of uncoordinated rescue efforts that
endanger the lives of response personnel themselves as well as lives of people who are directly
affected by the emergency itself.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) and SAFECOM agency reports
from 2003 state that the federal government was aware of significant interoperability issues, and
had been concerned about these since the early 1970’s. Weiser (2007) identifies two primary
reasons for this:
The first is that many agencies have communication systems based on older, outdated
technology. Through a survey of first-responders, Weiser determined that in many cases the
technology employed in their communication systems was more than twenty years old.
It was also found that public safety agencies generally do not consult with each other
when selecting and implementing communications system technology. Each agency tends to
select a single-purpose communications system that best meets the specific needs of that
particular entity. And so, communications systems with broader functionality that are typically
seen in the armed forces or private sector organizations are not chosen (Dedrick, 2006).
Additional reasons given by Weiser (2007) for this situation are that different types of
public safety agencies and different levels of Federal, State, and local government have different
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sources and different levels of funding, as well as different missions and priorities. Therefore,
each agency selects a communication system based on what it can afford, and what its funding
will support; as well as the specific purpose for which it will be used.
Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2006) observed that members of the general public
quickly become aware of and utilize new advances in cellular phone and other texting/messaging
technology in their own personal communication, but that public and government agencies lag
behind.
Dedrick, Xin, and Zhu (2008) determined that the field of public administration is very
limited when developing interoperability technology theory, and slow to utilize current
communication technology to ensure that communication systems used by first responders and
other public agencies are compatible with each other.
Across a broad spectrum of different crisis and emergency situations, Kapucu (2008)
found that catastrophic disasters require intense collaboration and close cooperation between first
responders and other organizations. In order for this to occur, leaders must have robust, reliable
communications systems that can be counted on to withstand extreme conditions, and these
systems must have the ability to communicate with each other across all applications.
In many schools, principals communicate with other administrators and staff members
using a variety of methods, including email, text, cellular phones, land-line phones, and radio
(walkie-talkies.) Within school buildings, announcements for students and staff members are
often made over public address systems wired to speakers in various locations. But each of these
systems has limitations, and they are each subject to breakdowns and failure; particularly when
subjected to extreme conditions and demands.
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During hurricane Katrina, lack of effective communication among crisis leaders and
responders meant that leaders and followers did not know who was really in charge. The initial
response failure this caused led to a new stage of the disaster – a crisis of response systems
breakdown, and the ensuing chaos in the city of New Orleans that followed (Farazmand, 2007).
If one or more communication systems should fail within a school during a crisis event,
school leaders may not be able to consult with other leaders; they may be unable to receive
instruction from superiors, or give direction to subordinates. This can lead to confusion and
chaos among students and staff, especially if they hear incomplete or conflicting messages from
different sources. In this instance, school leaders may not be able to quickly pass along critical
information, or effectively disseminate important plans needed for the safety and protection of
students and staff members.
Workplace technology such as computer systems, related software applications, and
modern communications devices all provide many benefits; allowing individuals and
organizations to accomplish more and process information with greater speed and accuracy.
However, in a study of sense-making, decision-making, and overall response to natural
disaster and terror-related events in general, Boin (2006) found that at least in some instances,
having an abundance of technology may actually make effective crisis response more difficult.
The growing complexity of modern social, corporate, industrial, financial, infrastructure
management, and administration structures and systems in general may produce unforeseen
disturbances, especially if one component does not operate as it should. And if even one part of
the system should fail completely, the entire system may be compromised.
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Boin (2006) determined that with an increased dependence on technology and other
critical infrastructures in municipal services, private industry, government, and the military, there
is greater exposure to the possibility of malicious attack, and the potential for more extensive
damage to essential systems. The complexity of these systems can make it more difficult for
leaders to respond quickly and effectively when a crisis event does occur. Anticipating exactly
which technology system areas are most likely to fail or be attacked, and what the subsequent
effects of such failure or deliberate attack might be is one of the new challenges for both public
and private crisis management.
In another study comparing news media reports, government reports, and after-event
independent analysis of September 11 New York City terrorist attacks as well as hurricane
Katrina, Kapucu (2011) found that actual response networks used by local first-responders as
well as FEMA and other federal agencies differed from what had been outlined in pre-event
emergency and disaster response plans. This was due to failure of and interoperability issues
with local, state, and federal communications systems, as well as intermittent uncertainty as to
how communications should have been coordinated and carried out.
Kapucu (2011) noted that during catastrophic disasters, the communication system(s)
actually used or available for use and corresponding communication network management may
be different than what is commonly deployed during less severe disasters; which occur more
frequently and are therefore more familiar to leaders and response agency personnel.
Potential interoperability issues may exist within communication systems used by many
schools and school districts as well. There is little in the existing literature that gives an
indication of whether school administrators or others have explored this possibility. It is also
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uncertain whether principals and other educational leaders have an understanding of
communication systems used by those who will respond to school emergencies or crisis events
within their buildings, and how their own communications systems interface with the
communication systems and technologies used by outside agencies.

Theme #2 – Credibility and Authority

People may follow leaders they trust and revere because of their admiration for personal
qualities such as charisma and integrity, or those they distrust and fear out of concern for their
own well-being. Many factors may contribute toward establishing a leader’s power and
authority. However, although they may obey the orders of certain authority figures, people may
also choose not to listen to communication and information coming from leaders they perceive as
lacking credibility.
A leader’s perceived credibility in the eyes of followers contributes to his or her
leadership effectiveness; particularly during times of crisis or in emergency situations.
Noordegraaf (2011) conducted studies involving two different emergencies, a tornado
that struck Birmingham, England and a fireworks factory explosion in Enschede, the Netherlands
and found that when leaders played a caring and enabling role (Enschede), they were seen as
compassionate heroes, and there was a stronger ethos of support and “togetherness” among crisis
victims and other members of the public.
Conversely, when leaders were seen as uncaring and self-serving (Birmingham), their
directives and recommendations were largely ignored because of public distrust. In this
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situation, leadership came primarily from ordinary citizens within the community itself, who
were seen by most as honest and selfless; and therefore credible.
Both of these situations serve to illustrate that leadership style and public perception of
credibility impacts the ability of leaders to communicate, either limiting or enhancing their
capacity for effective leadership during times of crisis.
After a serious airline crash in Amsterdam, Boin (2003) found that people looked to their
“true leaders” for information and reassurance. There was a widespread distrust of regular
government officials and news media figures; individuals whom people had found to be
untruthful or unreliable in the past. And so, the public turned to local administrators and lowerranking civil officers who they believed would give them honest, accurate information.
In this case, Boin found that higher-ranking officials and more established media
personnel lacked credibility in the eyes of the public not necessarily because they were seen as
dishonest or corrupt, but due to the fact that some of these people had been overly-optimistic
during emergency and crisis situations in the past; making statements and sending out offers of
support that they ultimately could not fulfill.
In this situation, leaders said they wanted to restore public confidence and be seen as
strong figures for their nation and the local community. They also expressed a sincere desire to
help and provide victims with care. However, this attempt failed because of the complex nature
of the crisis, and the limited ability of officials to provide resources and actual support. Because
of prior unrealistic promises and their inability to follow through and deliver on these, they were
subsequently viewed by citizens as being unreliable and ineffective.

58
This has implications for school leaders as well. School district superintendents, school
presidents, and other school administrators who make “pie in the sky” promises and overlyoptimistic statements about their ability to obtain funding, provide educational materials, or raise
levels of academic achievement may lose credibility; even if they are seen as honest and wellintentioned. In times of emergency or crisis, teachers and others may then be reluctant to follow
the directives of administrators who are believed to be unrealistic in their assessment of
situations, incapable of making effective plans, or unable to obtain and deliver needed resources.

Leadership Communication Methods and Styles

In some cases, the way in which a leader communicates may be just as important, if not
more so, than the content of messages that he or she delivers. The media format(s) a leader
employs, the stylistic methods a leader uses to communicate, and the language that he or she
chooses can have a significant effect on how information is received and perceived.
In a study of leadership response to catastrophic floods in Queensland, Australia,
Debussy (2012) found that Queensland Premier Anna Bligh was seen as inspirational and
charismatic by followers because she openly expressed sadness and grief, as well as hope,
confidence, and optimism when addressing the public. In contrast, Australian Prime Minister
Julia Gillard was described as “robotic” and “disconnected” during the crisis because of her
highly-structured, emotionless communication style.
Debussy’s study supports the idea that the transformational style of leadership can be
highly effective during times of crisis. Premier Bligh was perceived to have much stronger
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transformational leadership traits than Prime Minister Gillard; people were reassured and felt
greater confidence both during and after the floods because of the more open and empowering
way in which Premier Bligh spoke with them.
Fairhurst (2009) and Martinko (2009) each found that the public expects leaders to be
present and visible during crisis situations. Public perception of a leader’s communication,
visibility, and degree of accountability for disaster response operations plays a major role in
determining how people evaluate a leader’s effectiveness during a catastrophic emergency.
Such visibility may be important for school administrators too, particularly during a crisis,
because people want to see that the leader is present and actively working on their behalf.
During and after hurricane Katrina, Louisiana governor Kathleen Blanco was widely
criticized, and her handling of the Karina disaster response was seen as ineffective although it
was later acknowledged that she spent a great deal of time and energy working to coordinate
relief efforts there. Because Governor Blanco tried to deflect criticism and used the news media
to place blame for poor disaster response on New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin and FEMA, she was
viewed by the public as unorganized and indecisive (Brinkley, 2006.)
Similarly, New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin was described by members of the public and
the news media as unprepared and lacking in leadership not only because of his own
indecisiveness and lack of accountability, but because he attempted to blame Governor Blanco
and FEMA for almost everything. It was found that the poor relationship between Governor
Blanco and Mayor Nagin contributed toward a negative public perception for both of them.
Conversely, it was seen that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s 2008 response to
wildfires in California created a positive public perception that enhanced his credibility there
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(Fairhurst, 2009). When wildfires in southern California destroyed many acres of forestland,
threatening homes and businesses, Governor Schwarzenegger arrived quickly on the scene;
meeting with people and listening to their concerns.
Governor Schwarzenegger coordinated with emergency service responders, and reassured
the public by outlining a response plan that was published in the media and broadcast on
television news reports. In this case, public response was favorable and Schwarzenegger’s
leadership was seen as highly effective, because of the “presence” that he established and the
example that he set for other emergency service leaders and coordinators.
Although it was later determined that Governor Blanco had worked very hard to help the
people of Louisiana after Katrina, her contributions were not appreciated or valued as highly,
because she worked primarily from her office (Fairhurst, 2009). As a result, the things she did
were not as visible or widely known to hurricane victims or the general public.
In late fall of 2001, there was an anthrax attack in New York City. Mayor Rudy Giulini
immediately held press conferences, during which he directly answered questions and gave
accurate, useful information while appearing with other city officials. Mayor Giuliani’s
performance during these press conferences was well-received, because he was seen to be
empathetic and involved.
It was found that Giuliani’s leadership during the anthrax outbreak was judged to be
effective not only because of the way he handled this particular situation, but also because he had
responded in similar fashion during the recent September 11 terrorist attacks (Mullin, 2010).
Because of the way he effectively handled the 9/11 attacks, Giuliani gained in public stature and
perception. This gave him more authority and credibility during the anthrax crisis that followed.
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When school leaders are able to communicate effectively and handle emergencies
successfully their credibility is enhanced as well; students, staff, and parents may then be more
willing to follow their direction during subsequent crisis events. The language and style of
delivery that a leader uses in his/her communication both before and after a crisis can also have a
significant impact upon followers.
Rudy Giuliani may have recognized this. Pennebaker (2002) conducted a review of 35
speeches given by Mayor Giuliani between 1993 and 2001, and found that Giuliani’s public
communication style changed significantly over time. Over the years, Giuliani used language
with more warmth in his speeches, incorporating more common social words and phrases. After
the September 11 attacks, Giuliani’s language in speeches became simpler, and he focused on the
future rather than the present or the past. This was seen as an attempt to relate more closely
while building connections with fellow New Yorkers; further enhancing his public image and
perception.
Martinko (2009) found that the public perception had a significant impact on how people
responded to their leaders during crisis situations, and their assessment of events and outcomes
that followed. People attributed negative crisis situation outcomes after Katrina to negative
personal qualities they had identified in their leaders (Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin), and more
favorable outcomes (people, animals, and property saved; homes spared) after the California
wildfires to the positive personal qualities they attributed to Governor Schwarzenegger.
From these examples, it seems that effective crisis leadership may consist not only of
responding to emergency situations effectively, but also of creating a positive mindset and an
expectation of positive results among followers. Leaders may attempt to accomplish this not
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only through their own words and actions during an emergency, but also by mobilizing
professional and communications networks so that a one’s interventions and contributions
toward crisis leadership are made visible, thereby establishing a strong leadership “presence” in
the eyes and minds of the public.
During a crisis event it may be helpful for principals and superintendents to be visible,
communicating effectively and often with their staff; keeping people informed not only of
changing conditions and situations, but also telling them about the steps that have been taken and
the progress that has been made in dealing with negative effects caused by the crisis. Above all,
the leader can maintain a realistic yet positive outlook; using optimistic language while creating
a belief and an expectation among followers that together, they will come through the crisis
event successfully.

Impact of Communications Media

The way in which a leader’s crisis response is portrayed through the media may also have
a significant impact on how followers evaluate his or her performance. In a review of news
articles that appeared in major newspapers during and after hurricane Katrina, Littlefield (2007)
found that the focus and tone of these articles changed over time, reflecting different phases in
their approach to coverage of this event.
At first, stories tended to concentrate on descriptions of the hurricane itself and a more
neutral view of what was happening in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Positive news
coverage was associated with action words such as “warned”, “prepared”, and “evacuated.”
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Later, the media began to judge and assign blame through more negative coverage and articles
that contained descriptive words and terms such as “overwhelmed”, “disorganized”, and
“miscommunication.” It was often seen that the point of view of a particular article was not
consistent with perceptions of other authority figures, or views held by the general public
(Littlefield, 2007).
During a rapidly-unfolding crisis in which access to official information is severely
restricted, the media may abdicate their editorial duty to weigh and assess the value of such
information, preferring to resort to inflammatory headlines. When a nuclear energy plant
accident in Chernobyl, Russia caused failure of the plant’s nuclear reactors and a subsequent
“meltdown” disaster, very little official verified information was available while this crisis was
happening, and for some time afterward. This was due not only to an ineffective, disorganized
emergency situation response, but also because of the Russian government’s tight control of the
news media there (Marples, 1988).
Because so little reliable information was available at the time, media outlets seized upon
wildly exaggerated accounts and started reporting these as fact. This caused widespread fear and
panic, especially among the local population.
The mass media comprise another important resource in crisis management. The news
media is mainly a reactive force, often obliged to depend upon information supplied by sources
closely associated with the crisis event. Because these situations are fast-moving and happen
under rapidly-changing conditions, the media often report information which, under normal
circumstances, they would reject as unsound or uncorroborated.
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Understanding this, school administrators may facilitate a more organized crisis response
by releasing a full and complete account of events as soon as this becomes known to them; in
order to prevent panic and chaos among staff, students, and the public.
Koven (2010) found that during a disaster, officials may try to “spin” the news in order to
show that they are providing strong leadership. This happened during and after hurricane
Katrina when FEMA Director Michael Brown, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, and New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin all put out announcements in which they attempted to portray
themselves as effective leaders during the crisis, while assigning blame for the poor overall
disaster response to each other.
This lack of coordination, and outright competition between Brown, Blanco, and Nagin
to show “strong leadership” also reflected poorly on President George Bush, and contributed to
an atmosphere of incompetence and chaos in the city of New Orleans (Koven, 2010).
People will judge whether principals and superintendents are in control and effectively
handling an emergency situation or crisis event by looking to see if these leaders are able to
effectively coordinate information among themselves, and if they join together in agreement
about crisis facts and strategies when making announcements to the media. Doing so projects an
image of competence and control, and is likely to elicit a more effective emergency or crisis
response among followers and the general public.
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Theme #3 - Understanding/Sense-Making

A catastrophic crisis event involving loss of human life and widespread destruction of
property can be terrifying for the public. In such a horrific situation, leaders may be hesitant to
provide very much information, especially if the information they have is extremely grim. In
order to inspire confidence in followers and convince them to remain calm, leaders may feel they
should not say anything that could increase levels of panic or fear.
However, people deserve to know, and have a fundamental need to know what is
happening during a serious public emergency. Back (2010) conducted a study of over 500,000
lines of pager texts sent and received while the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were
occurring in New York City.
Examining the contents of these messages, Back found that as the attacks unfolded
people continued to become angrier and also more anxious because they didn’t know what was
going on. However, after 2:49pm Eastern Standard Time, when Mayor Rudy Giuliani addressed
the media and issued a statement outlining the staggering number of deaths and the extent of
physical destruction caused by the attacks, text message expressions of sadness and anger
continued to rise but expressions of anxiety declined (Back, 2010).
This finding may serve to illustrate that people want to know what is happening during a
crisis, even if the news is bad. It seems that for many affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it was
most stressful simply not knowing what was going on. Once they had a clearer picture of events
on that day, they were able to focus and express their emotions.
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Leaders may believe they are reducing anxiety by withholding or delaying bad news, but
followers want and need accurate information as soon as possible both during and immediately
after a crisis, so they may start to adjust and respond to what has occurred.
Gaspar (2011) conducted a study of several hurricane and storm-related disasters in the
United States between 1970 and 2006, analyzing voting records and patterns, as well as public
opinion polls involving public officials in states affected by these disasters. Gasper found that
when the response to a particular disaster is judged to be poor, state governors are blamed for not
having provided greater preventive measures.
When people felt that a governor had responded quickly and communicated openly with
the public, they were ranked higher in opinion polls. When governors had requested federal
assistance and a disaster declaration was granted, their support among the public increased as
reflected by improved ratings in opinion polls and better election results. This seems to support
the idea that when an emergency situation is quickly addressed and an official disaster
declaration is made, victims will be less upset and angry because their plight is officially
recognized and acknowledged.

Restorative Rhetoric

First described by Spence, Lachlan, and Griffin, (2007), Restorative Rhetoric consists of
emotionally-charged proclamations and statements delivered by a leader or other significant
public figure either through the mass media, or in person. Restorative Rhetoric is created
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through a leader’s ability to genuinely identify with and give voice to the concerns and needs of
those affected by a catastrophic crisis event.
According to Spence, et al., (2007), Restorative Rhetoric serves three key purposes: (1)
Creating a sense of security during resolution of the crisis, (2) Facilitating the emotional and
psychological healing of those directly affected by the crisis as well as others who have
witnessed the event, and (3) Giving people a sense of hope by instilling a preferred vision for the
future.
Seeger and Griffin-Padgett (2010) found that while some individuals are directly
affected by a particular crisis, there also exists a wider group that has been emotionally
traumatized by the event. Leaders may use Restorative Rhetoric to help crisis victims and others
cope with the physical and emotional effects of a catastrophic emergency, serving to facilitate
the sense-making and healing process for those who must deal with what has just happened.
Griffin-Padgett (2010) compared New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani’s response to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks with New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin’s response to hurricane
Katrina in 2005 by analyzing their press conferences, interviews, and speeches given in the days,
weeks, and months following each of these disasters.
In each instance, Mayor Giuliani and Mayor Nagin maintained a constant, visible
presence in their cities throughout the crisis event; Giuliani appearing often at “Ground Zero” of
the destroyed World Trade Centers and Nagin frequently visiting those areas of New Orleans hit
hardest by the hurricane. Both mayors spoke of the brutal hardships people in these cities had to
endure, directly addressing their citizens as well as the entire nation, conveying a message to
constituents that they were concerned about their emotional and physical well-being.
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Koven (2006) states that mayor Ray Nagin believed he could do little or nothing to help
the people of New Orleans even before Katrina arrived, and so he attempted to shift culpability
onto others even before the hurricane made landfall. Both Nagin and Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Blanco quickly recognized they were unable to cope with the magnitude of the
impending storm, and began to chastise the federal government for the city’s lack of
preparedness (Brinkley, 2006, p56).
In a September 1, 2005 interview on local radio which was later broadcast over the
Internet, Nagin strongly condemned George Bush. Nagin claimed that there was an incredible
crisis happening in New Orleans, saying that thousands of people were “stuck in attics” while
others “don’t have a clue what’s going on.” Nagin appealed for reinforcements, troops, and buses
and announced that a national disaster existed that was “a major, major, major deal.” (CNN.com,
2005).
Nagin also expressed frustration at what he believed to be misdirected national priorities
such as the war in Iraq. He implored the President and the Governor of Louisiana to “get off
your asses and do something” (CNN.com, 2005). Following the radio call in, Nagin was
congratulated by local officials who felt he had given voice to the frustrations felt by many in the
New Orleans community.
Griffin-Padgett and Allison (2010) found that restorative rhetoric appears to be effective
in crisis situations when the crisis event is not a result of an organization’s unethical behavior or
a serious mistake made by corporate leaders. In these cases, the use of such rhetoric is seen
primarily as a device that a company may use to regain public confidence in its products or
services, thereby restoring its own public image.
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In their study, it was seen that true restorative rhetoric requires authentic motives, or at
least the outward appearance of authenticity from leaders. People in New York and New
Orleans believed in the authenticity of what Mayor Giuliani and Mayor Nagin were saying. Their
words resonated strongly; accurately reflecting what many in these cities were feeling and the
emotions they each expressed seemed very genuine.
This authenticity, and the ability of Giuliani and Nagin to connect with people on a
human level, gave people a sense of hope and relief while helping them make sense of what had
happened.
Both during and after a crisis event, principals and other educational leaders may help
followers understand and make sense of what has happened by communicating frequently,
directly, and openly with them. They can also give voice to the fears, frustrations, and concerns
of followers by addressing these through the media with honestly, concern, and compassion.
This facilitates the psychological healing process for students, staff, and other victims that may
be needed due to emotional trauma caused by a major emergency or time of crisis.

Theme #4 - Psychology

Catastrophic disasters can cause tremendous physical damage and destruction. After the
crisis event has passed, cleanup begins; homes, buildings, and other structures are eventually torn
down, repaired, or replaced. Restorative Rhetoric and other near-term coping mechanisms may
allow people to make sense of what has just happened and regain their psychological equilibrium
in the aftermath of disaster. But crisis events often have a more permanent psychological effect
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that can take root during the crisis, and then persist long after physical damage has been fixed
and visible evidence of the disaster no longer remains.
Repairing the physical damage caused by a catastrophic event restores needed facilities
and services. However, this process serves an additional purpose. Austin (2014) interviewed
experienced senior managers who had directed the reconstruction of city infrastructure and
restoration of public services after a crisis, and found that this repair activity went beyond simply
giving people access to basic necessities and things they needed for their daily lives. It also
helped to ease fears and emotional distress in crisis victims, by providing a visible symbol of
recovery and healing that gave people confidence, letting them know that conditions had
returned back to normal.
After a particularly violent and shocking event at a school, such as the mass shooting that
occurred at Sandy Hook (NJ) elementary , survivors and other victims may not be emotionally
prepared to return to the specific building or location where such tragedy occurred. But if strong
negative emotions or fears are not associated with a particular school or educational site, then it
may be preferable to begin cleanup, repairs, and reconstruction of the physical structure as soon
as possible.
Wright & Wordsworth (2013) conducted a study of college students in New Zealand in
order to gauge the efficacy and psychological effects of measures implemented by the college
after a series of earthquakes devastated their campus. Analysis of their data identified four major
themes relating to actions taken by university personnel following the earthquakes. These were
related to psychological and emotional needs of students, reducing student uncertainty,
programmatic/pedagogical changes to courses, and behaviors relating to communication.
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Throughout this recovery period, university administrators and instructors made a
number of adjustments to class locations, schedules, and requirements. Classes were held in
tents put up on university parking lots; some were relocated to area motels, churches, and local
corporate offices. Many courses changed to an online format. When two more significant
earthquakes hit during finals week, the exam schedule was compressed and many tests were
administered via the internet. A significant effort was made by college administrators to
maintain a positive, high-quality learning experience for their students.
Student responses indicated an appreciation for instructors who acknowledged the
difficult nature of the current educational environment and the emotional impact of what they
had been through. However, data also showed students preferred that instructors focus on the
key course topic rather than earthquake-related events. Although many had been traumatized,
they expressed a desire to return to “normal” class routines and their usual class facilities as soon
as possible (Wright & Wordsworth, 2013.)
People have a psychological need to feel “in control” of events, and their immediate
surroundings; a perceived loss of control often leads to fear and anxiety. Arceneaux (2006)
surveyed voters in Houston, TX who participated in a mayoral election following severe flooding
there and found that people evaluated local government leaders based on whether preventive
measures they believed were needed had been provided.
Arceneaux found that attribution of blame to various political leaders was shaped by the
direct experience of voters, and the amount of political information they had received. People
who could see evidence of flood prevention measures, either through direct observation or via
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pictures and descriptions given through the news media were much less harsh in their assessment
of the mayor and other political leaders.

Coping and Healing

During a crisis, people want to know who is in charge; so they may know who will
provide information and direction, and who they should blame if things go wrong. Arceneaux
(2006) discovered that for people who had experienced the Houston floods, assigning blame for
negative outcomes was not simply an outlet for anger and frustration. It also fulfilled a
fundamental need and desire to maintain a sense of control, even when things happened that
were well beyond the control of those who were there.
Restorative Rhetoric has already been cited as a coping mechanism used during and
immediately after a catastrophic crisis by civic and government leaders; to help people
understand and deal with the impact of what has just occurred. New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin
stands out because of his forceful use of restorative rhetoric during hurricane Katrina. It was
found that Nagin’s use of such rhetoric, through angry, accusatory statements broadcast by the
news media actually helped calm fears and give hope to those affected most by the storm
(Spence, et al., 2007).
It is widely acknowledged that the local, state, and federal response to Katrina was
extremely poor (CNN.com, 2006). News reports emphasized Mayor Nagin’s failure to mobilize
available resources that could have been used to help victims and prevent further deaths during
the hurricane, Governor Blanco’s failure to effectively evacuate the New Orleans area or provide
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state government assistance before Katrina hit, and the federal government’s (FEMA) failure to
provide emergency shelter, food, medical supplies, and other needed resources during and after
the storm.
After Katrina had subsided, days, weeks, and months went by and still many people were
suffering. Large parts of the city of New Orleans remained under water; and many had been
displaced from their homes. Basic services and necessities were still lacking, and people who
remained there were discouraged and distressed by what they perceived as the federal
government’s indifference to their plight (USAToday.com, 2015).
Mayor Nagin was constantly criticized in the media for the poor job he had done in New
Orleans. Still, Nagin continued to lash out at leaders in Washington and other local officials,
arguing against those who wanted to limit the rebuilding of homes and neighborhoods in New
Orleans while making additional statements accusing various individuals of racial bias.
One of the most widely-known examples of restorative rhetoric from this period occurred
during a hurricane relief concert which was held on September 2, 2005 and broadcast live by
NBC. Upon taking the stage, rapper Kanye West deviated from prepared remarks and
immediately launched into an improvised monologue that contained a number of inflammatory,
racially-charged statements, including the now-famous and oft-repeated accusation that “George
Bush doesn’t care about black people.” (NBC, 2005).
At first, concert hosts and other performers appeared to be shocked and aghast at what
West had just said. But West’s remarks resonated strongly, especially among blacks in the New
Orleans area. This statement was repeated often, particularly in the African-American
community. “George Bush doesn’t care about black people” became a rallying cry for many and
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a symbol of unity; especially in the aftermath of the Katrina when weeks and months went by
and people continued to suffer under wretched living conditions while receiving little or no
assistance from the federal government. West’s statement appeared to give voice to what many
in New Orleans were thinking and feeling.
Interestingly, several other concert performers, including those who had initially seemed
to distance themselves from West’s statement, later put out statements of their own praising
Kanye West for his courage, while agreeing with what he had said that night. Maybe this was an
attempt to repair their own public image, or perhaps they were engaging in some restorative
rhetoric of their own.
Nagin’s continued use of restorative rhetoric long after hurricane Katrina was over gave
people a sense that someone cared about them and their situation, when it appeared that most
state and federal leaders did not (Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 2010). Nagin’s use of restorative
rhetoric helped people in New Orleans deal with the long-term emotional and psychological
effects of the storm, helping them deal with losing family members and loved ones, as well as
their homes and other possessions.
After Katrina, Nagin’s rhetoric became more strident and more racially-based,
questioning the motives of local leaders and those in Washington, while accusing them of
neglect and indifference due to racial bias. Some local officials and businessmen were hesitant
to rebuild parts of New Orleans, especially areas where the land was below sea-level. But this
was where most black New Orleans city residents lived. Nagin refuted this thinking (Levy,
2005). While delivering a speech on Martin Luther King Day in January of 2006, Nagin used the
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phrase "Chocolate City" to indicate that New Orleans would remain a majority black city. He
later repeated the metaphor in several other public statements (CNN, 2006).
Nagin also said that New Orleans "will be a majority African-American city because this
is what God wants it to be.” He then condemned leaders in Washington D.C. by saying God
"sent us hurricane after hurricane after hurricane, and it's destroyed and put stress on this
country", suggesting God's disapproval of President George Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in
2003 (Washington Post, 2006).
This was something that resonated strongly with the people in New Orleans, where the
population was predominantly African-American. Lay (2009) analyzed data from pre- and postelection polls in New Orleans, finding that voter preference and behavior after hurricane Katrina
was primarily based on racial group interests.
African-Americans there overwhelmingly approved of Nagin’s rhetoric and the
comments he was making through the media. African-American voters agreed with Nagin,
blaming the federal government and not local officials for failure of the city’s levee system and
the resultant flooding caused by Katrina. Even though these same voters acknowledged that
Nagin had done a poor job in preparing for and dealing with Katrina, they still re-elected Nagin
as mayor, primarily because the aggressive restorative rhetoric approach he had used appealed to
people and gave them confidence (Lay, 2009).
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The Power of Presence

The physical presence of a leader during times of crisis gives credibility to their
restorative rhetoric; it also gives reassurance to followers. Mayor Ray Nagin’s constant presence
in the most damaged areas of New Orleans provided a powerful visual backdrop that gave added
meaning and authority to his statements. Similarly, Mayor Rudy Giuliani appeared frequently
near the damaged World Trade Centers in New York City when speaking after the terrorist
attacks there on 9/11.
In some cases, a leader’s presence may possibly avert or help calm a crisis situation.
Pinkert (2007) found that during an extended period of riots in Israel, crowd control was
achieved only after the Jerusalem city mayor made a personal appearance at the scene. In this
case, the leader’s ability to intervene while the crisis event was ongoing prevented further injury,
damage, and destruction.
This does not necessarily mean that leaders should be present only if they can do so while
the crisis event is unfolding. Three days after the 9/11 attacks, President George Bush went to
Ground Zero in New York and gave a short speech then posed with firemen on a pile of rubble
creating a powerful photo. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had caused massive physical damage,
and there was little that Bush could do to immediately help. However, being at the attack site
created a strong visual image that depicted him as concerned and caring during a crisis situation
(Ciulla, 2010).
Conversely, President Bush was not there during Katrina. On August 31, 2005, President
Bush flew back to Washington from a vacation in Texas. Dyson (2006, p71) observed that Bush
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might have stopped in New Orleans or at other locations along the battered Gulf Coast in order
to interact with the people; thereby providing both real and symbolic leadership. But he did not.
Instead, as Air Force One passed over the city of New Orleans, Bush simply had the plane
descend so he could get a better view of the devastation that had occurred below.
During this time, photographers on board were invited to take pictures of Bush surveying
the hurricane’s damage. Advisors hoped to portray Bush as a man concerned about people
affected by the tragedy of the storm. But Brinkley (2006, p408) reports that this effort backfired;
saying the resulting photos made Bush look uncaring and uninformed. These photos became a
symbol of Bush’s supposed indifference toward the plight of those affected most by the wrath of
Katrina.
Perhaps Bush felt there was little he could have done. But regardless of whether he could
have personally helped in disaster relief efforts or not, Bush could have “been there” during
Katrina. Ciulla (2010) found that a leader’s “being there” for constituents is a matter of moral
and emotional importance, even when doing so lacks immediate practical value. A leader’s
physical presence serves the expectations and needs of followers: Being present, visible, and
accessible during a crisis gives them hope and reassurance.
Similarly, school leaders who are present and visible during an emergency may give a
tangible sign that they are “taking ownership” of the event, and that they are available to help
support followers and others who need them.
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Theme #5 - Decision-Making and Competence

The easiest crisis to manage is one that never occurs. In other words, it pays for leaders
to be vigilant; anticipating and taking steps to prevent situations from happening that could lead
to an emergency or catastrophe.
Olaniran and Williams (2001) found that the concept of control is important in
anticipating and managing a crisis situation. The anticipatory model fosters vigilance and
preventive decision-making in the pre-crisis stage when warning signs of impending problems
first appear, as well as during and after a crisis event. The primary emphasis of this model is on
crisis prevention and de-escalation, achieved by paying close attention to early warning signs of
a potential crisis and then taking the action required to avoid crisis or minimize its impact if one
should develop.
Caro (2015) states that failure to heed “red flags” and other pre-crisis warning signals
often leads to systemic paralysis during emergencies; this creates chaos and delayed response
during a crisis that can be disastrous. Crisis situations hold many dangers; they challenge people
psychologically as well as physically. Supervisors, managers, and other leaders such as school
administrators who encounter crisis or emergency situations only rarely, may not understand or
fully comprehend the warning signs of potentially significant danger when these appear. These
individuals may not even realize that action is required at the onset of a crisis event, and once the
crisis has intensified they may feel confused or overwhelmed; powerless to direct or do anything.
One of the primary challenges of crisis situation leadership may consist of establishing
who will actually take control and lead during the disaster, especially if the person previously
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designated for this assignment is not present, willing, or able to do so. This can be true for
educational institutions as well.
The superintendent of a school district or president of a school is the “official”
organizational leader, but this person may not be the one best-suited for the role and may not be
able to effectively execute it under crisis conditions. If another person is assigned to take over
and direct response operations at any point during an actual emergency or crisis event, then
students, staff, and others will need to have a clear understanding of where and to whom they
should look for direction and guidance.
Boin (2009) found that catastrophic disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, terrorist
attacks, and other destructive events often have a large geographic and functional “spread.” This
means that catastrophic events can occur over a large physical area, and involve many different
emergency response agencies. This creates a power vacuum and leads to indecision or inaction
when it is not clear who “owns” the crisis, and who must deal with it.
From a survey of experienced crisis event managers, Boin (2013) determined that the ten
most important tasks for successful crisis management are:
1. Early recognition of potential crisis conditions
2. Sense-making for those who have experienced a catastrophic crisis event
3. Making correct choices when faced with critical decisions during the crisis
4. Orchestrating vertical and horizontal coordination between response agencies
5. Coupling and decoupling crisis response activities
6. Meaning-making for those who survive the crisis event.
7. Communication throughout the crisis
8. Rendering accountability for crisis-related decisions and response activities
9. Learning from the crisis in order to improve response to future crisis events
10. Enhancing resiliency of the organization and people affected by the crisis.
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Boin found that misunderstandings between crisis managers were common. It was seen
that an appreciative gap, or a difference in how people perceive and react to the same crisis event
often exists between crisis directors and managers who devise the strategic crisis response, and
operational leaders who must organize and implement crisis response plans. Boin determined
that this is because individuals may not agree on the specific cause for a particular crisis.
Complex situations triggered by a sequence of events or by multiple events that occur
simultaneously may be seen and interpreted much differently. Similarly, crisis event directors
and emergency response managers may not agree on what constitutes the most effective type of
disaster response. Valuable time is often lost while managers and leaders debate the precise
meaning of specific events, and the potential effectiveness of various possible response options
(Boin, 2013).
Boin (2013) reports that followers and the general public will assess the effectiveness of
crisis management according to whether they see response personnel “getting things done”, and
workers who are “making things happen.” Witnessing this type of activity, and seeing these
images fulfills a symbolic psychological need, and makes people feel secure by instilling the
belief that things are being taken care of.
The way in which school administrators and leaders handle a crisis by reaching out to
those affected can also impact their psychological and physical well-being. Elliott and Taylor
(2006) studied the actions of school district administrators when Hurricane Katrina struck
Louisiana’s St. Bernard Parish.
During and immediately after Katrina, many who remained in New Orleans could not
escape. In this situation, rising waters from the storm caused those who could not evacuate to
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seek shelter within the Parish; fifteen hundred people made their way to the Parish high school
and were eventually trapped there on the second floor.
In response, the school leadership team showed strong, decisive leadership in moving the
sick and disabled to the highest parts of the school, and in rationing provisions of food and water
so that these supplies would not quickly run out. School officials remained and coordinated
rescue efforts as people were gradually transported away as the storm subsided.
Decisive, effective leadership on the part of the school district superintendent and her
staff during and after this emergency was cited as an important element in maintaining morale
under difficult conditions. By observing the fact that school leaders remained calm and
confident of success, followers were inspired to remain calm and confident too, believing that
they would survive the difficult conditions created by Katrina and that they would soon be
rescued.
When crisis response is delayed or only partially implemented, people may start to
believe that crisis leaders do not know what should be done (Scholtens, 2008). This perception
may increase levels of fear and panic among followers, which can further inhibit effective crisis
response if people are reluctant to follow crisis leaders’ directives or if they act in ways that are
counter-productive to the efforts of emergency response personnel. Examples of this could
include refusal to evacuate, refusal to follow instructions given by police and other authorities, or
even looting, robbery, assault, and other types of criminal activity.
This happened during and after hurricane Katrina, when local, state, and federal agencies
and organizations were overwhelmed. Because standard communications systems that were in
place did not work, an organized response was not possible and this led to chaos. People trapped
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in the city of New Orleans soon realized that no one was coming to help them, and many
perished. Those remaining tried to escape the rising flood waters on their own and then set about
obtaining food, water, or other needed supplies in any manner that they could; breaking into
abandoned homes, stores, and businesses or stealing from other residents, as well as from tourists
and visitors who happened to be nearby (Scholtens, 2008).
Katrina clearly showed that during the acute phase of a catastrophic disaster, it may be
impossible to achieve central controlled response coordination, especially when a large portion
of the population has been affected by panic and fear.
Maintaining calm and preventing panic among students, staff, parents, and the members
of the school community during a crisis may pose a significant challenge for educational leaders
as well; since schools often concentrate a large number of people within facilities that have many
classrooms and other smaller learning spaces isolated from each other, with restricted, limited
access to exit escape routes or emergency shelters.
Based on leadership survey results from a variety of catastrophic events, Goldberg and
Blake (2018) state that during a crisis situation, it is important to consider that conditions can
change rapidly and that available information may be outdated or inaccurate. Incoming
information about crisis events needs to be examined and taken in context, with consideration
given to the potential for data inaccuracy and the possibility of misinterpretation issues,
psychological interference, and possible breakdowns in technology. Their findings emphasize
the importance of communicating concisely, precisely, and decisively during and emergency;
avoiding redundancy.
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Dolan (2006) interviewed a number of school administrators who had experienced
significant crisis events. One such individual (Gonzalez) directed response operations at a large
state university during and after several natural disaster events including hurricanes Andrew,
Ivan, and Katrina. Gonzalez states that before a crisis situation occurs a leader needs to be
proactive and have a response team already in place rather than waiting for a crisis to happen and
then trying to organize. Gonzalez claims that people on the crisis response team can’t have an
“academic modality” of “looking at the situation from every possible angle” (p.7), and says there
must be appropriate action immediately as events unfold. Gonzalez believes decisions must be
made in a timely manner, and that each person on the response team should have a clearlydefined role to play.

Crisis Response - Organization

Experienced crisis managers from many different fields all seem to agree on the need for
timely, accurate communication and a clearly-defined leadership structure with individualized
job functions and a well-established chain of command in order to deal effectively with
catastrophic emergency situations.
The need for strong, timely leadership during crisis applies equally in other emergency
response fields such as medicine. In a study of hospital emergency room trauma cases, Hoff,
Reilly, Rotondo, DiGiacomo, and Schwab (1997) found that when medical ER teams had a
designated trauma team physician-leader, team members were more likely to adhere to
Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) standards of care. It was seen that when a physician-
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leader was not present, ER personnel were more likely to deviate from ATLS treatment
protocols. Regardless of leadership style employed by the physician team leader, it was found
that simply having a strong leadership presence can help ensure that standards of emergency
medical care are maintained; by holding team members accountable for their actions.
Holcomb et al. (2002) studied medical trauma emergency response in the military; at
hospitals as well as in the field. Obtaining results similar to Hoff et al., Holcomb et al. found
that medical emergency response teams were more effective and achieved higher incident/injury
survival and recovery rates as well as reduced recovery time when a clearly-defined emergency
team leader was present; with other team members playing supporting roles.
In an observational study of various hospital and clinical medical emergency treatment
settings, Yun (2005) found that emergency medical response leadership effectiveness varied,
depending upon severity of the patient’s injury and the level of medical team members’
experience. Directive (strongly transactional) leadership was seen to be more effective (based
upon survival/recovery rate and recovery time) when the patient’s injury was more severe, or
when members of the emergency response team were less-experienced. Empowered (strongly
transformational) leadership was shown to be more effective in less-severe injury cases, or when
ER team members were more experienced.
Based upon these examples, it seems that when medical emergency response personnel
are less experienced, they may want and need more directive leadership, especially in critical
situations. When ER team members are more experienced, they may be better able to draw upon
their own knowledge. They may also be more confident in their ability to accurately apply this
knowledge and their own professional skills in treating patients.

85
In the course of this literature review, similar studies were not seen for emergency
responders in other fields. Additional research in this area may be helpful; it may be useful and
desirable to further explore the relationship between leadership presence, level of experience
among response team members, and emergency response outcomes for other types of first
responders such as police, fire, EMT, etc. in future research studies.

Crisis Response – Operations

Although crisis response plans may outline the steps to be taken in various types of crisis
or emergency situations as well as designate who is responsible for carrying out these actions,
someone must actually direct the implementation of the plan and direct response operations
before, during and after a crisis event.
Small, minor emergencies may be handled by one specific agency or even one particular
person, but large-scale, catastrophic crisis situations such as hurricanes or earthquakes require a
coordinated response involving a number of different organizations and entities that must work
together in concert (Koven, 2007).
In the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible
for handling natural disasters that may impact a significant number of people, and those that
require substantial response and resources beyond what state or local governments may have
available (FEMA, 2018). During a disaster, the Incident Commander and subordinate officials
are responsible for planning the overall incident response and managing all necessary tactical
operations. The Incident Commander reports directly to the Director of FEMA (FEMA, 2018.)
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According to FEMA, The Incident Command System (ICS) is a management system
designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a
combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating
within a common organizational structure. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely applicable.
It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a broad spectrum of
emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and manmade.
ICS is used by all levels of government—Federal, State, local, and tribal—as well as by
many private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. ICS is also applicable across
disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas:
command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. The person who
directs this response is the Incident Response Commander (IRC).
All responders, regardless of agency affiliation, must report in to receive an assignment
in accordance with the procedures established by the Incident Response Commander, and each
individual involved in incident operations will be assigned to only one supervisor (FEMA,
2016).
During a crisis situation, the Incident Commander is responsible for overall incident
management, including establishment of an Incident Command Post, establishing immediate
priorities, establishing the level of organization needed, and continuously monitoring the
operation and effectiveness of that organization, approving and implementing the Incident
Action Plan, coordinating the activities of the Command and General Staff, approving requests
for additional resources or for the release of resources, approving the use of participants,

87
volunteers, and auxiliary personnel, and authorizing the release of information to the news
media (FEMA, 2016).
Analyzing information and insight gained from emergency managers, directors, and
senior emergency response leaders involved with the September 11, 2001 New York City
terrorist attacks, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Kapucu (2006) found that members of the public
want greater state and federal leadership during exceptional catastrophic disasters such as these,
and that people expect professional emergency response managers and public leaders to do a
consistently excellent job, no matter how long the disaster might last.
From this study, in addition to analysis of previous and subsequent natural disasters and
man-made crisis events, Kapucu (2008) found that disaster management during catastrophic
situations requires intense collaboration and close cooperation between various emergency
response agencies and organizations at the national, state, and local levels.
Stern (2013) indicates that one of the primary responsibilities of crisis response
leadership includes planning and making preparations for future possible crisis events. However,
it is extremely difficult to anticipate and plan for every possible contingency, and every different
type of emergency situation that might occur.
Kapucu (2011) found that emergency response network procedures actually used during
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and the September 2005 landfall of
hurricane Katrina in New Orleans were different than those that had been laid out in prior
emergency disaster response plans. Due to the highly-unpredictable nature of catastrophic
disaster events, management of the emergency response network in these cases has proven to be
different from, and more challenging than management of less-extreme disaster response efforts.
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This is due, at least in part, to the fact that less-extreme disasters occur more often, thus
giving crisis situation leaders and emergency response personnel more experience in dealing
with these events. With this experience comes repetition and knowledge, which may be applied
again in the future when confronted with similar situations.
However, just being familiar with crisis response plans and practicing crisis response
activities may not be adequate preparation for leading effectively during an emergency situation,
and especially when faced with a catastrophic crisis event. In a study of public health and safety
crisis leadership, Hadley (2011) found that emergency leadership efficacy depended to a lesser
extent on simply knowing crisis response procedures, and much more soon the leader’s ability to
understand and process information quickly, and then improvise an effective response in a
rapidly-changing and unpredictable environment.
Low (2008), in describing the use of crisis response teams to help students and staff after
a crisis event, explains that many school administrators may react slowly or ineffectively during
a crisis because the educational leader’s fear of being viewed as inadequate was strong. Low
cites the work of Johnson (2001): “Administrators are under tremendous stress during a crisis
situation, often feeling personally responsible for both the incident and the outcome” (p. 106).
Farazmand (2007) found that anticipation is a key element of both emergency and crisis
event management. During hurricane Katrina, lack of effective communication among crisis
leaders and responders meant that leaders and followers did not know who was really in charge.
The initial response failure this caused led to a new stage of the disaster – a crisis of response
systems breakdown, and the ensuing chaos in New Orleans that followed.
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Failure to provide not just effective emergency response during and after Katrina, but
neglecting to give “chaos” training; giving leaders practice and developing their skills in
adapting to a variety of different scenarios they might be confronted with during a crisis situation
was cited as a major failure of city, state, and federal disaster response agencies.
Farazmand (2007) advocates for such chaos training, teaching how to handle and adapt to
unexpected and chaotic conditions, as a way to build emergency response and crisis management
capacity in crisis management leaders and first responders such as police and fire department
personnel.
On May 12, 2008, a large area in Sichuan Province, China was shaken by an extremely
strong and long-lasting earthquake that registered a Richter Scale magnitude of 8.0. As a result
of this event, 69,227 Chinese citizens were killed, 374,643 were injured, and 17,923 were
missing. (Lin, Ashkenazi, Dorn, & Savoia, 2014). In response, the Chinese government
stablished an emergency response command, with the Chinese Premier taking the post of
Commander-in-Chief.
Premier Wen Jiabao went to the disaster scene 90 minutes after the earthquake began in
order to personally direct rescue and recovery efforts. It was reported in the media that his
presence there had a positive impact on subsequent crisis response decisions, because he had
first-hand knowledge of the situation and a clear understanding of the disaster’s magnitude and
effect (Lin et al., 2014).
Premier Jiabao declared the need to engage the People’s Liberation Army, as well as
armed national police and fire fighters, who all operated under the unified guidance of China’s
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Central Military Commission. However this vertical command system, with its strict chain of
authority, led to excessive intervention of these supervising agencies (Lin et al., 2014).
Because of this, local leaders and emergency response personnel were hesitant to act
without direct orders or authorization from the central command. This led to delays, which were
found to have restricted the ability of local disaster relief and emergency response personnel to
carry out their duties in providing needed food, medical care, and other essential services for
earthquake victims. It was determined that these delays increased the number of deaths
attributed to the disaster (Lin et al., 2014).
The studies previously cited in this review have shown that strong, decisive leadership is
a key element in dealing effectively with crisis and emergency situations. However, leaders
must also be able to sort and process information quickly and accurately, while communicating
effectively with managers and first responder personnel in the field.
During the Sichuan earthquake, China’s central command system may have been a
benefit in providing a strong leadership presence and clear directives for workers to follow. But
in some ways this strong presence proved to be a hindrance, especially when national leaders
were not familiar with local geography, language, and the availability of resources that could
have been used to help more earthquake victims faster, and more efficiently.
While strong, competent leadership is needed during a crisis, it is also vital that leaders
have the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and some degree of experience with
situational dynamics. Practicing response techniques to simulated emergencies has shown to be
helpful in this regard; developing skills in “improvising” responses to unusual circumstances or
uncommon situations has proven to be valuable as well.
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Existing literature gives no indication whether this concept has been considered or
applied within schools and other educational settings on a consistent basis. However, similar
practice and training may prove to be useful for school administrators. Simulated crisis events
could give educational leaders experience in implementing their crisis response plan while
interacting with local first responder personnel. Incorporating “surprise” elements would test a
leader’s ability to process unexpected factors while improvising an appropriate response to
changing conditions.
Steinman (2012) conducted a study of hospital emergency room personnel both before
and after receiving team training involving a 4-hour disaster response simulation. It was seen
that after completing this training, teamwork among ER personnel improved significantly and
the time needed to complete routine patient care tasks was reduced.
Similarly, Capella (2010) studied medical emergency room personnel both before and
after receiving specialized disaster response team training. Capella found that after receiving
training,

ER doctors and supervisors demonstrated stronger leadership, and ER personnel

showed more cohesive teamwork. This led to faster delivery of medical testing procedures, more
effective medical interventions, and more efficient transfer of patients to and from triage,
treatment locations, and operating room areas.
In another study of hospital emergency room trauma cases, Lubbert (2009) found that
when medical response teams had no clear leader, errors in ER intake and treatment team
organization led to more errors in routine treatment tasks and procedures. It was seen that these
errors were significantly reduced when a recognized leader was in charge. Lubbert concluded
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that people are more accountable and attentive when an acknowledged supervisor is present,
particularly when this individual provides competent, decisive leadership.
Sakran (2012) studied trauma resuscitation team members’ performance in clinical
settings as well as in the field during response to catastrophic disasters, and measured workers’
perceptions of their supervising physician’s leadership qualities using the modified Campbell
Leadership Descriptor Survey. High leadership quality as indicated by a high CLDS score
correlated directly with high leader visibility, competence, and strong, directive leadership
qualities. These elements were directly associated with less delay in accomplishing ATLSrelated medical treatment tasks and procedures.
In Ford’s (2016) study of emergency situation medical resuscitation and treatment in the
field, it was found that competent, decisive leadership improves and speeds processes of care in
trauma resuscitation. Ford saw that the ability of supervising doctors and physicians to
accurately assess patient symptoms and medical information and then choose the most effective
treatment options was crucial to obtaining the best patient outcomes.
However, physician-leaders who actively participated in patient care by performing
medical procedures themselves were found to have lower overall team performance scores.
Other supervising physicians who did not actively participate in administering medical treatment
had higher scores. This was attributed to the fact that these physician-leaders were able to focus
on overseeing, monitoring, and actively directing the work of other treatment team members
(Ford, 2016).
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Crisis Situations in Schools

Existing literature does not indicate if a directive leadership style or the more
participative “team-oriented” leadership approach is used most often during in schools and
educational settings when administrators are faced with actual emergencies. It may be useful to
know which approach is more common, and which has been observed to be more effective in
responding to school-related crisis events.
Little research has been done specifically in the area of educational leadership during
school emergency or crisis situations. Although studies have been conducted involving the
recovery of schools and educational systems after crisis events, only a small amount of
information is available concerning the actual performance and leadership of public and private
school administrators when faced with specific emergency situations.

Literature Review Summary

Throughout this review of the literature, researchers and authors have consistently cited the
following as the essential components of effective crisis response:


A robust, reliable communications network



Effective communications systems



Comprehensive crisis response plans



A formal management structure



Clearly-defined roles and responsibilities for personnel at each position
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For crisis response leaders, this includes:


Ability to acquire and process information quickly



Ability to formulate an effective response to crisis situation events



Clear, honest, and direct communication with subordinates and the public



The willingness and ability to take decisive action when needed

In implementing an effective crisis event response that is consistent with contingency
leadership theory, these components are most frequently utilized within the framework of a
highly-structured, transactional leadership approach. Strong, directive leadership is seen almost
universally as the most appropriate and effective leadership style when responding to crisis or
emergency situation events, particularly during catastrophic emergencies.
Transformational or participative leadership, using a consultative approach that involves
delegating authority and decision-making by consensus has been observed in some cases, and
has shown to be beneficial under some circumstances. But overall, the transformational
approach has been found to be impractical in most crisis and emergency situations where time is
of the essence and when decisions and actions must be taken quickly, often on the basis of partial
or limited information.
Throughout this review of the literature, we see that strong, directive leadership is the
primary style used by crisis response directors, first-responder organization leaders in police and
fire departments, emergency medical treatment doctors and supervisors, federal, state, and local
emergency response leaders, and officers in every branch of the military.
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During a crisis event, followers need to know who is in command. Listening to several
different managers and hearing conflicting instructions from them can lead to disorganization,
confusion, and chaos. Followers need to understand exactly who is in charge, so they know
where to go for information and direction.
Consistent with contingency leadership theory, we see that crisis response leaders employ
techniques that yield efficient teamwork, from groups whose members exhibit a high degree of
maturity and respect for each other as well as their leader. This is one of the keys to effective
crisis situation response and survival, and to helping others survive these situations as well. The
examples cited in this review of the literature bear out this principle; as do studies of military
personnel and others who must operate under similar circumstances.
In an emergency response environment, the leadership techniques that produce this type
of coordinated teamwork correspond closely with a transactional leadership style. But even
within a strong transactional framework, the inclusion of transformational elements may prove to
be useful. Bass (1985) found that transformational leadership supports and strengthens the
effects of transactional leadership, demonstrating through a study of military officers and
industrial managers that augmented transformational leadership had a significant incremental
effect over and above a heavily transactional leadership style
We have seen that in emergency and crisis situations, team member cohesion is critical.
A leader must have credibility in order to elicit a positive response, and prompt action from
followers. When time is of the essence, subordinates must believe in the leader’s competence in
order to accept and follow directives from their leader without question. Similarly, leaders need
to know that they can depend upon followers to carry out directives precisely, without delay.
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Using the leadership methods that most effectively create team cohesion and generate prompt
action from followers directly echoes the fundamental principles of contingency leadership
theory.
Dirks and Ferrin (2002) identified trust as the foundation upon which organizational
cohesion is built. Trust is what bonds people together and allows them to work cooperatively
toward shared objectives and goals; promoting group welfare even at the risk of personal cost.
This is a critical factor for leadership, particularly in dangerous or hazardous situations when
soldiers, law enforcement, health professionals, and other first-responders may be called upon to
risk injury or death in order to carry out the group’s mission.
Lapidot, Kark, and Shamir (2007) found leader competence to be the most important
factor in establishing trust among followers. However, competence extends far beyond having
technical knowledge or situational experience. It also entails analytical and decision-making
abilities, as well as stress management skills. Under challenging conditions, group members
must depend upon the leader’s expertise and judgment to plan and execute operations
successfully.
As described by Heifetz and Linsky (2017), the way that a particular situation develops
and unfolds may be influenced just as much by the prior attitudes and actions of subordinates or
those without direct decision-making power, as by the regulatory policies and response actions of
administrators, supervisors, and managers; those who have direct decision-making power and
control.
During emergencies and crisis events, a contingency-based leader will consider prior
historical events as well as the attitudes and viewpoints of individuals affected by the current
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emergency situation, in addition to evaluating the immediate physical environment. Doing so
allows the leader to anticipate further problems and human issues that could arise. This means
taking appropriate actions, and making needed adaptations with the least risk possible to
followers’ lives. Having the knowledge, judgment, and skills to accomplish this will depend on
the leader’s accurate perception of environment and external conditions, as well as a willingness
and ability to understand followers; providing the leadership characteristics and actions that
subordinates most desire and trust (Heifetz & Linsky, 2017.)
It remains to be seen whether school district superintendents and school presidents
generally attempt to establish such competence and trust with subordinates and followers by
utilizing contingency-based leadership principles prior to facing actual emergency or crisis
situations, and whether there is agreement among superintendents and other educational leaders
as to the specific leadership behaviors and practices most important in effectively handling actual
school and school community emergencies; both during and after a crisis event.
Most importantly, the researcher desires to know if, and if so to what extent, school
superintendents and school presidents apply contingency-based leadership principles and
demonstrate contingency leadership practices when dealing with significant school emergency
situations or school-related crisis events. Comparing school district superintendents’ and school
presidents’ leadership actions and styles during crisis events to those that they normally use
during non-emergency periods may also reveal how these administrators’ prior leadership
beliefs, orientation, and training both influenced and impacted their overall leadership approach
and effectiveness while directing a crisis event response in their own school or school district.

CHAPTER THREE – THE STUDY
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Purpose

A review of existing literature reveals that effective leadership during a crisis can have an
immediate and significant impact on the progression and ultimate outcome of a crisis situation.
The way in which school administrators organize and lead their schools or school
districts is a direct reflection of their personal leadership philosophy, and their preferred
leadership styles. The research study proposed will examine emergency/crisis leadership actions
and styles utilized by school district superintendents and school presidents through the lens of
contingency leadership theory; comparing their actions and styles to the overall leadership
approach that these individuals normally use when leading their schools and directing significant
educational initiatives during normal, non-emergency periods.
The researcher has identified a substantial gap and believes that this proposed study has
the potential to make significant additions to our current knowledge and understanding of
effective contingency-based leadership, as well as how contingency-based leadership may be
applied most effectively during school-related emergencies. The researcher believes that
acquiring this information directly, from school leaders who have experienced emergency
situations firsthand, will contribute significantly to the limited body of knowledge that currently
exists related to emergency situation management and crisis response leadership in our schools.
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Discovering the leadership methods and styles preferred by school district
superintendents and school presidents during normal, non-emergency periods and determining
the extent to which these administrators regularly used various types of situational, contingencybased principles or other specific leadership constructs prior to facing actual emergency and
crisis situations will allow the researcher to assess and better understand how and why each
district superintendent or school president maintained, adapted, or changed his or her usual
leadership style and approach when faced with a major school-related emergency.
By gathering information from school district superintendents and school presidents for
the purpose of learning about his/her preferred general leadership philosophy and methods used
during normal, non-emergency periods, and then comparing this to the leadership actions and
style each administrator utilized during times of crisis, we may discern the extent to which
normal, non-emergency leadership principles influenced and informed his/her overall leadership
approach during emergency situations. The researcher will also seek to determine how each
superintendent or school president decided upon the specific leadership strategy that he/she
employed when dealing with a specific school-related emergency situation, as well as the
challenges that he/she faced in the process of transitioning from non-emergency leadership into
his/her chosen crisis leadership mode.
In this study, several key elements of contingency-based leadership will be considered.
The task/relationship preferences of school district superintendents and school presidents will be
examined. The extent to which these leaders formulate and implement responses to emergency
and crisis events by consulting and cooperating with superiors, such as school board members or
board of directors members, and their own staff members will be investigated. The degree to
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which leaders delegate authority to subordinates for the purpose of carrying out particular
emergency situation/crisis response actions will also be explored
Within the context of these actions, evidence related to the leaders’ views and perceptions
of subordinates’ maturity, capacity for accepting responsibility, and levels of trust among staff,
emergency/crisis response team members and/or other followers will also be collected and
analyzed.

Research Question

The primary research question to be answered by the proposed study is as follows:



Are contingency-based leadership principles evidenced in the actions and leadership
styles of school district superintendents, CEOs, and school presidents when formulating
and implementing a response to school-related emergency situations and crisis events?

Research Design

The research study proposed utilizes a qualitative design. Qualitative research is
exploratory in nature, based upon fundamental concepts of the scientific method. While the
scientific method may sometimes make use of quantitative data, it is primarily concerned with
investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous
knowledge to expand upon or clarify existing theory (Johnson & Christensen, 2014).
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The researcher first wishes to learn whether school district superintendents and school
presidents utilize contingency-based leadership principles when responding to school-related
emergency situations or crisis events. If so, the researcher then desires to know and understand
the extent to which these principles were used, and in what context(s) they have been applied.
A qualitative-based approach is the most appropriate method for this study because the
researcher desires to find out not just how often or to what degree various leaderships styles and
actions have been employed during crisis events and emergency situations, but also how these
styles and techniques have been applied, as well as why school administrators have employed the
specific crisis-leadership response methods that they have chosen to use.
With this information, school district superintendents, and school presidents’ beliefs and
perceptions regarding the effectiveness of contingency-based transformational and transactional
leadership and the specific methods that they have personally used during emergency situations
or times of crisis may be revealed. The collective experience of these individuals should provide
relevant and instructive examples; illustrating how contingency-based leadership methods and
actions have led to various results and outcomes during various school-related emergencies and
crisis events.
Case study research is the specific qualitative approach proposed for this particular study.
A case is defined as a bounded system (Johnson & Christensen, 2014). For the purpose of this
research, each included school or school district community will be thought of as a bounded
system - a set of interrelated elements that combine to form an organized whole. As such, Stake
(1995) believes that the proper approach is to study each case in depth, with an emphasis on
learning them well in order to gain a thorough understanding of what makes each one unique.
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For this project, a collective case study is most appropriate because the researcher
believes that greater insight may be gained by concurrently studying multiple cases; comparing
these for both congruency and divergence. The researcher intends to apply in-depth analysis
when examining the selected topic in each case, and therefore proposes to set the number of
cases for inclusion in this study at four.
Each case has an internal and an external context (Johnson & Christensen, 2014).
To see how each school or school district functions in an emergency or during a time of crisis,
each of these entities will be further defined and described holistically in terms of their own
unique educational and administrative structure. To gain an understanding of external context,
the researcher will look at the geographic area in which each school or school district is located,
as well as the political, economic, and demographic characteristics of the communities that they
serve.
Because the researcher desires a deep understanding of how different school
administrators have experienced and directed response actions during various school and school
community emergency situations and crisis events, each case chosen for inclusion will be
represented solely by its designated organizational leader – the school president, or school
district superintendent.
To achieve this detailed understanding, a fluid narrative inquiry approach will be used.
People give meaning to experiences and interactions with others through stories, using story to
interpret events and explain (Clandinin, 2007). Narrative inquiry involves the study of
experience through story. As stated by Connelly and Clandinin (2006, p.375), “to use narrative
inquiry methodology is to adopt a particular view of experience.” As described by Clandinin
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(2007), there is now a well-established view of narrative inquiry as a methodology through
which researchers inquire into the phenomenon of experience when experience is understood as
a narrative phenomenon.
Clandinin and Rosiek (2007, pp 42-43) further explained that the narrative inquiry
conception of experience builds on John Dewey’s philosophy of experience, which has two
criteria: Continuity of experience, and interaction between each person and his or her situation.
The focus of narrative inquiry then is not just on an individual’s experience, but also on the
social, cultural, and institutional narratives within which individuals’ experiences are
constituted, shaped, expressed, and enacted.
Because of this, the researcher will conduct uniquely-tailored one-on-one interviews with
study participants. Through this process, participants will be asked to tell about their own school
crisis experiences so that they may confidentially express their own personal account of these
situations.
Central to this is an understanding that in addition to the social, cultural, and institutional
narratives just mentioned, the telling of each participant’s story, or the relating of a narrative of
their own experience which includes their individual views, beliefs, and assessments concerning
situation events, reactions, and outcomes, necessarily occurs in the relational space between the
researcher and participant and is therefore also a product of this relationship (Johnson &
Christensen, 2014).
Remaining mindful of this relationship throughout, the researcher will share of his own
experiences with study participants where appropriate; maintaining neutrality and suspending
judgment. The process of coming alongside study participants when engaging in narrative
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inquiry into participants’ experiences and stories requires the researcher to engage in narrative
inquiry into his own experiences and stories. The interaction between participants and
researchers as lived and told stories are shared is known as retelling stories. (Johnson &
Christensen, 2014).
As the researcher comes alongside participants and as stories are retold and shared, the
social and relational narratives affecting these stories may be changed. Because of this,
additional relevant information or deeper insight into the description of events within the stories
may be gained. This process may also lead to improved communication that will generate more
introspective, thoughtful commentary from study participants.
By securing school district superintendents and school presidents who each have
experience with different types of school emergency and crisis events, representing schools and
school districts that have different geographic, cultural, and socio-economic makeups, the
researcher will obtain a variety of viewpoints regarding the perceived effectiveness of
contingency-based transformational and transactional crisis leadership actions and styles across a
varied set of emergency situation circumstances.
The researcher will then attempt to find common themes among these varied settings and
responses; analyzing and synthesizing information provided by participants along with other
evidence and facts; in order to draw reasoned conclusions.
In this study, a sequential qualitative plan is proposed. The researcher will first
administer a descriptive survey in order to gain basic qualitative information regarding the
general background and work history of school administrators, as well as their level of
experience with specific school-based crisis and emergency situations. This part of the survey
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will include approximately 5-6 open-ended questions, allowing survey respondents the
opportunity to provide as much information on these topics as they wish. In order to achieve
standardization, all survey participants will answer the same set of questions.
In this survey, school administrators will also be asked about their perceptions of general
leadership elements that they might employed to handle crisis events, or during normal, nonemergency periods. These elements may include things such as their communication with
subordinates, or their typical practices when analyzing problems or making decisions. It is
expected that survey results obtained in this first step will facilitate the refinement of specific
targeted questions to be used during the qualitative interview phase.
During the second phase, interviews will be conducted with participants using a semistructured interview template. Participants will be asked to tell the story of their own school
emergency situation or school/school district crisis event, expanding upon the answers they gave
to questions regarding school emergencies and crisis events during the initial quantitative phase,
describing in more detail the specific leadership actions and techniques they used to deal with
these situations.
During this phase, the researcher will guide the conversations using a pre-established
interview protocol, asking each study participant critical questions concerning contingency-based
leadership principles that will require participants to assess their own crisis response actions
within this context. A number of self-reflective questions will also be asked. These will require
participants to consider and compare the leadership actions and styles they prefer during normal,
non-emergency periods to the actions and styles they actually used while engaged in the process
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of formulating and implementing a coordinated response to the emergency situation/crisis event
in their own school or school district.
The purpose of this approach is to elicit more detailed explanations from participants
concerning what they believe to be the specific elements necessary for effective general
leadership under ordinary conditions compared with effective school emergency/crisis event
leadership, as well as their insights regarding the specific leadership principles and practices that
they believe are most effective under each of these circumstances.
While the researcher desires consistency in obtaining qualitative information from survey
participants on the same leadership and crisis event topics, maintaining flexibility during the oneon-one interview sessions may provide an opportunity to gain greater insight by allowing the
researcher to probe more deeply into areas of interest that come up during the qualitative survey
phase, thereby providing a richer source of information for analysis.
As described by Weiss (1994), interviewing can provide the researcher a valuable
description of actions and events that have occurred in the past. Because some survey questions
in the proposed study will be based on prior crisis events, interviewing should provide data
regarding the experiences of subjects during past emergency situations, for which no
observational access is possible.
In the course of this proposed study, the researcher will conduct an in-depth inquiry by
recording detailed interviews that capture direct quotations; accurately reflecting the experiences
and perspectives of study participants in their own words. The researcher will adopt an
empathetic yet neutral interviewing stance, by sharing of his own experience and insights while
listening to the thoughts and ideas of participants without judgment. The researcher will
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maintain openness, respect, and sensitivity, while being fully present at all times during the
interview process; mindful that recalling and talking about the specifics of particular school
emergency situations may generate an emotional response for some.
If it appears that a participant is experiencing difficulty or discomfort as a result of this
interview conversation, the researcher will talk with the participant and ask if they wish to pause
or terminate the session. The researcher will also remind participants that their inclusion in the
study is completely voluntary; they may decline to answer particular questions and they are free
to withdraw from the study at any time.
As interviews proceed, the researcher will keep in mind that although general elements in
each individual case may be similar, each case situation is also somewhat unique. Qualitative
research principles (Patton, 2002) tell us that context is important in understanding each
particular case.
Fiedler (1967) advanced the idea central to the concept of contingency theory that
effective leadership takes into account available contingencies and selects an appropriate balance
of practices according to the situational context that exists in a particular place, at a particular
period in time. In order to understand and assess human reactions and decisions during
emergencies and times of crisis, we need to understand the environment and situational context
in which these decisions are made.
Leadership decisions made during each school-related emergency situation or crisis event
included in this study will be analyzed within the social and historical context unique to that
particular school, school district, and school community. For the purpose of describing
environment and defining context, basic demographic information outlining the population,
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economic level, and ethnic/cultural makeup the schools, school districts, and communities served
by these schools and school districts may be considered. This information is intended to clarify
and provide a better understanding of actions taken during emergencies within these
communities, as well as statements made and viewpoints held by study participants.
The researcher will also attempt to identify and recognize his own biases related to the
study topic and work to minimize these, in order to bring as much objectivity and balance as
possible to his interaction with study participants, and also in the analysis of study information
obtained. All of the actions that the researcher will take, and the principles that he will adhere to
while conducting this research align with the twelve major characteristics of qualitative research
outlined by Patton (2002):

1. Naturalistic Inquiry – The researcher studies real-world situations as they unfold
naturally
2. Emergent Design Flexibility – The researcher is open to adapting the inquiry,
pursuing new paths of discovery as these emerge.
3. Purposeful Sampling – Cases are chosen for study that are “information rich” and
offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest.
4. Inquiry in Depth – Consisting of qualitative observations that yield detailed, “thick”
description.
5. Personal Experience and Engagement – The researcher directly contacts and gets
close to the people, situation, and phenomenon being studied.
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6. Empathetic Neutrality and Mindfulness – The researcher adopts an empathetic
interviewing stance, seeking vicarious understanding without judgment.
7. Dynamic Systems – The researcher pays attention to process, assuming change is
always ongoing.
8. Unique Case Orientation – The researcher looks at each case as being special and
unique.
9. Inductive Analysis and Creative Synthesis – The researcher seeks immersion in the
details and specifics of the information to discover important patterns, themes, and
inter-relationships.
10. Holistic Perspective – The phenomenon being studied is understood as a complex
system which is more than the sum of its parts.
11. Context Sensitivity – The researcher places findings in a social, historical, and
temporal context and is careful about the possibility of meaningfulness of
generalizations across time and place.
12. Voice, Perspective, and Reflexivity – The researcher owns and is reflective about his
or her own voice and perspective, conveying authenticity and trustworthiness.

As evidence is collected throughout the initial and secondary phases, these pieces will be
compared through a process of triangulation. This process, as outlined by Fielding & Fielding
(1986), is designed to see whether convergence, correspondence, and corroboration can be
shown between the results obtained from the various research techniques employed. If so, then
the accuracy and credibility of conclusions drawn from these results may be enhanced.
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The process of data triangulation compares information obtained from different sources,
or by using different methods. In this proposed study, the researcher will gain information about
the perceived effectiveness of various leadership actions and techniques employed by different
school administrators; school district superintendents and school presidents who have actually
experienced crisis and emergency situations at their schools or in their school districts and
communities. The information and descriptions obtained will then be “triangulated”, or
examined to see where significant continuities and discontinuities exist.
Because the researcher intends to include four school district superintendents or school
presidents in the study who have each experienced a different type of crisis event, it is very
possible and perhaps almost a certainty that significant variations will exist in the interview
narratives collected from these different individuals describing their own unique situations. Due
to this probability, the researcher’s triangulation focus will be on internal consistency.
Throughout each one-on-one interview, each participant will be asked several questions;
posed in different forms but designed to elicit the same descriptive information concerning the
participant’s crisis response leadership actions and style, as well as their general leadership
philosophy and practice. For example, the researcher may ask participants to explain their
general approach to leadership. Later in the interview, participants may be asked how they
believe school staff members would describe them as a leader. The participants might then be
asked to describe how they would lead the process of implementing a significant new initiative
in their school or school district. Afterward, as the researcher goes through the interview
transcripts and recordings, each participant’s answers to these questions will be examined and
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compared through a process of triangulation; to see if their responses remain consistent
throughout. If so, then the responses given by participants are more likely to be valid.
However, triangulation is more than a process designed to simply confirm the validity of
data obtained through various methods. Patton (2002) states that finding differences in the
information obtained through use of multiple techniques is not unusual. In fact, this occurrence
should be expected; because each research approach will have its own unique strengths.
According to Patton, finding such inconsistencies should not diminish the importance of the
evidence. Rather, it provides an opportunity to question further and discover deeper
relationships and additional meaning contained within these descriptions.
In each case, considering and assessing the descriptive responses given by participants
during the early portion of each interview session should provide additional insight that will
guide the researcher’s approach as he formulates and poses further questions to study
participants, encouraging participants to express their feelings, insights, and views openly while
exploring the unique experiences and perspectives that participants may be expected to provide.
After personal interviews with participants have been completed and as the researcher considers
the information obtained, other questions may arise. In this case, the researcher may contact
participants again via phone or email, seeking additional insight or clarification.

Study Participants

Purposive sampling, as described by Johnson & Christensen (2014), consists of
identifying individuals who fit specific characteristics as part of a population that the researcher
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wishes to study. A non-random “snowball” method will be used to select participants for the
proposed research. This group will consist of approximately four public school district
superintendents or school presidents who have leadership experience in leading public or private
unit, elementary, high schools, or school districts; or a college/university during significant
school-related emergency situations or crisis events.
The researcher will ask colleagues to recommend candidates who may be qualified and
willing to participate in the study. Individuals who are willing to do so will then be asked to
recommend other school administrators they know who may also be qualified. In this way, word
of the proposed study will be passed along to a greater and greater number of people. Similarly,
members of professional organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association and the Illinois
Association of School Administrators will also be asked to participate in the search, and to
recommend colleagues for inclusion in the study.
For the purpose of recruiting participants, a description of the study will be written that
outlines its purpose along with a statement that each prospective participant must be a current or
retired school district superintendent or school president who held this position during a
significant qualifying school district- or school-related crisis or emergency situation, as defined
by the following characteristics: A situation that posed an imminent, serious hazard including a
grave threat to life and property; further defined to include: Fire, earthquake, tornado, hurricane,
tropical storm, flood, blizzard, armed intruder, bomb threat, bombing, terrorist attack, shooting,
kidnapping, hostage-taking, chemical/biological attack, bus or automobile accident, or
unexpected death of a student or staff member.
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All school district superintendents and school presidents who have experienced one or
more of the identified naturally-occurring or man-made crisis situations will be considered for
inclusion. However, so that a wider range of situations and response actions may be studied and
compared, the researcher will secure participation from school district superintendents and
school presidents who have all experienced different types of school emergency or crisis events.
LeCompte & Priessle (1993) used the term criterion-based selection to describe the
process of choosing participants who can provide specific information that the researcher needs.
Patton (1987, 1990) called this purposeful sampling, or purposive sampling. By using a
purposive sampling strategy to identify participants who fit the criteria outlined, the researcher
will be able to obtain survey and interview responses and personal accounts from school district
superintendents and school presidents who have each formulated and implemented crisis and
emergency action plans in response to specific identified types of major crisis events. The goal
of this process is to obtain information concerning leadership actions and methods utilized over a
wide range of school-related emergency and crisis situations.
After this information is obtained and initially coded, the researcher will examine
participants’ survey responses and interview accounts for evidence of contingency-based
leadership actions and principles. If evidence of these actions and principles is found, the
researcher will look to see how much variability exists in the degree to which contingency-based
leadership was used by participants, and the level of consistency concerning the way(s) in which
contingency-based leadership principles were applied by participants while responding to
emergency situations and crisis events in their schools.
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If the initial information and evidence is unclear, incomplete, or raises issues that the
researcher believes merit a different focus and/or further refinement, then additional sampling
techniques such as extreme-case, critical-case (Patton, 1990), or mixed-purposeful sampling
(Patton, 1987) may be employed if particularly unique or significant findings are revealed.
If individuals are identified who have experienced a significant success or epic failure
when dealing with a school crisis event, then it may be useful to examine these extreme cases in
more detail to discover precisely which factors and leadership decisions led to these highly
successful or disastrous outcomes.
If participants are identified who have experienced a landmark crisis event or emergency
situation such as Hurricane Katrina or the 9/11 New York City terrorist attacks, then it may be
useful to examine these experiences of these individuals in more detail in order to gain
perspective and insight concerning major crisis events that have had a major impact upon our
educational systems as well as on American society as a whole.
These various types of sampling may legitimately be combined as part of a mixed
purposeful sampling approach. As described by Patton (1987), this technique refers to mixing
different sampling strategies, which may be utilized when the researcher discovers a general
pattern of finding in the initial survey information and then uses various sampling methods to
determine the limits and generality of the pattern.
Mixed purposeful sampling may also be incorporated as part of the data triangulation
process in this proposed study; in order to compare information obtained from multiple sources,
corresponding to the various sampling techniques employed. Doing so will enhance validity,
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particularly if consistency can be demonstrated when information obtained from different
sources and by different sampling methods is compared (Fielding & Fielding, 1986.)

Descriptive and Interpretive Validity

As described by Johnson & Christensen (2014), descriptive validity refers to the factual
accuracy of accounts reported by the researcher. This includes information obtained from
research study participants, and observations made by the researcher. Interpretive validity
describes the degree to which the researcher understands study participants’ viewpoints,
thoughts, feelings, intentions, and experiences related to the research study topic, and the
accuracy with which the researcher portrays these elements in the research report.
A variety of strategies will be used to verify and improve the factual accuracy of accounts
given by study participants, and to accurately portray study participants’ perspectives and
viewpoints, as well as the meaning attached by participants to interview questions asked by the
researcher.
Johnson & Christensen (2014, p. 302) state that feedback given by study participants,
also known as member-checking, is one of the most important methods for obtaining accurate,
useful information. By sharing his interpretation of participants’ viewpoints with study
participants and then discussing his conclusions with them, participants have the opportunity to
verify the data the researcher has obtained, while clarifying or correcting any areas of
misunderstanding or misinterpretation on the researcher’s part.
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Maxwell (1996) defined interpretive validity as the ability of the researcher to understand
and accurately portray the perspectives of research participants. In addition to participant
feedback, low-inference descriptors will be used to record and report information obtained from
research study participants. By using participants’ actual spoken language, dialect, and personal
meanings, verified through member-checking, the researcher will strive to accurately convey
participants’ true thoughts and feelings about crisis-related study issues and emergency situation
experiences being explored.
An additional technique, peer review, will also be utilized. As data is collected from
study participants and subsequently analyzed, the researcher’s interpretations of this data and any
conclusions drawn from these interpretations will be discussed with a number of professional
peers and colleagues, as well as with the chair and other members of the researcher’s dissertation
committee. Any problems identified through these discussions will then be resolved by
collecting additional data, or by re-assessing data already obtained before proceeding further
with the study.

Analysis of Data

When study data has been obtained, each case will first be considered and analyzed
individually. Each case will be considered in total, with consideration given to the school district
superintendent’s or school president’s stated leadership philosophy; comparing this with his or
her leadership actions and interactions with particular embedded units such as central office staff,
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building administrative teams, individual departments or certain groups of staff members during
an identified time of crisis.
After this, the leadership actions taken by each school district superintendent or school
president will be compared in a cross-case analysis for similarities as well as differences. In
assembling the final report, the researcher will provide relevant study findings; presenting a rich,
holistic description of each case and its context. This will be achieved by reconstructing the
crisis event from the realities of study participants, while portraying the multiple viewpoints in
each case that participants and stakeholders may have.
The information and viewpoints offered by study participants will be examined and
evaluated within a grounded theory methodology. Glaser & Strauss (1967) believed that
qualitative research should not focus on testing hypotheses derived from previous theory.
Rather, they advocated that theory should emerge inductively from empirical data. Strauss &
Corbin (1994, p. 273) further stated that “Grounded theory is a general methodology for
developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed.”
In order to accomplish this, the researcher must first collect relevant data, then take time
to analyze and consider the data, and finally develop an understanding of the phenomenon based
on the data obtained (Johnson & Christensen, 2014). Strauss & Corbin (1990) described this as a
continuous, non-linear process whereby earlier steps may be revisited several times as the
researcher first collects and analyzes initial data, looks to see what concepts or theory start to
emerge, and then goes back, collects additional data, and conducts further analysis in clarifying,
developing, and validating the theory.
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The researcher in this study has no interest in testing, confirming, or rejecting any
specific hypothesis. Rather, the researcher will objectively and systematically assess study data
obtained; looking for concepts that may emerge directly from this information. After analyzing
and considering this information, the researcher will then attempt to develop an understanding of
the leadership actions and principles that have been described by study participants, as well as an
appreciation for why these particular actions and methods were employed during the various
emergency situations that occurred. Only after this will the researcher attempt to draw tentative,
evidence-based conclusions about the individual and comparative case results obtained.
Strauss & Corbin (1990) identified three stages of data analysis: Open coding, axial
coding, and selective coding. In the first stage of analyzing data obtained in this study, the
researcher will use open coding - beginning to examine the information by reading participants’
interview transcripts, naming and categorizing discrete elements in the data by labeling
important words and phrases used, and major ideas/concepts that were expressed by participants.
The number of times that these key words, phrases, and concepts appear will be recorded.
As data analysis moves to the second, axial coding stage, the researcher will place
emerging concepts into categories and then organize the categories according to the type of
concepts they contain. The research will take particular note of words, ideas, and concepts that
participants mentioned many times during the interviews, looking across the categories already
established to see possible relationships among them, and for themes that appeared across the
interviews study participants. The researcher will begin to compare these emergent themes to
the fundamental principles of contingency-based leadership, looking to see if elements of
contingency-based leadership principles are present within these themes.
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In the third stage of data analysis, selective coding, the researcher will reflect further
upon the data, and results that were produced during open-coding and axial-coding stages. The
researcher will then distill these results along with the other prior evidence and themes obtained;
combining these to generate a grounded theory that will encompass the primary conclusion(s) of
this research. Data analysis and refinement of the primary conclusion(s) will continue even after
this phase, as the researcher continues to search for additional ideas that will further develop and
validate the grounded theory.

CHAPTER FOUR – STUDY DATA AND INFORMATION
The purpose of this chapter is to present a summary of information gathered from each
study participant, as well as the findings and general themes derived from each individual
emergency situation or crisis event case selected for inclusion. After it was determined that their
individual case met the criteria for inclusion in the study, each study participant submitted
written answers to questions on an initial survey instrument. After this, a private verbal
interview was conducted with each participant; according to the research structure previously
outlined, and the interview protocol described in Chapter Three.
I will provide general background, a description of events, and demographic
characteristics concerning each case; along with information obtained from answers given to
basic initial written survey questions by each participant. This will be followed by a descriptive
summary of leadership actions and methods used by study participants in responding to a major
emergency situation or crisis event in their school(s) or school district; taken from narratives
provided by study participants. In writing about these cases I have used the pronoun he/she in
some instances; in order to preserve the confidentiality of study participants.

Case One - Overview

The first case in my study involves a mass shooting at a large public university. During
this tragic event, several students were killed and a number of others were injured by gunfire in a
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university lecture hall. The act was committed by a lone individual, and the crisis situation
developed suddenly and unexpectedly. University officials had no prior warning or indication
that such an event was about to occur on their campus.

Case One - Leadership Philosophy

Through written answers to initial survey instrument questions, the university president
(Administrator “A”) describes himself as a consensus-builder who prefers to delegate authority;
and a team-builder who believes in strong, clear decision-making. The president recognizes the
need to follow and respect contractual agreements and established policies, yet sees himself as a
pragmatic leader who remains flexible; always prepared to pursue opportunities as they arise.
He often creates a team to brainstorm new ideas, and makes extensive use of data from various
sources to inform and drive his decisions.
In response to verbal interview questions, the university president stated that he feels it is
important to consider the cultural and financial impact of various actions he might take, as well
as the possible legal, cultural, and political ramifications that may result from these actions; for
the university and its people. The president believes in appreciating and utilizing the diverse
abilities and unique talents of individual staff members. He delegates authority extensively,
giving subordinates the freedom to work independently and execute their assignments without
undue interference.
However, the university president also understands the need to hold those in positions of
authority accountable for their actions and performance, and the importance of being able to
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recognize indicators of impropriety or malfeasance. The president constantly monitors things
that are happening around him and makes sure that internal controls - a system of procedural and
financial checks and balances - are in place; to assist in regulating these functions.
The university president believes subordinates and others who work with him would say
he is good at bringing people together, that he seeks and accepts input from many people, and
that he tolerates a wide variety of personality “quirks” and behaviors if people are productive and
beneficial for the organization. He also believes that colleagues view him as very experienced,
competent, and stable; and that they feel he makes decisions thoughtfully and carefully.
At all times, the university president remains flexible in his leadership approach and
methods, according to the specific conditions of each situation, the nature of the task to be
performed, and the personnel involved. This outlook is consistent with the basic philosophy of
contingency-based leadership, as described by Fiedler (1967).

Case One – Leadership Actions

The university president learned of the crisis event just moments after it occurred;
informed through a telephone call placed by the chair of the university crisis response committee
that a shooting had taken place in a campus classroom facility. This notification was consistent
with emergency communications protocol that had previously been established by the crisis
response committee. The university president immediately invoked the university crisis
management plan.
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The crisis response committee chairperson was in charge of the university police, and had
been designated in the crisis management plan as the administrator who, in an emergency
situation, would communicate directly with the chief of the university police force. In this role,
the committee chair was responsible for working directly with the chief of university police
while interfacing with first responders, as well as with local municipal police, fire department,
and EMT personnel.
Functioning in this capacity immediately after the shooting, the committee chairperson
relayed information and directives from the university police chief and first responders to the
university president. During this period the chief and his officers searched and secured the
building where the event occurred, assisted those who had been injured, and secured areas
adjacent to the shooting scene; as well as other nearby buildings and the larger campus itself.
The university president quickly received more detailed information concerning the
extent and specifics of the crisis event by speaking directly with the committee chairperson. In
response, the president then instructed the crisis committee chair to contact selected local
government officials to let them know what had happened. The president directed other
university administrators to send messages concerning the event over campus classroom
intercom systems as well as campus radio and TV, telling students and staff members about the
incident while advising them to remain cautious and alert.
After this initial response, the university president called members of the crisis response
committee together and held a meeting. The university president had formed this committee
shortly after coming to the university, selecting its members from various administrative
positions and university departments. During this session committee members continued to
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receive information about the shooting from various sources including the internet. They
discussed and processed what they knew about the crisis, establishing the course of action they
intended to follow over the next several hours. At this time, reports containing information on
the number of injuries and deaths were received from first responder agencies and a local
hospital.
On a number of previous occasions, the crisis response committee had discussed various
types of emergency scenarios that might occur at their school. Because they had considered the
possibility of a crisis event such as this and planned in advance for it, committee members had
already been given specific assignments with responsibility for various emergency response
functions by the university president. He now confirmed that committee members would be
expected to carry out these assignments, and explicitly gave them authority to do so.
The university president did not provide detailed instructions to committee members.
Rather, he relied upon members’ collective experience and each individual’s specific area of
expertise, leaving it up to their professional judgment in determining what should be done in
terms of canceling or re-scheduling university academics, athletics, and extra-curricular events,
as well as how best to deal with the immediate and subsequent emotional impact of the crisis on
students, staff, and community members.
That very same day as word of the lecture hall shooting began to circulate, a large
number of regional, national and international news reporters, journalists, and broadcast
personnel descended upon the university campus. The university president then brought in a
public relations firm; to assist in handling the flow of crisis-related information as well as to
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screen interview requests and schedule interviews with individuals from a myriad of print and
electronic news entities.
The university president also began to receive and respond to many calls from other
local, state, and national leaders. Later in the afternoon, he went to the area hospital that had
received injured victims from the shooting. At the hospital, he spent time talking with the family
members of victims as they awaited updates on the status of their loved ones, and well as with
the relatives of those who had been killed. The university president felt it was important to be
there at the hospital with victims and their families, in order to offer support while being visible
and accessible during this time.
At 7:00pm that evening, the university president gave a press conference at the hospital,
during which he described the situation that had unfolded earlier in the day and answered
questions from electronic and print media reporters. After the press conference, the university
president remained at the hospital in order to receive periodic updates on the status of those who
had been wounded. As the evening progressed, the president and others from his leadership
team continued to talk with the family members of victims, offering reassurance and support.
By the next morning, crews from local, regional, national, and international new agencies
were reporting from the university campus. The university president had received hundreds of
requests for interviews and information concerning the shooting. It was not possible for him to
respond to such a large number of requests, so a public relations spokesperson assisted in
disseminating information and issuing statements regarding the emergency.
To assist in answering questions from students, parents, community members, and others
who called the university wanting to know more about what had happened, the office of student
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affairs set up phone lines and organized their staff who spoke with callers utilizing a standard set
of information and scripted answers.
During this time, the university president also conferred with other university
administrators, as well as with local officials. Although the university crisis management plan
had been implemented, many near-term decisions about how the university would respond still
needed to be made. The university president left these decisions in the hands of those who had
been delegated responsibility for making them.
Academic classes and other on-campus extra-curricular/athletic events were canceled for
the next several days. The local weather was a significant factor in this decision, because
temperatures had become extremely cold and were expected to remain this way over the next
week. University officials wanted to protect the health and safety of students and staff, as well
as provide time for them to grieve and process what had just occurred. However, the university
president and other members of his administrative cabinet also felt it was important to restore a
sense of normalcy, and therefore attempted to return the university to its regular operating
schedule as soon as they reasonably could.
In the days immediately following the resumption of classes, the university president
visited a number of classrooms to talk with students. He shared his own feelings about what had
happened, and listened to how students were reacting to the tragedy. The president also wanted
to make students aware of the university support system and resources such as grief counselors
that were being made available to help them during this time. University liaisons from the
department of student affairs contacted the families of students to let them know of these
resources as well.
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During this time, the office of student affairs organized and held vigils in remembrance
of the victims, and the office of student communications planned and held a campus-wide
memorial service to honor their memory. The university president made phone calls to every
student who had been injured during the crisis, and spoke with the parents of each student who
had been killed. The state governor wanted to meet with students on campus, and this was
arranged. The university president felt it was important to listen to those who were directly
affected by the shooting, and authorized his staff to provide any help or assistance that families
of the victims needed, regardless of financial cost. The president and members of his
administrative staff attended the funeral held for each shooting victim.
Because of the extreme, violent nature of the event, healing did not come quickly or
easily. This shooting deeply affected the university and surrounding community. Recognizing a
need, the office of student affairs organized an on-going support group that continued to meet for
many months following this crisis event.
The lecture hall area where the shooting had occurred was immediately closed off, and
class meetings previously held in this facility were relocated to other adjacent buildings.
Although some people expressed a desire to tear down the structure where the shootings had
occurred, a majority of current students and alumni wanted to preserve it. Because of this
prevailing sentiment, the building interior was later renovated. The area where the lecture hall
had previously existed was permanently closed off, and memorials to the shooting victims were
constructed both inside and outside of the building itself.
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Case One - Leadership Summary

Throughout the crisis event, the university president maintained a high degree of
visibility. However, he did not “take over” during the emergency, issuing orders or attempting to
dictate the crisis response as a more transactional leader might. Instead, the president delegated
authority extensively; giving a great deal of autonomy to the administrators of various
departments and allowing them to freely direct the crisis response within their own specific areas
of expertise.
During the verbal interview, the university president expressed a high level of confidence
in the abilities of his various department leaders. This type of demonstrated trust in subordinates
and followers is also key component of contingency-based leadership.
Throughout the crisis response period the university president maintained frequent
contact with subordinates, communicating with his closest advisors and cabinet members by
phone, email, and in person. The university president also maintained constant communication
with local law enforcement, first responders, and the public; through a sequence of press
conferences and press releases. He maintained a very visible presence at the hospital over the
next 72 hours following the shooting, in order to communicate with and comfort the surviving
victims and their families, as well as the family members, relatives, and loved ones of those who
had been killed.
Throughout the crisis response, the university president wanted to be “present” as much
as possible, and he wanted to be involved with helping the victims as well. The university
president felt it was his role to be the “face” of the crisis, and believed it was his responsibility to
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be open and transparent about what had happened when speaking with the public through the
media.
However, the president also realized there were other staff members who were more
experienced in handling various aspects of the crisis response. And so, the university president
willingly stepped aside and deferred to others when particular situations came up during which
he felt that the leadership of others could be more effective.
In this way, the university president was flexible in his leadership methods; sometimes
embracing a more participative approach as various members of his crisis response team were
called upon to provide actual leadership contributions at different times and places over the
course of the crisis. This flexibility, as well as the willingness and ability to adapt to changing or
unexpected conditions, is a hallmark of contingency-based leadership.
According to Administrator “A”, there were those who tried to exploit the crisis situation
both during and immediately after this tragic event, in an attempt to enhance their own personal
image or for the purpose of political gain. The university president firmly rejected each of these
attempts, and did not allow these individuals to profit from the physical and emotional pain and
suffering that had been inflicted on so many innocent students and members of the university
community. By doing so, the university president shielded and protected his followers;
engendering trust and earning their gratitude which likely further strengthened his leadership
credibility among that group.
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Case Two - Overview

Case Two involves the bombing of a large government structure in an urban area. The
bombing incident occurred suddenly and without warning, taking government officials and
school district officials by complete surprise. Fortunately, only one district school and one other
district facility sustained physical damage from this event, and no students or staff members
were injured or killed.
However, some students and staff were significantly traumatized by the concussive sound
of the blast; as well as by the extreme physical force that the bomb unleashed and the violent,
destructive nature of the event. Many were subsequently affected emotionally and
psychologically because of injuries suffered by or the deaths of family members, relatives, and
friends who had been inside or near the building that was targeted.

Case Two – Leadership Philosophy

The person who was superintendent of the municipal school district at the time of this
crisis event (Administrator “B”) is a highly-experienced educator and instructional leader. She
served previously for many years in public schools; first as a classroom teacher, and later as an
assistant principal and then principal. She eventually assumed the responsibilities of a districtlevel administrator as assistant superintendent, and had been working as her district’s
superintendent for three years when the crisis event occurred there.
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This superintendent believes in leadership by example, taking an active role in
formulating and implementing educational initiatives. She involves people at every level in the
decision-making process. She takes time to develop relationships with people, striving to make
them feel valued and comfortable expressing their thoughts and opinions. The superintendent
wants district staff, parents, and community members to know that their ideas are appreciated
and valued.
The superintendent believes it is important to accept and embrace the culture and
traditions of others, making people feel comfortable. By learning about others, she begins to
develop an understanding of their core beliefs and values. This improves the communication
process, as the superintendent identifies areas of common interest and learns about the
educational priorities and goals that people have for their children.
The superintendent feels strongly that it is important to go beyond simply talking about
change; she considers how change can be made, as well as the resources that will be needed to
achieve it. The superintendent builds support for major initiatives by working closely with
individual school board members, visiting individual neighborhoods to talk with parents and
community residents. She believes that subordinates and others would describe her as both
focused and determined; a fair person and a fair leader who strives to always make decisions that
are in the best interest of students and the entire district community.
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Case Two – Leadership Actions

On the day of the bombing incident, the superintendent recalls that there was a meeting at
the district office attended by the principals of every district school. She remembers hearing a
very loud noise and almost simultaneously feeling a strong vibration. People then went quickly
to nearby windows and looking out, saw a large black cloud rising ominously into the midmorning sky, creating a dark haze that threatened to block out the sun. Stunned by this stark
image, someone exclaimed that a bomb must have gone off.
Little did anyone know just how accurate this spontaneous remark would soon turn out to
be. A few moments later, the superintendent received a phone call from a federal government
official, informing her that an extremely powerful bomb had indeed exploded; at a nearby
government structure.
The principals who had gathered at district office were then instructed to return
immediately to their home schools. The safety of students at schools located closest to the
bombing site was an immediate concern. Prior crisis event planning sessions led by the
superintendent had anticipated potential emergency scenarios such as this. Because the district’s
written crisis response plans provided for delegation of authority in these scenarios, assistant
superintendents, directors, and other administrators responsible for various departments had
already been authorized to take action in case of an emergency.
District security personnel began to call schools, and quickly arranged transportation for
students at schools most directly affected by the bombing. Administrators at these schools were
instructed to move their students to designated safe locations at other district facilities while
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school staff members notified parents by telephone about what had happened, and what was
being done to safeguard their children. Parents were then asked to come and pick up their
children.
Operations and maintenance personnel began to assess and contain physical damage to
schools and district buildings that were located in close proximity to where the bombing had
occurred. At the school closest to the bombing site, windows had been blown out and the
heating/cooling system was damaged, creating clouds of dust inside. Assistant superintendents
at the district office contacted the principal at each school to find out the extent of physical
damage, if any, at each school site.
School board members were now calling the superintendent, because they could see what
was happening on the local television news. They were reassured when the superintendent told
them of the steps that were being taken to protect students and staff, and by the fact that the
superintendent’s leadership team had the situation under control.
The district public relations director remained in contact with local and national news
media throughout that day and during the days immediately following the emergency, providing
information concerning the impact of the bombing on school operations and educational events
within the district and the school communities, as well as actions taken by district personnel in
response to the crisis.
In order to assist students and staff members who had been emotionally impacted by the
bombing, teams of crisis counselors were brought in the very next day and sent to each school
where they were made available to assist those in need. The United States Department of
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Education even sent a crisis intervention team of counselors to assist school district personnel,
and to serve as grief counselors for the school district counselors themselves.
Although no student or staff members’ lives were lost directly because of the bombing,
the terroristic nature of this event significantly impacted those who had a friend or family
member seriously injured or killed. And so, these crisis counselors remained in district schools
for an extended period of time.
This bombing was a very serious and very disruptive event, however schools were not
closed and district activities were not cancelled. The superintendent and her staff felt that
students and their families needed to maintain a sense of stability during a period of relative
chaos, and that keeping the schools open while operating on a regular schedule would help
sustain the people and provide support to help them get through a very difficult time in their
lives.

Case Two – Leadership Summary

Throughout the crisis event period, the school superintendent maintained a high degree of
visibility. However, similar to the manner in which the university president handled the crisis
event on his campus, the district superintendent gave a great deal of autonomy to the
administrators of various departments; trusting in their professional capabilities and allowing
them to direct the crisis response in their specific area of expertise.
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During this crisis period, the district superintendent maintained frequent contact with
subordinates and superiors; communicating with her assistants, department heads, and school
board members by phone, email, and in person.
The school superintendent also maintained constant communication with local law
enforcement, first responders, and the public; through a sequence of public appearances and
press conferences, as well as through news releases. She remained highly visible at schools and
school events throughout the district for the remainder of her tenure there; in order to
communicate with and comfort the surviving students, as well as the families of those whose
loved ones had been seriously injured or killed. These demonstrations of care and concern were
appreciated, and increased levels of trust between parents, community members, school staff,
and district administration.
While the superintendent remained highly visible during the relatively brief crisis and
then the much longer recovery period, much of the decision-making during and immediately
after the bombing had been done by assistant superintendents and school principals. This
demonstrated the trust that the superintendent had in the competence of crisis response team
members, key elements of contingency-based leadership.
The superintendent had great confidence in the ability of her administrative team
members to plan and organize an effective response to the crisis. This trust was justified; borne
out by the resumption of normal district operations within a very short time, as well as the high
degree of cooperation that existed between various individuals and groups within the district in
the weeks and months following the bombing event. This demonstrated confidence in the
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capabilities of leaders and other group members is another indicator of contingency-based
leadership.

Case Three – Overview

Case three involves a significant weather-related crisis event - a hurricane. In August of
2005, Hurricane Katrina had a major impact on communities and school districts throughout the
gulf coast region of the United States. At that time, it was considered one of the most destructive
hurricanes ever to make landfall in the continental United States. Recent hurricanes in 2017 such
as Maria and Harvey each caused more flooding and physical damage, resulting in higher repair
and cleanup costs. However, Katrina still ranks as one of the deadliest North American
hurricanes of all time, with over 1400 people killed or missing after the storm.

Case Three – Leadership Philosophy

The gentleman in charge of one particular school district directly impacted by Katrina is a
highly-experienced educator and instructional leader. This superintendent (Administrator “C”)
believes strongly in servant leadership. His leadership process is very inclusive; his goal is to get
as many people involved in the planning and decision-making process as possible. He sets high
expectations for himself, as well as for the performance of others with whom he serves. He
practices leadership by example; this means he is willing to do whatever he might ask of
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subordinates, and that he does whatever is necessary to help his district reach the goals that have
been established.
To set district goals and decide upon methods for attaining them, a district strategic
planning committee is utilized. Staff and community members, parents, students, and all district
stakeholders are represented on this committee. Proposals for district initiatives are given by
committee members, or may be brought to the committee by others. These proposals are then
discussed and evaluated in an open forum, with participation from members of the public
especially welcomed. The superintendent tries to build consensus and broad support for all
major district plans and initiatives.
The superintendent feels it is vitally important to connect and communicate with people
through the district, and throughout the community. The superintendent has a leadership team
composed of five other district administrators and the principals of each district school. This
team meets at least once each month and the superintendent relies upon these people for input
and advice. When considering ideas for change or improvement, the superintendent gets parents
and the community involved in every major decision. When faced with a serious issue or
problem at the district level, he also goes directly to the individual(s) or group(s) involved,
seeking their input.
The superintendent frequently delegates authority, telling people what needs to be
achieved while providing them the power and the means to accomplish their mission. The district
has long maintained a comprehensive crisis response plan, which is reviewed and updated at
regular intervals. Within the crisis response plan, specific emergency response procedures have
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been developed that cover a wide variety of possible scenarios, and the responsibilities of each
building- and district-level administrator are clearly outlined for each.
The district superintendent believes that relatively new staff members would describe
him as a “grizzly bear”, while veteran staff would refer to him as a “teddy bear.” He attributes
this to the fact that new staff members consistently see him emphasizing accountability and high
expectations for their job performance in what they may perceive as a very stern or serious
manner. The superintendent believes that veteran staff, having worked with him for a longer
period of time, know that he is very flexible and fair. The superintendent feels they understand
that he cares deeply about his students and staff, as well as his district and the community.

Case Three – Leadership Actions

On August 23, and August 24, 2005, warnings were issued for the Atlantic Ocean
tropical storm that soon developed into hurricane Katrina. Katrina became a category 3
hurricane but weakened as it passed over southern Florida, leaving behind some minor damage
from wind and rain. When Katrina reached the Gulf of Mexico, the hurricane stalled. At first, it
seemed that most areas along the southern gulf coast would only get moderate or brief heavy
rainfall. But surprisingly, Katrina started to strengthen. The track of the storm then changed
dramatically over the next 72 hours (NOAA, 2005).
On Friday, August 26, the district superintendent and a colleague ventured less than a
mile down to the gulf coast, and drove along the beach to see what was happening. The weather
was still mild at this time, and everything appeared normal. But the superintendent and his
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associate noticed something unusual; the beach itself and areas adjacent to the beach seemed
strangely quiet. Then they understood why - all of the cranes, gulls, sandpipers, and other sea
birds typically found along the coastal waters had disappeared. According to the superintendent,
this was the point when they started to realize that “something big” was coming.
That Friday evening, a district high school played their home football game under calm,
clear skies. People were able to sit outside comfortably that night; there was no indication of
imminent rainfall or threatening weather in the area. However, the superintendent and his staff
began monitoring the regional forecasts very closely. On Saturday, August 27th, National
Weather Service hurricane warnings for Florida were discontinued. Additionally, a tropical
storm warning was issued at 9:00am for an area just west of the Florida Keys (NOAA, 2006).
Things soon began to change. Katrina, which had been languishing offshore as a
weakened category 3 storm near Key West and the Dry Tortuga islands, suddenly gathered
massive amounts of energy from the warm Gulf of Mexico waters and started to move on a track
that a few days before had been considered only a remote possibility – toward heavily populated
areas of Louisiana and Texas.
Sometime during Saturday afternoon, forecasters realized that Katrina had strengthened
significantly and was now heading almost directly north. Katrina’s final path was still uncertain,
so at 3:00pm a hurricane watch was given for areas adjacent to New Orleans. By 9:00pm, this
watch had been expanded to include the entire gulf coast; from the Florida panhandle to New
Orleans, Galveston, and Corpus Christi (NOAA, 2006).
Throughout that day, the local county emergency response agency continued to issue
more severe bulletins than the ones being given by the national weather bureaus, warning about
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the potential impact of the impending hurricane. Many area residents had taken these warnings
seriously, and wasted no time evacuating. The urgent nature of these warnings confirmed the
superintendent’s belief that a catastrophic storm was approaching; he and his administrative team
members began to make preparations for just such an event.
School had already started there, on August 1st. Fortunately, because it was a Saturday
afternoon, schools and most district buildings were closed. The superintendent and his staff
sprang into action, working quickly to secure district property and resources. One of the first
things they did was relocate the district’s buses and other vehicles, moving these to the highest
ground possible while parking them closely together.
It was understood that if a worst-case hurricane scenario came to pass, people would need
full access to their financial resources in the aftermath of such a storm. District paychecks had
already been prepared and were ready to be issued the following week, so the superintendent
authorized immediate distribution of electronic payments that same day.
It was also anticipated that when Katrina hit their community, some area residents would
lose their homes and find themselves in need of a place to go. Two district school sites were
prepared to receive people displaced by the storm, and designated as emergency public shelters.
Announcements to this effect were made by local radio and television stations; this information
was also placed on the city and district websites.
The superintendent realized the school district had perishable resources that were likely
to be lost or damaged; either by flooding or lack of electrical power. He made the decision to
immediately have the district’s frozen foods delivered to area church groups, as well as the
county jail. The superintendent also donated the district’s supply of diesel fuel to an area
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hospital, because he anticipated the district would not be running its school buses for some time
and knew that the hospital could use this fuel to run their emergency generators for electrical
power. Finally, word was put out through local television and radio that school would be
cancelled until further notice.
Katrina arrived early in the morning on Monday, August 29th. Strong winds and rain
were accompanied by a storm surge from the gulf; a massive wall of water that moved rapidly
inland, destroying homes, buildings, and property while inundating everything in its path.
Regardless of what might happen, the superintendent was committed to remaining there in his
community and his district for the duration.
According to the superintendent’s eyewitness account, roaring currents from the surge
continued moving inland for approximately 45 minutes; rapidly covering thousands of acres for
several miles in all directions. Then, after reaching a brief stage of temporary equilibrium, the
waters suddenly began to recede. After another 45 minutes, much of the surge had retreated
back to the sea.
But the devastation that Katrina left behind could be seen everywhere. A railroad
embankment that runs parallel to the coastline blocked some of the waves. However, many lowlying areas remained underwater for days and weeks afterward. Many houses that had not been
immediately toppled by the gale force of Katrina’s winds were eventually torn down anyway.
This was due either to extensive structural damage caused by the storm, or because of
saturation by floodwaters which, when combined with high temperatures and extreme humidity,
caused mold and rotting; creating a health hazard and compromising the integrity of interior
walls, flooring, and other structural components.
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That same day (August 29th), the superintendent held an emergency meeting with his five
department directors. They talked about how to proceed, and began to assess the extent of
damage in the school district. Surprisingly, local cellular phone service was restored within 24
hours, so the superintendent and other district officials were able to remain in contact with each
other as they moved from place to place, conducting their inspections. Limited electrical and
natural gas service within the immediate area came back online relatively quickly too; 48 hours
after being knocked out by the storm.
By 7:00pm on Tuesday, August 30th, a damage report had been prepared for every district
facility. Katrina destroyed two district schools, and a district athletic field. Six vans used for
student transportation were also lost, due to flooding. Other school buildings had sustained
damage to roofs, windows, and other components; a few needed relatively minor cleanup from
the effects of wind and water. On Wednesday, August 31st, the school board met and authorized
emergency repairs and reconstruction.
The district leadership team and staff members at each school moved quickly and
efficiently to identify, contain, and repair damage caused by Katrina. Central to this process was
constant communication between the superintendent and his administrators. However, the
superintendent believed it was also important to have frequent communication with parents and
community members during this period.
An automatic recorded call was sent out after the storm to the parents of every student;
to let them know what was happening. Although physical damage throughout the district had not
been extreme, much work needed to be done and the schools would not be able to reopen again
for some time. However, the superintendent felt it was important to instill a sense of “normalcy”

143
as soon as possible. He knew that people depended on the schools and their associated resources
such as libraries and playgrounds, and wanted people to be aware of progress that was being
made in their effort to quickly resume regular operations.
Because school had been in session for over three weeks before Katrina, school officials
already had all of their students’ records and current contact information. This allowed them to
maintain constant communication with parents through electronic calls. The superintendent
utilized the local press and electronic news media; making himself available at 9:00am each day
for interviews and announcements to keep people informed of progress concerning the district’s
recovery. The superintendent also made extensive use of telephone calls and the news media as
the district’s recovery was nearing completion; to let people know when schools were getting
ready to open again.
Electricity had been almost completely restored to area residents 11 days after the
hurricane. The municipal water supply was also back online, but the water was not yet safe to
drink. This posed a problem for school officials, because children and adults would need to have
clean water for consumption, and to use in preparing meals for students during the day.
Fortunately, a solution was suggested by a national soft-drink company and also a large local
brewing company; both offered to provide bottled water to the schools at no cost.
The vast majority of students and their families returned to the area after Katrina, as did
teachers and other staff members. But many people had lost their homes. To assist them,
teachers and others were allowed to live in temporary housing – trailers, campers, and RVs
placed in school parking lots. The superintendent understood that even though staff members
were able to come to work every day, many people still needed to take care of home repairs and
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other personal issues caused by Katrina. For the next several months, district employees were
allowed as much time as they needed away from work to attend to these matters.
District schools re-opened twenty-six days after hurricane Katrina struck the region. At
this time, almost all district school buildings and facilities were fully functional. The fresh
bottled water previously offered to the district was not needed; municipal water could be used for
cooking and drinking at this point. The superintendent reports that over 90 percent of their
students were present initially, and that over 98 percent returned by the end of the first semester.
With only a few exceptions, all district teachers returned as well. The superintendent attributes
this fact to the resiliency and dedication of students and staff members alike. However, it seems
that effective district and local community leadership may have also played a significant role.

Case Three – Leadership Summary

In his written responses to pre-interview leadership questions and throughout the inperson interview, the district superintendent emphasized the fact that he delegates authority
extensively, while insisting upon accountability and performance. Before, during, and after
Katrina, he was in frequent communication with his team of key district leaders. Each person
had been given specific areas of responsibility prior to the hurricane, and the superintendent had
confidence that each person would perform at a high level when called upon to do so. This
confidence and trust in members of his team is an important component of contingency-based
leadership.
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The superintendent believed that he had very capable district team. He felt site
administrators at each school knew what needed to be done in the hurricane’s aftermath, and that
they would proceed to handle matters. These individuals exceeded his expectations, showing
extreme dedication by going to their schools even before Katrina subsided, jumping immediately
into the task of directing recovery from the storm. Principals, assistant principals, and other staff
members remained at their schools long beyond normal working hours in the days and weeks
immediately following Katrina, until everything had been restored back to normal. This high
level of dedication to achieving team goals exhibited by district and building leadership team
members is yet another critical element of effective contingency-based leadership.
The superintendent stated that immediately before and during the storm, he utilized more
of a transactional, top-down management style than he typically employs. This was primarily
because the superintendent knew little time remained before Katrina would arrive, and much
needed to be done. Many decisions needed to be made quickly, in order to protect and secure
resources that were vulnerable to the potential impact of Katrina. However, even during this
period, the superintendent was in frequent contact with other key administrators and school
board members, and they still had an opportunity to provide input.
After speaking directly with a number of administrators within the district office and at
district schools, I perceived that team members had high levels of confidence in the
superintendent, in their own abilities, and in each other. The superintendent believes that the
local community has first-responder groups that are highly coordinated, and highly effective in
working with each other. He feels this is an important reason why the local community was able
to recover so quickly after Katrina in comparison with other cities and municipalities, where
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recovery efforts became bogged down and civic leadership was later judged to be relatively
ineffective.
The superintendent credits high levels of cooperation between local civic leaders,
directors of first-responder agencies such as police and fire protection departments, and the
school district as a primary reason why very little recovery assistance was needed from outside
federal agencies such as FEMA. The superintendent believes that an ethos of trust and
cooperation had been established between these entities long before Katrina, and that this spirit
of trust, responsibility, and cooperation had been the driving force behind recovery efforts within
the school district, as well as throughout the entire local community.

Case Four - Overview

Case four involves a hostage situation that developed when the parent of an elementary
student in a west-coast school district held a teacher for several hours against her will at the
child’s school. The parent refused repeated requests from police negotiators to release the
teacher, and even refused to acknowledge or speak with members of his own family who came to
the school and pleaded with him directly to let the teacher go.
No progress was made after several hours spent attempting to talk and negotiate with the
parent. And so, police commanders ultimately decided to storm the room in which the parent
had barricaded himself; along with his hostage. When the police response team broke through
and entered the classroom, they were attacked by the parent and subsequently used lethal force to
subdue him while freeing his hostage.
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Case Four – Leadership Philosophy

The superintendent of this school district (Administrator “D”) is an instructional leader
with over twenty-five years of experience as a building- and district-level administrator. He
describes his leadership style as situational, and believes that in order to lead effectively one
must be highly skilled at developing relationships with others. For this superintendent, it means
being able to communicate clearly and relate closely with students, parents, teachers, staff,
building- and district-level administrators, and other subordinates; while also being able to
communicate effectively and work closely with those in superior positions such as school board
members, civic officials, political leaders, and others.
The superintendent also believes that inter-personal skills must be balanced with the
requisite knowledge and ability to manage the everyday functions that need to be completed
within a district and its schools, while remaining focused on the attainment of larger district
goals. He feels that the ability to develop cohesive teams is important, so that people may work
together effectively toward a common purpose. The superintendent strives to always maintain a
balance between increasing his own functional knowledge while continuing to refine his interpersonal skills.
The superintendent believes it is important to have and show empathy and concern for
others. He also feels that it is his responsibility to help school staff, district administrators,
school board members, and others improve upon their professional knowledge and skills;
developing the professional capacity of other instructional leaders in his district in order to
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strengthen the entire organization. To do so effectively, he believes that relationships and trust
are essential.
The superintendent strives to build these relationships with colleagues and build trust by
being honest and transparent at all times. His core values are “learning” and “well-being.” The
superintendent feels a responsibility to balance the need for technical knowledge and skills with
the desire to create a positive climate and harmonious work environment; one in which people
feel valued and supported.
The superintendent said that how he communicates with his staff, and how his staff
members communicate with others is also very important. He believes that respect and civility
should always be present when talking with others, both in public and in private. He strives to
create an environment in which people feel safe talking and expressing their honest feelings and
opinions. The superintendent believes that this honest dialogue creates a “bond” among team
members, and helps engender trust.
The superintendent believes in delegating authority, and does so extensively. He
understands that school districts are large, complex organizations, and knows that running a
district effectively requires the coordinated effort of many people. He has given authority for the
district’s departments to eight assistant superintendents, each of whom has subordinate staff
members reporting directly to him or her. The superintendent monitors operations of the district
overall, but has placed decision-making power in the hands of these assistant superintendents, as
well as with principals and other building-level administrators.
When considering methods for implementing regular district initiatives or finding
solutions for non-emergency problems, the superintendent prefers to discuss these matters first
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with his group of assistant superintendents, and a few close advisors. This group is then
expanded to include other subordinate district- and building-level administrators, where issues
and their possible solutions or methods for obtaining desired results are proposed and considered
in more detail.
The superintendent also says that some staff members might describe him as “hard to
work for”, or “uptight”. He believes that these descriptions may stem from the fact that he is
very particular in terms of how he wants certain things done, and that he is unwavering in his
expectation that staff will always meet the high standard that he sets for their conduct and
performance.

Case Four – Leadership Actions

The hostage situation in this instance developed early in the morning, on a Tuesday. A
parent who was well-known to staff members brought his child to school that morning. But
instead of dropping the child off and then leaving, as he usually did, the parent on this day
insisted upon seeing the child’s teacher. Before anyone could stop him the parent went
immediately to the teacher’s classroom, then entered and locked the door; keeping other staff and
students outside.
The superintendent was in his usual Tuesday morning meeting with district- and
building-level administrators when the director of pupil services received a text notification that
911 had been called at one of their schools. The director stepped out of the cabinet meeting and
called the principal at the school, who explained what was happening there.
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The director of pupil services then spoke with the superintendent, telling him that
the school campus was being evacuated because someone with a backpack had come into the
school without authorization; an upset parent who went to see a teacher and barricaded himself
in the classroom with that person. Within 15 minutes, the director received another call from the
school saying they needed help; because students were being taken to a park adjacent to the
school and staff members were trying to notify parents to come and pick up their children.
District administrators then turned on a television and began to watch a local station that
was reporting live from outside the school; to see for themselves exactly what happening. After
doing so for a moment and gauging the situation, the superintendent and his director of pupil
services decided they should go down to the school. When they arrived, the only district
personnel present were the superintendent, the director of pupil personnel, the building principal,
and the principal’s administrative assistant.
At this point the local police were already on the scene; their emergency response team
handled all interaction with the intruder. The captain of this team told the superintendent what
had happened, and what they were doing to communicate with the intruder while trying to
persuade him to release the teacher he was holding hostage. After receiving this information, the
superintendent then sent out a group text to school board members so they would be aware of the
situation as well.
Throughout the day the superintendent remained at the school, constantly monitoring the
situation while receiving periodic communication/negotiation updates from the emergency
response team captain. In the afternoon, members of the intruder’s family were brought into the
school; they attempted to talk him into letting his hostage go and surrendering. However, this
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proved unsuccessful. After this effort failed, a joint text/email statement issued in conjunction
with the local police department was sent to all district staff in the afternoon; before pupils at
other district schools were dismissed.
Late in the afternoon, police emergency response team members still had not been able to
communicate with the teacher who was taken hostage. At that time, response team negotiators
had still made no progress in getting the intruder to respond, or to release the hostage. Not
knowing what was happening in the barricaded room and concerned for the teacher’s safety,
police decided to storm the room where they overpowered and shot the intruder, while freeing
the teacher. The intruder was transported to a local hospital, where he later died. The teacher,
who had been held captive for several hours, suffered only minor physical injuries.
The superintendent and pupil services director then went to the hospital, where they
spoke with and comforted the teacher. They also spoke with members of the intruder’s family,
who were shocked by the day’s events and traumatized by how the situation had ended with the
violent death of their relative. Another text and email message was sent in the evening to school
district personnel, informing them that the crisis had been resolved while providing further
information concerning the events that had taken place.
After this, the superintendent and pupil services director went back to the school. They
had the classroom where the crisis occurred cleaned. Then they secured and locked the building.
This work was finally finished at 3:00am.
It was now the next day. The superintendent made the decision to close the school for
two days. He also decided to close the classroom where the incident had occurred for the rest of
the school year. Parents were allowed to bring their children back to school on Saturday, to
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retrieve belongings left behind during the evacuation, and to learn about new classrooms where
they would be located for the rest of the year.
The superintendent was concerned that very young children may have been adversely
affected or traumatized by the sudden presence of police officers forcefully rushing into their
school to confront the intruder. So when students returned to school on the following Monday,
the superintendent had arranged for police officers to be there; greeting everyone in a cordial,
friendly way while handing out teddy bears to children in order to comfort and reassure them.
Grief counselors were also made available to students, parents, and staff members; to
further assist them in returning to the school environment where this crisis event had just taken
place.

Case Four – Leadership Summary

Both during and after this crisis event, the district superintendent was in frequent
communication with his team of key district leaders. Each person in the superintendent’s cabinet
of advisors had been delegated specific areas of responsibility with authority assigned for a
specific area or department, and the superintendent had confidence that each person would
perform at a high level when called upon to do so.
The superintendent believed that he had very capable district team. He also felt that the
school principal and other building administrators knew what needed to be done during the
crisis, and that they would proceed to do it. These individuals met or exceeded his expectations,
evacuating students and relocating them to a nearby park even before news of the situation
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reached district office. The school principal and key staff moved quickly and efficiently to
contact parents while getting children out of harm’s way. After the crisis was resolved, these
administrators worked diligently to help children, parents, and staff members adjust and recover
from this tragedy.
Both during and after the crisis, the superintendent was largely able to utilize and
maintain the type of participative, team-oriented leadership approach that he typically prefers to
employ. This was possible primarily because assistant superintendents and building
administrators proved to be very capable of handling the crisis situation as it occurred, quickly
and correctly making important decisions that were needed to protect the safety and welfare of
students and staff members.
However, even during this critical period, the superintendent was still in frequent contact
with other key administrators, school board members, and local officials; these individuals still
had an opportunity to ask questions and provide input.
The superintendent had complete confidence in the ability and competency of his
administrative team members, and in the local police emergency response team. The
superintendent reports that administrative team members and school building administrators also
had high levels of confidence in the superintendent, in their own abilities, and in each other. He
credits these individuals with getting the school up and running again very quickly, and believes
this is an important reason why the school and school community was able to recover from the
crisis with minimal long-term impact to students and staff.
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The confidence, competency, and trust demonstrated by the superintendent and evidenced
by district leadership team members throughout their handling of the crisis are key elements of
contingency-based leadership.
The superintendent credits high levels of cooperation between local civic leaders,
directors of first-responder agencies such as police and fire protection departments, and the
school district as a primary reason why very little recovery assistance was needed from outside.
The superintendent believes that an ethos of trust and cooperation had been established between
these entities long before this particular event, and that this spirit of trust, responsibility, and
cooperation has been cultivated through specific targeted actions within the school district, as
well as throughout the entire local community.

Organization and Classification of Data

I first copied and recorded the written responses given by participants to initial written
survey instrument questions, compiling information concerning participants’ beliefs and
perceptions related to various leadership elements as well as descriptions of their own preferred
leadership styles, and leadership techniques they typically utilize during normal, non-emergency
periods.
I then listened to an audio recording of the one-on-one verbal interview conducted with
each participant, supplementing this source with written notes that I took while speaking with
each administrator to produce a complete written transcript of each interview session.
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After this was done, I sent each participant a copy of the transcript, and asked him/her to
check it for accuracy. After receiving their feedback, corrections and adjustments were made
where necessary.
I then began to read the written transcripts; looking for words, ideas, and phrases that
represented the leadership concepts and principles most important to those who participated in
my study. After classifying this information obtained from participants I began to examine the
data; comparing it at several key points according to standard, accepted procedures for the
analysis of qualitative data that were outlined and described earlier in chapter three.
This process of member-checking continued throughout the study. After organizing the
data and information obtained in this way and upon assembling a written narrative of each
interview and a description of each participant’s leadership actions during a crisis response, I
again submitted this to each of them and asked for their help in identifying any factual mistakes,
misunderstandings, or omissions.
In this way, emails were exchanged and phone conversations were held with participants.
This helped greatly throughout the process of assembling, interpreting, and writing about the
information they had shared with me; allowing me to better understand what they felt and
experienced before, during, and after handling a major crisis event.
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Data Summary– Written Survey

As described in chapter three, the first stage of qualitative data analysis is open coding. I
began my analysis by going through answers that study participants gave to questions on the
initial written survey instrument.
Study participants were asked to provide their educational background and work history.
Three of the participants hold Doctorate Degrees, and one of these three completed extensive
post-doctoral research in his major field. One of the participants holds a Master’s Degree. All of
them have worked exclusively in the field of Education, and each participant held several
different administrative jobs in various types of schools prior to becoming a school president or
school district superintendent.
The total amount of administrative experience that these participants have acquired
ranges from eighteen to over thirty-five years; each participant’s total experience as a school
president or school district superintendent is between eight and twenty-five years.
When asked to describe the leadership philosophy and style they typically employ during
normal non-emergency periods, each study participant said that he or she considered
himself/herself a situational leader who interacts with people and strategizes the formulation and
implementation of initiatives or event planning according to the specific characteristics of each
individual or group of people, and each unique situation.
On the initial written survey instrument, study participants were also asked to rank the
general leadership elements of authority, communication, competence, credibility, decisionmaking, and psychology in their relative order of importance. These essential elements were
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derived from my literature review of non-school and non-school district emergency situation and
crisis-response leadership; representing the leadership aspects and components most employed
most often in devising and implementing a coordinated institutional/organizational response to a
major emergency or crisis event.
No definition or description was given for these leadership elements and none was
requested by study participants, so the rankings obtained for each element are subject to the
interpretation and meanings assigned to them by each administrator. One study participant did
include a very brief written comment/rationale for each ranking assigned. However, the other
three participants declined to do so.

Table 1 - Initial Written Survey Instrument – Ranking of 6 Leadership Elements
Authority
Administrator
“A”
Administrator
“B”
Administrator
“C”
Administrator
“D”

Communication Competence

Credibility

DecisionMaking
5

Psychology

2

4

3

1

6

6

2

3

1

4

5

5

3

2

1

4

6

5

2

3

4

1

6

The table above lists the rankings given by study participants. A visual inspection shows
that the rankings given by study participants for each leadership element are fairly similar. In
general, study participants considered leader credibility, competence, and communication more
important than decision-making, authority, and psychology.
Study participants were not asked to provide any reason or justification for the rating that
they assigned to each leadership element; no explanation or rationale for each administrator’s
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ratings was given. A more detailed analysis of participants’ survey responses and possible
rationale for the rankings that they assigned to each element is provided in chapter five.

Data Summary – Personal Interviews

Continuing the first step of analyzing my data, I then went back and read through written
transcripts of each participant’s verbal interview. This part of the analysis process involved
naming and categorizing discrete elements in the data by labeling important words and phrases
used, and major ideas/concepts that were expressed by participants. The number of times that
these key words, phrases, and concepts appeared was recorded. The amount of time spent
interviewing each participant was noted as well.
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Table 2 – Leadership-related Words and Phrases used by “Administrator A”
Interview time: 3.5 hours
Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “A”
Accountability

Number of times used by
participant
5

Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “A”
Learning from others

Number of times used by
all participant

Assigning responsibility

5

Monitoring

5

Awareness

4

Planning

8

Checks and balances

3

Politics

6

Communication

8

Pragmatic

3

Competence

7

Processing information

5

Correction

2

Recognize

4

Credibility

8

Reflection

5

Culture

4

Relationships

9

Data-driven decisions

3

Research

6

Delegating

7

3

Determination

2

Respect
agreements/policies
Reviewing and assessing

Diverse abilities/talents

3

Seeking input

5

Evaluating

4

Servant leadership

4

Finding common ground

2

Shared principles

4

Focus on priorities

4

Situational

8

Give people authority

10

Similar core values

4

Growth

4

3

High expectations and
standards
Inclusive

7

Take advantage of
opportunities
Team-builder

5

Tested

4

Involving others

6

Trust

8

Leadership by Example

5

3

4

5

160
Table 3 – Leadership-related Words and Phrases used by “Administrator B”
Interview time: 2.5 hours
Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “B”
Accountability

Number of times used by
participant
4

Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “B”
Learning from others

Number of times used by
all participant

Assigning responsibility

2

Monitoring

3

Awareness

3

Planning

7

Checks and balances

0

Politics

5

Communication

7

Pragmatic

0

Competence

5

Processing information

2

Correction

1

Recognize

4

Credibility

6

Reflection

3

Culture

6

Relationships

8

Data-driven decisions

2

Research

1

Delegating

8

0

Determination

3

Respect
agreements/policies
Reviewing and assessing

Diverse abilities/talents

3

Seeking input

6

Evaluating

4

Servant leadership

4

Finding common ground

1

Shared principles

3

Focus on priorities

5

Situational

8

Give people authority

7

Similar core values

3

Growth

2

1

High expectations and
standards
Inclusive

7

Take advantage of
opportunities
Team-builder

3

Tested

3

Involving others

5

Trust

7

Leadership by Example

4

2

4

7
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Table 4 – Leadership-related Words and Phrases used by “Administrator C”
Interview time: 4.0 hours

Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “C”
Accountability

Number of times used by
participant
7

Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “C”
Learning from others

Number of times used by
all participant

Assigning responsibility

6

Monitoring

5

Awareness

5

Planning

8

Checks and balances

0

Politics

3

Communication

10

Pragmatic

3

Competence

6

Processing information

4

Correction

2

Recognize

5

Credibility

8

Reflection

3

Culture

5

Relationships

8

Data-driven decisions

5

Research

3

Delegating

9

0

Determination

2

Respect
agreements/policies
Reviewing and assessing

Diverse abilities/talents

4

Seeking input

8

Evaluating

5

Servant leadership

5

Finding common ground

2

Shared principles

5

Focus on priorities

3

Situational

8

Give people authority

9

Similar core values

4

Growth

6

2

High expectations and
standards
Inclusive

8

Take advantage of
opportunities
Team-builder

6

Tested

3

Involving others

7

Trust

8

Leadership by Example

5

3

6

7
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Table 5 – Leadership-related Words and Phrases used by “Administrator D”
Interview time: 1.0 hours

Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “D”
Accountability

Number of times used by
participant
3

Word, phrase, or
concept used by
Administrator “D”
Learning from others

Number of times used by
all participant

Assigning responsibility

3

Monitoring

2

Awareness

4

Planning

4

Checks and balances

1

Politics

1

Communication

4

Pragmatic

0

Competence

3

Processing information

3

Correction

1

Recognize

2

Credibility

3

Reflection

3

Culture

2

Relationships

4

Data-driven decisions

1

Research

2

Delegating

4

2

Determination

2

Respect
agreements/policies
Reviewing and assessing

Diverse abilities/talents

0

Seeking input

3

Evaluating

2

Servant leadership

2

Finding common ground

3

Shared principles

3

Focus on priorities

3

Situational

3

Give people authority

3

Similar core values

1

Growth

3

1

High expectations and
standards
Inclusive

2

Take advantage of
opportunities
Team-builder

1

Tested

2

Involving others

2

Trust

4

Leadership by Example

4

2

3

3
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The length of each interview was different, because each participant took the opportunity
to expand upon their answers to my questions; providing information and insights that they felt
were important to understanding their actions and decisions within the context of the particular
emergency situation or crisis event that they had dealt with.
Another element that contributed to differences in the duration of each interview was the
fact that I asked different follow-up questions in response to the information provided by each
participant, because each of these crisis events and emergency situations was somewhat unique.

Data Summary - Axial Coding

As noted in chapter three, Johnson & Cristensen (2014) describe axial coding as the
process of placing concepts identified through examination of the data in to categories, and then
looking for broad relationships and themes. During axial coding, the second stage of my data
summary, I placed emerging concepts into categories; and then organized the categories
according to the type of concepts they contain. Throughout the process of axial coding, I took
particular note of words, ideas, and concepts that participants mentioned many times during the
one-on-one verbal interviews, looking across the categories already established to see possible
relationships among them; and for themes that appeared across the interviews of study
participants.
As I proceeded to analyze and classify the words, phrases, and major ideas expressed by
study participants, five distinct groups began to emerge; with five different themes. I have
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organized these groups of major ideas and concepts, and their corresponding overall themes as
follows:
1. Credibility

4. Decision-Making

2. Communication

5. Planning

3. Competence

Theme 1 – Credibility
Concepts related to Credibility:
Accountability

Awareness

Leadership by example

Pragmatic

Reflection

Respect for agreements/policies

Servant leadership

Team-builder

Trust

Evidence Statements related to Credibility:

“I understand the need to follow and respect contractual agreements and established
policies – people will be watching to see if I’m doing this.” – Administrator “A”
“As a leader, I have to hold people accountable and be able to recognize when things
don’t look quite right” – Administrator “B”
“I have to get out there and set an example for my people, and jump into the work
myself.” - Administrator “C”
“People are more willing to do the hard jobs if they see that I’m willing to do those kinds
of things, too.” – Administrator “D”
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“I need to always be alert – prepared to pursue and take advantage of opportunities that
become available for my organization.” – Administrator “A”
“I have complete confidence in the abilities of my staff, and my staff members all have
complete confidence in each other.” – Administrator “B”
“Servant leadership is at the heart of everything we do. We are here to serve students,
parents, and the entire community.” – Administrator “C”
“The decisions that we make, are made together. And the actions that we take, are taken
as a cohesive team” – Administrator “D”

Theme 2 – Communication
Concepts related to Communication:
Finding common ground

Inclusive

Relationships

Shared principles

Politics
Similar core values

Evidence Statements related to Communication:

“Members of my leadership team don’t always have to agree with me. But it’s important
that we all have the same goals, and similar core values.” – Administrator “A”
“I believe in being very inclusive. I take my ideas to the people, because I want input and
help from everyone in the community.” – Administrator “B”
“Relationships are so important. People need to know that we really care about their
kids, and about the community.” – Administrator “C”
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“I want to make connections and build relationships with people; this happens when we
find common ground” - Administrator “D”
“Educational organizations can be very political. I need to be aware of how my decisions
will be received by various constituencies.” – Administrator “A”
“Relationships are the key to everything we do.” – Administrator “B”
“Making connections with political leaders and others who are in a position to help the
district is very important.” – Administrator “C”
“We make a real effort to be inclusive by reaching out to parents” – Administrator “D”

Theme 3 – Competence
Concepts related to Competence:
Culture
Growth

Data-driven decisions
High expectations & standards

Processing information

Recognizing opportunities

Situational

Utilize diverse skills/talents

Determination
Learning from others
Review & assess

Evidence Statements related to Competence:

“I’m good at recognizing and using the diverse skills and talents of my staff members.
This is an important ability for a leader to have.” – Administrator “A”
“Everything we do is based on data. A good administrator must be able to look at many
different kinds of data, and figure out what this data means.” – Administrator “B”
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“I’m definitely a situational leader. Everything that we did during the crisis was
determined by our situation and conditions at that time.” – Administrator “C”
“I consistently emphasize personal and professional growth, for myself as well as
members of my staff” – Administrator “D”
“I give my people a lot of freedom. But I have high expectations, and set high standards
that they have to meet.” – Administrator “A”
“The culture of an organization is very important. We’ve established a culture in our
district where excellence is expected, even during critical situations.” – Administrator “B”
“We review and re-assess our emergency preparedness at regular intervals, and learn
from the example of others.” - Administrator “C”
“During the crisis we processed information quickly, but carefully - Administrator “D”

Theme 4 – Decision-Making
Concepts related to Decision-Making:
Assigning responsibilities

Delegating

Giving people authority

Involving others

Monitoring

Seeking input

Evidence Statements related to Decision-Making:

“I delegate authority extensively. Both during and after our crisis response, major
decisions were made by those who had responsibility for various departments and functions.” Administrator “A”
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“I monitored our crisis response continuously by staying in touch with members of my
administrative cabinet, as well as members of our school board.” – Administrator “B”
“I try to involve as many people in the decision-making process as possible” –
Administrator “C”
“I seek input from all members of my administrative cabinet, the district leadership team,
and others before making major decisions.” – Administrator “D”
“I assign responsibility for various functions to specific departments, and the leaders of
those departments.” – Administrator “A”
“I give our district and building administrators the authority to do what is necessary, to
achieve our goals and accomplish our mission.” – Administrator “B”
“I let people know what needs to be done, and then provide them with the authority and
resources with which to do it.” – Administrator “C”
“School districts are large organizations. I delegate authority extensively, and give my
district administrators full authority to run their departments without interference.” –
Administrator “D”

Theme 5 – Planning
Concepts related to Planning:
Checks & balances

Correction

Focus on priorities

Research

Evaluating
Simulation/practice/testing
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Evidence Statements related to Planning:

“We had already researched and written an extensive organizational crisis plan. When
the crisis event occurred, people knew what to do because we had discussed and reviewed our
plan extensively” – Administrator “A”
“We’re always evaluating our response to different situations, trying to make corrections
and find ways we can improve.” – Administrator “B”
“We conducted simulations that allowed us to test our knowledge of the district’s written
crisis management plan, and our response to different types of crisis events.” – Administrator
“C”
“After the crisis had passed, we evaluated our decision-making and our planning, to see if
there were areas where we could improve our crisis response.” – Administrator “D”
“During the emergency and immediately afterward, we were inundated by people
wanting information, interviews, and access…I had to focus on priorities and decide what was
best for the institution, the victims, and their families.” – Administrator “A”
“During the crisis we relied on our written crisis plan. That allowed us to focus on
priority areas and concentrate our resources where they were most needed.” – Administrator “B”
“Our district’s written crisis management plan isn’t a static document – it’s always
changing as we learn of new and different types of crisis events, and make corrections or
changes based on how others have responded to these events.” – Administrator “C”
“We want to stay on top of current research, and evaluate best-practice to see how we can
improve our own preparation and performance.” – Administrator “D”.
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Selective Coding

Five themes have emerged from information and data obtained in this study; identified
first through the processes of open coding, and then refined by axial coding. These are:
Credibility, Communication, Competence, Decision-Making, and Planning. The implications of
these themes and their application toward forming new theory grounded in accepted concepts
along with the evidence produced in this study will be discussed in chapter five.

CHAPTER FIVE – DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Overview

At the outset of my study, I wanted to know if contingency-based leadership methods had
been used to successfully implement and manage an effective response to a school- or school
district-related crisis event. To answer this question, I examined the leadership styles and actions
of school district superintendents and school presidents in places where major crisis events and
had taken place in schools or school-related settings.
In the process of conducting this research, I spoke directly with school district
superintendents and school presidents to learn about the specific leadership styles and methods
they had utilized in the course of responding to a major emergency situation or crisis event. I
also wanted to know whether these leaders, while directing their organization’s crisis response,
had significantly altered or deviated from the leadership approach they typically employ during
normal, non-emergency periods.
The central question that I originally posed has been answered: The results of this study
reveal that participants made extensive use of contingency-based leadership principles and
methods in formulating and directing an effective emergency situation response in their school(s)
or school district. But as a result of this finding, other issues have emerged.
In the cases examined during my review of the literature, it is evident that contingencybased leadership methods and techniques have been used on many occasions in responding
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successfully to a wide variety of non-school emergency situations and crisis events. So, it was
not surprising to find that the participants in my study also used contingency-based principles
when leading their school(s) or school district during times of crisis.
However, what I also discovered is that each participant made extensive use of
contingency-based, situational leadership principles and techniques during normal, nonemergency periods as well. In fact, the approach and methods used by these participants while
leading their school or school district during and after a significant crisis event was a direct
reflection of their earlier leadership philosophy and style under normal conditions.
It turns out that the leadership of study participants actually remained remarkably
consistent; regardless of circumstance or external conditions. The key factor that made this
possible is delegation of authority.
Throughout my review of the literature, I read many cases and learned about the way in
which various chief executives, mayor, governors, and others used contingency-based principles
when leading their organization during a time of crisis. Many businesses, as well as municipal,
state, and national governments, are large organizations that require many people to staff them.
We know that leaders of these organizations must delegate authority, at least to some extent, in
order for these entities to function.
Schools and school districts are also large, complex organizations. Many people, having
varied skill sets and talents, are needed for educational institutions to operate effectively. School
presidents and school district superintendents therefore hire people with experience and expertise
in various areas, then delegate authority and responsibility for school or school district academic
and managerial functions to specific departments, and certain individuals.
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Data and information from my study reveals that each school president or school district
superintendent delegated authority quite extensively, as part of their standard contingency-based,
situational leadership approach. They trusted subordinates during normal, non-emergency
periods; granting them autonomy to run their individual offices and departments while giving
them the power to make important decisions.
During emergencies and times of crisis, this arrangement did not change. Participants did
not “pull back” the authority they had previously extended, nor did they attempt to dictate the
actions of subordinates in whose hands authority had been placed. On the contrary, each school
or school district leader displayed complete confidence that those to whom authority had been
given would make the right decisions, and demonstrate effective leadership themselves - before,
during, and after a significant emergency situation or crisis event.
The level of success produced by each school or school district’s crisis event response
depended therefore, to a great degree, on precisely how much authority these leaders had given;
and with whom this authority had been placed. Each crisis response outcome was also highly
dependent upon the way in which subordinates utilized the powers with which they had been
entrusted, and the way in which subordinates came together to create and implement a
coordinated plan during each school-related crisis or emergency situation. This finding reflects
the real value and significance of my study.
Throughout my review of the literature, as I read accounts and descriptions of crisis
response actions taken by corporate CEOs, military commanders, mayors, governors, and
presidents, it was evident that most, if not all of these institutional leaders had delegated at least a
portion of their authority to vice presidents, officers of lower rank, trusted assistants, and general
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staff members. Not one of these leaders operated in isolation; they each relied on the knowledge
and skill of subordinates and others, both inside and outside of their organization, to help
organize and carry out a coordinated response when confronted with a significant emergency
situation or crisis event.
But the way in which these leaders had delegated authority, how their authority had been
distributed and how subordinates used the powers they had been given was rarely touched upon;
never explained or outlined in any detail. I believe that this is the real gap in the literature related
to crisis event and emergency situation leadership.
I have found that emergency situation and crisis event leadership occurs not only while
the emergency or crisis is happening. It begins with preparation for such an event, which usually
occurs months or even years before. This is when effective crisis response plans are made, and
provisions for delegation of authority are specifically outlined. Crisis leadership also extends
beyond the event itself, into the time afterward when healing and closure are required.
After each crisis event described in my study, many things still needed to be done.
Physically restoring a normal educational environment, calming people’s fears, and helping them
cope in the aftermath of tragedy were also important functions that took place under the guidance
and direction of each participant. More than simply repairing buildings or replacing material
goods, each of their stories was about strengthening and sustaining relationships: Supporting
their communities, staff members, parents, and children; while helping all of them move forward
with their lives.
What does it mean to delegate authority effectively – before, during, and after a crisis?
How is this accomplished? Can subordinates effectively use the authority they have been given
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when an actual crisis event happens? What conditions, preparation, and training are necessary
for this to occur? The answers to each of these questions can be found in the methods and actions
of the participants in this study. I believe that the lessons they can teach us have tremendous
practical application for instructional leaders and school administrators. The crisis leadership
methods and actions of study participants will now be further examined and compared.

Cross-Case Analysis of Crisis Response Leadership

The four cases selected for inclusion in this study - a mass shooting that took place in a
crowded lecture hall, the bombing of a large building that contained many people, a massive
hurricane that struck heavily populated areas, and an armed intruder who took an employee
hostage - are all very different. Yet, the individuals responsible for implementing and managing
a crisis response in each of the schools or school districts associated with these events did so
using leadership styles, methods, and techniques that were very similar.

Delegation of Authority

Rather than trying to “dictate” what should be done in these emergencies by issuing
direct orders to subordinates, or tightly “controlling” these situations by giving staff members
detailed instructions as to how they should proceed at every step, each school district
superintendent or school president relied upon the expertise of his/her leadership team members -
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people who had specialized knowledge and training in certain defined aspects of crisis and
emergency situation response.
In these cases, school district superintendents and school presidents placed their trust in
key members of a leadership team. They delegated authority extensively, confident that these
team members would perform effectively when called upon to do so. The chief administrator
believed not only that subordinates would apply their specialized knowledge and skills, but that
they would also work together effectively with superiors, subordinates, colleagues, and others in
a highly cooperative way.
As previously cited, trust is one of the basic components of contingency-based
leadership. This includes mutual trust between leader and followers, and trust among followers
in each other. Zand (1997) found that quality of communications between leader and followers,
followers’ desire for openness within the professional relationship, and the willingness of
followers to exercise personal initiative are all indicators of how much trust followers have in
their leader.
In each study case, information was exchanged back and forth between the leader and
followers in a very informal way, quickly and without hesitation; particularly during and after
the crisis event. Followers willingly took on greater responsibility, working extended hours
during each crisis response while performing additional tasks that went far beyond the basic
requirements of their jobs.
The way in which each school president or school district superintendent communicated
frequently and openly with followers is a clear indication of high levels of mutual trust that
existed between participants and members of their leadership teams. Furthermore, the
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willingness of followers to exercise personal initiative in helping students, parents, and
colleagues recover during and after each school or school district’s respective crisis event shows
the high degree of trust that leadership team members had for each other.
This same type of confidence and trust also extended to students, parents, and members
of each school or school district community. Throughout each emergency or crisis event, school
and school district staff reached out to help co-workers, students, and community members;
thereby continuing to respond and perform in ways that justified the trust each leader had placed
in them; as well as the trust extended to them by their colleagues.
Although school district superintendents and school presidents delegated authority
extensively in every case, allowing subordinate team members to formulate and direct various
aspects of the crisis response, a laissez faire style of leadership was never in evidence. During
and immediately after each crisis event, the school district superintendent or school president in
charge did not distance himself/herself, or disengage from actively participating in the leadership
process.
In fact, each school president or school district superintendent monitored events closely;
maintaining standards and accountability by periodically issuing crisis-related goals that staff
members were expected to meet, establishing recovery expectations and timelines, and requiring
staff to submit periodic verbal and written reports on their progress toward meeting specific
crisis response goals issued by superiors and the general emergency response goals contained
within each institution’s written crisis response plan.
While subordinates were given great responsibility and latitude in choosing and
coordinating crisis response actions, the participants recognized that at certain times and in
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particular circumstances a more directive, transactional leadership approach was required.
Consequently, the school district superintendent or school president did not hesitate to step it and
take prompt, decisive action when he/she felt it was appropriate and essential to the response
effort.
This took the form of larger actions, such as when Administrator “C” designated and
prepared district facilities to serve as emergency shelters in advance of hurricane Katrina, then
donated his district’s fuel supply to a local hospital. There were also as a number of less-visible
things; such as Administrator “A”’s decision to have his institution pay the funeral expenses for
mass shooting victims.
However, this should not be seen as a contradiction. Bass (1985) recognized that even
leaders who are primarily transformational sometimes employ transactional leadership methods.
This is a basic principle of contingency-based leadership – the leader adjusts his/her style and
methods to suit the immediate situation, and the personnel under his or her authority. In each of
these cases, followers continued to perform at high levels even when leaders employed a more
authoritative leadership style.
Sweeney (2011) noted that besides competence, leaders’ concern for the welfare of
followers is a prime factor in the leader-subordinate relationship, and the establishment of trust.
In each case contained in this research study, followers readily complied with and actively
supported the directives of their school district superintendent or school president, even when
these directives were framed in a more transactional leadership style. Their willingness to do
this may indicate that followers had high levels of confidence and trust in their leaders.
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These superintendents and presidents understood that it was incumbent upon them to
assume ultimate responsibility for the crisis response, and that they would be called upon to
make critical decisions when time was of the essence and immediate action was required to
preserve school or school district resources, as well as to protect the safety and the lives of those
under their command. However, directive or transactional methods were not the preferred
leadership styles of study participants. District superintendents and school presidents
participating in this study stated that they employed these methods only for as long, and only to
the degree that they felt it was absolutely necessary to do so.

Crisis Management Planning

During the course of conducting interviews with study participants and throughout the
process of reflecting upon the information they shared, the same quotation came to mind time
and time again - amat victoria curam. The most accurate translation of this phrase from Latin
into English seems to be victory loves carefulness. However, I believe the spirit of the original
quote corresponds more closely to the idea that victory loves preparation.
Although each school district superintendent or school president gave a significant
proportion of credit for the success of his organization’s crisis response to assistant
superintendents, department directors, other individuals on their leadership team, and highlycompetent staff members who were able to think quickly and adapt to changing conditions, they
also cited the existence of an effective pre-existing crisis management plan as a key element that
served to orient and guide their leadership team members during and after the crisis event.
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These pre-existing written crisis management plans were universally praised by study
participants as invaluable resources - providing detailed action plans that included specific steps
to be taken by particular individuals; when faced with certain conditions during defined types of
crisis events. Along with delegation of authority, this extensive planning and preparation
beforehand was another important element. Each school or school district’s crisis management
plan provided a framework that allowed leadership team members to carry out a highly effective
crisis event or emergency situation response. This was achieved because subordinate staff
members effectively utilized the authority they had been given; applying this authority according
to their normal managerial/supervisory responsibilities, as well as the specific emergency/crisis
response functions that had been outlined for them in the written crisis management document.

Summary

In each case selected for inclusion in this study, the following characteristics were
observed:
(1) High levels of trust between followers
(2) Confidence of followers in the abilities of their leader
(3) Leader confidence in the capability of followers
(4) High levels of professional skill and competence associated with the leader as well as
with followers
(5) Consistent, open, and honest communication between the leader and followers
(6) Leader/follower flexibility in the process and methods used to handle problems.
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Trust, credibility, competence, and communication - these are the key elements of
contingency-based leadership. These core elements were valued highly by each district
superintendent or school president during normal, non-emergency periods.
These same core elements remained in place and became especially important for each
leader during emergencies or times of crisis. High levels of trust, competence, and credibility are
all clearly visible and abundantly present in the leadership philosophy and actions of each chief
administrator when faced with a significant emergency or crisis event in their school or school
district. Their crisis response leadership was very much grounded in contingency-based
principles.
Two major elements present in each participant’s emergency/crisis response are extensive
delegation of authority, and reliance upon on a detailed, comprehensive crisis response plan that
was adhered to closely by subordinates and staff. Additional commentary concerning key
components and effective application of these two factors will be given during my discussion of
recommendations for professional practice.

Narrative Inquiry

During the course of my interviews with participants, I also shared of my own
experiences during school-related emergencies and crisis situations. As described in Chapter
Three, the process of coming alongside study participants when engaging in narrative inquiry
into participants’ experiences and stories requires the researcher to engage in narrative inquiry
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into his own experiences and stories. Johnson & Christensen (2014) use the term retelling
stories to describe this interaction between participants and the researcher.
As I sat and spoke with study participants, asking questions, listening to their stories and
talking about how they had dealt with a variety of challenging emergency and crisis event
situations; I thought about my own non-school- and school-related emergency and crisis event
leadership experiences. When the conversation touched upon an issue that I had confronted,
whether in a similar situation or when faced with a somewhat different type of emergency or
crisis event, I selectively shared these with participants while explaining the logic and motivation
behind my thoughts and actions. By doing so, I hoped to draw additional information from
them, while allowing them to consider their own leadership philosophy and methods from a
different viewpoint.
Hearing of my experiences usually caused participants to reflect upon their crisis
response actions; sometimes causing them to re-assess their methods and approach to these
events while spurring them to offer additional thoughts, insights, and details concerning their
own leadership philosophy and practice. This increased the accuracy and depth of the data and
information that I was able to obtain from them.

Descriptive and Interpretive Validity

Throughout the process of data collection and analysis, I used triangulation as a method
to increase validity as I obtained, examined, and classified the information gained from study
participants. In this triangulation, my focus was on internal consistency. To assess this, I asked

183
each participant a number of questions that were designed to elicit the same type of information.
However, each of these questions was worded or posed to participants differently. Although the
content and nature of these questions appeared to be somewhat different each time, I wanted to
ascertain the degree to which the answers and information provided by participants would
remain consistent.
As I recorded the responses given by participants to initial written survey questions, and
as I organized information from narratives collected from these different individuals describing
their own unique situations, I compared the data at several key points.
Because each participant self-identified as a situational leader, I looked at their answers
to leadership style questions and the actions they took in response to an emergency situation or
crisis event to see if these views and actions were consistent with accepted situational leadership
philosophy and methods. As cited and described earlier in my discussion of leadership theory,
Hersey and Blanchard (1977) identified four primary situational leadership actions: Delegating,
Supporting, Coaching, and Directing.
In their narratives of crisis event response, every study participant gave examples
describing how they utilized these four actions: Delegating authority and responsibility among
leadership team members, supporting staff through extensive training and practice in crisis event
response, coaching and teaching staff through professional development that provided a balance
of theory and practice, and by actively instructing and directing subordinate personnel
themselves; before, during, and after the crisis event.
In each case, there was a high degree of internal consistency in the answers provided by
the participant to both written and verbal leadership style questions. In the written survey
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responses that participants gave, they each defined their personal leadership style as situational.
In their descriptions of personal leadership philosophy, they also used words and phrases closely
associated with situational leadership principles. And through the quotations listed in Chapter
Four that came directly from the spoken words of their interview narratives, we see a great deal
of evidence that each school district superintendent or school president acted very much as a
situational, contingency-based leader when faced with a significant crisis event or emergency
situation in their school district or school. Overall, this information and data strongly supports
their claims as situational leaders.

Leadership Philosophy and Style

While each participant in the study identifies strongly as a situational leader during
normal, non-emergency periods, the information and data obtained in my study also indicates
that these participants are primarily transformational leaders and remained so; before,
throughout, and after the crisis event or emergency situation that occurred in their school(s) or
school districts.
These district superintendents or school presidents adopted a more authoritative
leadership style only on rare occasions, and only when they believed it was absolutely necessary
to do so. On the whole, participants consistently utilized a transformational, situational,
contingency-based leadership approach; both during and in the period immediately following a
significant crisis event.
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In each case, the district superintendent or school president delegated authority
extensively, relying upon networks of highly-organized teams that were composed of members
who had specialized professional skills and expertise in particular areas. However, in addition to
being given authority, study participants had also provided extensive training and professional
development for these team members, thereby building the leadership capacity in subordinates.
In particular, these individuals had been given focused training to prepare them for initiating and
carrying out various response actions over a range of possible crisis or emergency situations.
While outlining how these teams operated both during and after the crisis event,
participants described the characteristics and abilities of the people who comprised these
response teams, as well as the way in which these individuals communicated with each other and
their leader in carrying out crisis response functions.
Participants each described how they supported members of their leadership teams and
other staff members before and during the emergency of crisis response; by providing verbal
encouragement and other affirmations of confidence in their judgment and abilities. This
indicates that participants had a good understanding of followers’ levels of maturity and task
readiness, further affirming participants’ self-identification as situational leaders.
As cited previously in chapters two and three, one of the central elements of contingencybased leadership is a team composed of highly-competent members who possess a high degree of
respect and trust for each other; and for their leader. Throughout each case included in this study
and during the period that followed, the district superintendent or school president maintained
supervisory authority while allowing subordinates the freedom to operate; empowering them to
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make crisis response decisions within previously defined parameters. This demonstration of
trust and confidence in followers is yet another hallmark of transformational leadership.

Data Analysis – Part One
Initial Written Survey Instrument – Ranking of 6 Leadership Elements

Table One lists the rankings given by study participants for six leadership elements.
These six elements were identified, through my review of emergency/crisis-related literature as
major leadership components utilized by those who had devised, implemented, and managed a
coordinated response to a significant emergency situation or major crisis event, as previously
qualified and defined in Chapter Three. These elements comprise the leadership function
categories that appear most often in the methods and actions of those who have directed a major
emergency/crisis response.
A visual inspection shows that in general, the rankings given by study participants are
fairly similar and consistent across each leadership element. Overall, study participants indicated
that they consider leader credibility, competence, and communication more important than
decision-making, authority, and psychology.
The rankings given by Administrators “A”, “B”, and “C” are in very close agreement.
The lone exception is the fact that Administrator “A” diverges from Administrators “B” and “C”
in assigning a rank of “2” to authority, whereas Administrators “B” and “C” give this element
ranks of “5” and “6” respectively.
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Administrator “D” generally agrees with the others, but differs significantly from his
colleagues on two elements. Administrator “D” rates leader decision-making as the most
important leadership element, while assigning a rank of “4” to leader credibility. Every other
participant believed that leader credibility was most important, unanimously assigning this
element a ranking of “1”, while giving ranks of “4” or “5” to decision-making.
As previously described, each superintendent or president handled the crisis event in his
school district or school using a very similar leadership approach and during verbal interviews,
they all outlined personal leadership philosophies that were very much the same. But since no
definitions or examples for these six elements were provided, it was left to each of them to
determine what these leadership elements meant for themselves. Therefore, it is not surprising to
see at least a small amount of variation in the rankings, or even a significant difference in the
rankings assigned to by one or more study participants.
During a crisis event or emergency situation, we might expect that school district
superintendents or school presidents would value decision-making and authority. But in this
survey, these particular elements were not highly-ranked.
This seems to be a direct reflection of the leadership philosophy and style demonstrated
by study participants during times of crisis. When faced with an actual emergency in their
schools or school district, these leaders felt it was their duty to be visible while projecting
competence and credibility. However, as these chief administrators managed the crisis response,
they did not utilize authoritative or highly directive leadership methods.
In each case, school district superintendents and school presidents communicated
extensively with subordinates, staff, and the media; yet did they not attempt to “take over” in an
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effort to exercise power, or in an attempt to demonstrate control. Instead, they relied upon the
skills and abilities of subordinates; giving these members of their leadership teams the freedom
to choose and implement crisis response actions independently, and without undue interference.

Data Analysis – Part Two

As described by Johnson & Christensen (2014) and outlined in Chapter Three, axial
coding occurs during qualitative data analysis when the researcher places emerging concepts into
categories, and then organizes these categories according to the type of concepts they contain.
As I examined written transcripts of interviews with study participants, I took note of words,
ideas, and concepts that participants mentioned many times.
I then looked across the categories already established during my summary of initial data
to see possible relationships among them, and for themes that appeared consistently across the
interviews with study participants. I then began to compare these emergent themes to the
fundamental principles of contingency-based leadership, looking to see if elements of
contingency-based leadership principles are present within these identified themes.
During the process of axial coding, five distinct themes emerged from the data. These
are: Credibility, Communication, Competence, Decision-Making, and Planning. These five
emergent themes, along with their related supporting concepts, will now be examined and
discussed in greater detail.

189

Theme 1 – Credibility

Concepts related to Credibility:
Accountability

Awareness

Leadership by example

Pragmatic

Reflection

Respect for agreements/policies

Servant leadership

Team-builder

Trust

Kouzes and Posner (2011) state that credibility is the foundation of leadership; it is based
on one’s words and actions. They identified honesty/trustworthiness, professional expertise,
foresight/vision, and optimism/inspiration as primary qualities that are closely associated with
leader credibility. In assessing the credibility of leaders, people look to see if they keep their
word and follow through; and if they show respect to subordinates as well as superiors.
Kouzes and Posner (2011) found that people also evaluate whether leaders have high
levels of professional knowledge and skills, and assess the leader’s ability to adapt to changing
conditions while anticipating possible future consequences. They determine whether leaders are
willing to listen, and if they are open to policy and procedural change that creates greater
organizational balance or increases fairness.
Each of these elements figures prominently in my study data. I have organized them,
along with others closely related, under the theme of Credibility.
For over 200 years, the United States Marine Corp has dealt with innumerable crisis
events and emergency situations, in every corner of the globe. The Marine Corps prepares
leaders to handle some of the most challenging situations in the world during wartime, as well as
spontaneous conflicts that arise during times of relative peace.
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The United States Marine Corps Non-Commissioned Officer Training Manual (1999,
p2.) states that “accountability is the cornerstone of leadership.” The manual goes on to say that
“accountability establishes reasons, motives and importance for actions in the eyes of superiors
and subordinates alike; it is the single most important element in establishing one’s credibility.”
During verbal interviews, each school district superintendent or school president
identified accountability as one of his/her key leadership principles. Each leader cited several
examples that show how they demonstrate accountability; in normal, non-emergency periods as
well as during crisis events or emergency situations.
Study participants said that they regularly hold meetings and forums; during which
organizational progress, issues, and problems are shared openly and discussed honestly with
students, parents, community members, and other stakeholders. As shown by the evidence
contained in the quotations listed under this heading in Chapter Four, these leaders also remain
highly accessible to their constituents; communicating regularly with their staff, parents, and the
public in order to provide information and updates on the progress of various projects and school
or school district initiatives.
Each district superintendent or school president practiced servant leadership - showing
genuine humility and concern for people, and spending time with them while providing
encouragement and tangible support; facing the crisis or emergency together. Each leader
demonstrated leadership by example - willingly stepping in to take his/her share of the “hard”
jobs or “dirty work.” This meant doing things that were distasteful, difficult, and occasionally
dangerous; while maintaining the ethics, values, and performance standards that they asked of
others.
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The narratives shared by study participants told of high levels of cooperation, a sense of
genuine camaraderie, and a willingness on the part of leadership team members and other
school/district staff to go above and beyond what was required of them in contributing toward
the crisis event or emergency situation response that took place in each participant’s respective
school or school district. This indicates that each district superintendent or school president
enjoyed a high level of credibility among staff members and subordinates.
Each participant emphasized the importance of accountability; they value servant
leadership principles and methods at all times, not only during crisis events of emergency
situations. These administrators universally share a belief in taking an active role within their
schools, school districts, and communities; and a commitment to practicing leadership by
example.
In the examples of successful crisis response contained throughout my review of the
literature, leader credibility is a key factor. In places such as New York City and Washington
D.C., response and recovery efforts were able to proceed quickly and effectively after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 because people there had trust and faith in the
competence of their civic leaders, and the leaders of other government and first-responder
organizations (Mullin, 2010).
The high levels of credibility enjoyed by participants in this study allowed them to
quickly mobilize staff, community members, and other constituents; getting recovery efforts
underway promptly in their own schools, school districts, and communities immediately
following the particular crisis event or emergency situation that occurred.
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Theme 2 – Communication

Concepts related to Communication:
Finding common ground

Inclusive

Relationships

Shared principles

Politics
Similar core values

Almost without exception, outstanding leaders throughout history such as Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Martin Luther King have been outstanding communicators. Former United States
President Ronald Reagan was known as “The Great Communicator.” This was not due simply to
Reagan’s public speaking proficiency; developed through training as an actor - but because he
was able to get large numbers of people to understand, believe in, and support the ideas and
initiatives that he wanted to pursue.
Reagan, King, and others were certainly great orators. But communication is more than
simply telling people something; disseminating information and facts. There is a saying that is
often used in education: “Children don’t care how much you know, until they know how much
you care.” This applies to adults as well. People want to know that a leader cares about them and
their well-being, before giving that person their attention, their loyalty, and their trust (Kouzes &
Posner, 2011). True communication, therefore, means creating and sustaining a relationship with
others, a relationship built upon common interests, shared principles, and similar core values.
Throughout the literature review, we have seen several examples of an effective crisis
response implemented by individuals perceived as highly effective communicators. During the
September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City, Mayor Rudy Giuliani maintained a constant
presence at “ground zero” and appeared frequently on TV and in the print media. In the days
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and weeks following this event, Giuliani continued to provide information and updates on the
recovery process, while expressing his personal feelings of sadness and loss. The candid and
open way in which Giuliani communicated these emotions made a genuine connection with New
Yorkers, and this helped to comfort and reassure the people there (Griffin-Padgett, 2010).
When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin used a different
communication strategy. After the storm had wreaked havoc and killed over 1000 people in the
city, Mayor Nagin took to the media with a relentless barrage of criticism of local, state, and
federal government leaders for their delayed and insufficient response to the disaster. Nagin
verbally blasted both Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and President George Bush, calling
them out for poor performance time and time again.
Even though Mayor Nagin’s own crisis response leadership during Katrina was
universally seen as poor, his words resonated strongly with constituents; especially those in the
city of New Orleans who had suffered greatly because of the storm. Nagin’s fiery “restorative
rhetoric” was praised by many, because this type of communication had given voice to the
frustration that people were feeling while providing a measure of reassurance that someone
understood and cared about their plight (Allison & Griffin, 2007).
Similarly, the participants in this research study are outstanding communicators as well;
willing to stand up and speak out on behalf of their students. Administrator “B” related that at
one point during her tenure, local businessmen opposed a tax increase to fund improvements for
district schools, including air conditioning for school buildings. The weather is often hot in
Administrator “B”’s school district, and she said that it was difficult for students and staff to
work under such conditions in non-air conditioned facilities.
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Administrator “B” could not understand or accept the lack of compassion shown by
business leaders, and organized a campaign to generate support for a referendum to fund these
improvements. Administrator “B” spoke on the topic frequently in public forums, and gave
interviews to television, radio, and newspaper reporters during which she stated that “even
inmates in our prisons get air-conditioning” while asking “Don’t our children deserve at least this
much?” Although a tax increase for schools had not been approved in her district for many
years, this referendum subsequently passed by a wide margin.
In their written responses to initial survey questions and during verbal interviews, each
school district superintendent or school president described in detail how he/she maintained
contact with stakeholders throughout the crisis event, providing not only information and updates
on the progress of crisis response efforts, but expressions of caring and concern, and reassurance
that everything was going to be alright. These things, along with other demonstrations of
support, are what gave people hope and the belief that their situation would soon improve.
But the groundwork and foundation for these successful crisis response outcomes was
actually laid much earlier. Each of these leaders had previously invested a great deal of time and
energy into building these relationships with their people and their community; starting years
before they had to confront a significant crisis event or emergency situation in their school
districts or schools. The participants in this study gave substantial evidence on this point, telling
and describing how they had been highly active, visible, and accessible in their schools and
within their school communities.
This was achieved by working closely with students, parents, staff, and community
members on a variety of educational projects in the areas of curriculum, instruction, facilities,
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finance, and social/emotional growth. These school district superintendents and school
presidents each developed relationships with subordinates, staff, parents, community members,
alumni, and others in a deliberate, purposeful way.
Interacting cooperatively with these stakeholders to solve problems and implement
initiatives provided opportunities to identify common interests, set priorities, and define shared
core values. Because of this practice, frequent and open communication developed into genuine
cooperation and trust.
Each participant in this study identified these particular elements, along with the strong
sense of “community” created as a result, as primary reasons why the people in their schools,
school districts, and communities had responded so quickly and effectively when faced with an
actual emergency situation or crisis event.

Theme 3 – Competence

Concepts related to Competence:
Culture
Growth

Data-driven decisions
High expectations & standards

Processing information

Recognizing opportunities

Situational

Utilize diverse skills/talents

Determination
Learning from others
Review & assess

Competence has been previously recognized as a key element in establishing trust.
Taraki, Greer, & Groenen (2016) identified leader competence as a critical factor in highperforming groups. In their study, groups attempting to perform complex tasks were much more
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successful when they had a leader who possessed a high level of task-specific knowledge and
experience. Conversely, groups that did not have leaders who possessed high situational and
task-specific competence fared poorly.
After Hurricane Katrina struck the gulf coast region in 2005, local, state, and federal
response was judged to be wholly inadequate. Because of this combined failure, the competence
of leaders such as New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, FEMA
Director Michael Brown, and President George Bush was strongly questioned.
Every participant in this study identifies as a situational leader, and the evidence cited
previously in the description of their leadership actions (Chapter Four) shows they each adapted
their methods and strategies to changing conditions as events and situations unfolded. But to do
so effectively, leaders must be knowledgeable in all facets of school/school district operations
and crisis response techniques, while understanding how to apply such specialized knowledge.
Each school district superintendent and school president stated that they have high
expectations and standards for performance, starting with themselves. They hold themselves
accountable for continuous growth and improvement, and have established a culture of learning
and growth among leadership team members and staff. They remain aware of developing issues
and potential problems in their field, constantly seeking relevant information and data.
In addition, they strive to make sure that other members of their leadership teams, school
board members, staff, parents, and community leaders have this information. This is achieved
through regular training and professional development provided for all district or school
administrators, school and school district staff, and school board/governing board members.
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Each participant stated that in addition to having a comprehensive crisis management
plan for their school or school district, school or school district leaders also met regularly to
update and revise this plan. During these meetings, members of each participant’s leadership
team discussed emergency situations and crisis events that had occurred in other schools and
school districts, discussing how they might prepare and respond if a similar scenario occurred at
their institution. In doing so, they assimilated and processed data from these sources. These
leaders learned from the experiences and ideas of others, raising the level of their own
professional competence.
The evidence in this study shows that each participant also strengthened and improved
the capabilities and competence of their leadership team members. They provided regular
opportunities for assistant superintendents, department directors, and principals to practice
various types of emergency situation or crisis response methods; holding trainings and exercises
during which various types of emergencies and crisis events were simulated.
“Surprise” trainings were also conducted, during which leadership team members were
confronted with unusual or unexpected issues within the context of an emergency situation or
crisis event. Because of this, leadership team and other staff members learned to adapt and
successfully handle problems for which they had not received specific targeted training. These
“surprise” exercises were credited with helping school and school district administrators and
staff members respond more effectively when they were confronted with an actual emergency or
crisis event.
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Theme 4 – Decision-Making

Concepts related to Decision-Making:
Assigning responsibilities

Delegating

Giving people authority

Involving others

Monitoring

Seeking input

Municipal governments and large private sector organizations are complex entities that
require the coordinated effort of many individuals in order to function effectively. Throughout
my review of the literature, we have seen that when these entities were faced with a significant
crisis event, a coordinated effort involving many people was required to implement a successful
crisis response.
Farazmand (2007) found that anticipation is a key element of both emergency situation
and crisis event management, and Olaniran (2007) states that the concept of control is important
in anticipating and managing a crisis situation. The anticipatory model fosters vigilance and
preventive decision-making in the pre-crisis stage when warning signs of impending problems
first appear, as well as during and after a crisis event.
Boin (2013) reports that followers and the general public will assess the effectiveness of
crisis management according to whether they see response personnel “getting things done”, and
workers who are “making things happen.” Witnessing this type of activity, and seeing these
images fulfills a symbolic psychological need, and makes people feel secure by instilling the
belief that things are being taken care of.
While competence is an important leadership component, the evidence shows that
participants in this study did not make most of the managerial decisions that were taken during
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the crisis event and emergency situation occurring on their watch. Each school district
superintendent or school president followed a written crisis response plan, delegating decisionmaking authority to subordinates who had been selected previously for these roles.
Although each study participant’s written crisis plan assigned specific crisis-related
duties and responsibilities to particular individuals, these participants had already delegated
authority extensively during normal non-emergency periods, allowing department directors,
leadership team members, and other administrators to run their own divisions, departments, or
school buildings with a great degree of independence. And so, to a great extent, the decisions
made and actions taken during each crisis event response were largely an extension of similar
types of decisions that these individuals would normally make, and types of actions normally
taken while performing their regular job functions under non-emergency conditions.
Each study participant cited delegation of authority as an important factor that
contributed to the overall success of their school or school district’s crisis response. Within such
large, complex organizations, many people with different types of training and expertise in
various administrative areas such as human resources, finance, curriculum & instruction, and
student services had been given the authority to supervise and direct their corresponding
administrative departments and offices. These were the people charged with carrying out many
of the crisis response operations necessary in each case.
However, while each study participant utilized this practice extensively, it did not
diminish their leadership role before, during, or after the emergency or crisis event. Although
subordinates made many of the logistical/operational decisions during times of crisis, each
school district superintendent or school president maintained a close presence throughout.
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Participants still made major decisions when necessary; they were also diligent in monitoring the
actions and performance of their leadership team members. Through regular electronic, written,
and personal communication, they sought the ideas and input of these subordinate
administrators; while assessing performance and assuring accountability for their decisions and
actions. In this way, the accountability and competence of subordinates was assured as well.

Theme 5 – Planning

Concepts related to Planning:
Checks & balances

Correction

Focus on priorities

Research

Evaluating
Simulation/practice/testing

In terms of their general leadership structure and planning, participants mentioned the
importance of having a system of checks and balances; in order to ensure academic, financial,
and procedural integrity as well as organizational fairness. When explaining and describing the
actions they took themselves during the crisis event, participants felt it was important to focus
their attention on priorities or crucial elements that had previously been identified as most
important.
As described in chapter two, the FEMA Incident Command System (ICS) is a
management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by
integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications
operating within a common organizational structure. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely
applicable. It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a broad
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spectrum of emergencies - from small to complex incidents; both natural and manmade
(FEMA.org, 2009).
It has been stated previously in Chapter Two that ICS is used by all levels of
government: Federal, State, local, and tribal; as well as by many private-sector and
nongovernmental organizations. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally
structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: Command, operations, planning,
logistics, and finance & administration. The person who directs this response is the Incident
Response Commander (IRC) (FEMA.org, 2009).
According to FEMA, essential components of effective crisis response include:


A robust, reliable communications network



Effective communications systems



Comprehensive crisis response plans



A formal management structure



Clearly-defined roles and responsibilities for personnel at each position

The evidence obtained in this study shows that participating school presidents and school
district superintendents placed a high value on each of these components, with particular
emphasis on the last three: A comprehensive crisis response plan, a formal organizational
management structure with unambiguous chain-of-command, and clearly-defined roles and
responsibilities for personnel at each position within this management structure.
Every participant in this study referred to the existence of a highly-detailed crisis and
emergency response plan for their school or school district, and participants unanimously gave

202
credit for successful crisis management to the existence of this plan. In each case, this crisis
response plan was prepared by a school or school district committee made up of a large number
of employees, representing all organizational areas, job functions, and departments.
Participants reported that when writing the original document and while periodically
revising this plan, other significant state, national, and international crisis and emergency events
that had recently occurred were researched and studied. The leadership methods and techniques
used to respond to these situations were discussed and evaluated as well. Some of these were
then incorporated into the school or school district’s plan, where appropriate.
Each school district superintendent or school president mentioned the importance of
conducting “live” simulations; thereby giving people a chance to practice the actions they would
be expected to take, and decisions they might have to make during a real crisis event. This type
of “live drill”, along with subsequent group analysis and critique, provided information the
leaders used to strengthen and improve their written crisis response plans. These drills also
provided opportunities for participants and subordinates to practice and refine situational
leadership techniques; by requiring them to adapt their leadership approach and methods in
response to unexpected and/or changing conditions.
During normal, non-emergency periods school district superintendents and school
presidents felt it was important to focus on organizational priorities. They each talked about
being inclusive; making sure that all people were given a voice in determining these priorities as
well as the overall direction of the organization. Participants felt that this created a greater sense
of “ownership”; while generating a stronger commitment from school and school district
personnel toward achieving the organization’s goals.
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Participants similarly believed that including many people from a wide range of job
functions and departments in the process of writing and revising the organization’s crisis
response plan would lead to better understanding of procedures for handling various crisis
situations, and a stronger commitment from school and school district personnel when
implementing the specific provisions of this plan.
However, they also spoke of having to deal with issues that had not been anticipated,
both during and after the crisis. The crisis event or emergency situation was very traumatic for
staff members and students. In many cases, these individuals needed the leader’s help and
support, and the support of their friends and colleagues, long after the crisis event itself had
passed.
Provision had been made in each participant’s crisis response plan to provide emotional
and psychological support for school and school district staff and students in the aftermath of an
emergency or crisis. However, each emergency or crisis event is unique; unfolding and affecting
various individuals in different ways. Therefore, it was not possible for each crisis management
plan to contain specific, detailed instructions for helping every person who needed this support.
This is where participants’ and subordinates’ ability to skillfully apply situational, contingencybased leadership principles became especially important.

Selective Coding

During my review of crisis-event based literature, I identified five broad functional
categories used by leaders when implementing a crisis event response: Authority/Credibility,
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Communication, Psychology, Decision-Making/Competence, and Understanding/Sense-Making.
These correspond closely with the five themes that have emerged from this study; identified
through the processes of open coding and then axial coding of the study information and data
obtained. These are: Credibility, Communication, Competence, Decision-Making, and Planning.
One common thread that runs through all five of these emergent themes is trust. Trust,
along with competence and communication, has already been cited as one of the most basic
elements of contingency-based leadership.
Each participant in my research study identifies as a situational leader. The emergent
leadership themes and the demonstrated leadership styles of study participants correspond
closely with the identified traits, characteristics, and behaviors of situational, contingency-based
leaders.
When discussing the crisis event response in their school or school district, terms closely
associated with situational and contingency-based leadership were used most frequently. These
include Assessing, Communication, Delegating, Planning, Relationships, Supporting, and Trust.
As stated in my introduction to this chapter, I surmise that the research question posed at
the beginning of this study has been answered: Contingency-based leadership principles and
methods have been used to successfully manage crisis events and emergency situations by the
school district superintendents and school presidents who participated in this study.
The evidence also indicates that thorough advance planning, documented in detailed
organizational crisis management plans, and competent delegation of authority, as shown by the
highly-effective response actions carried out by subordinate administrators and staff members,
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also contributed significantly to successful crisis event outcomes in the schools, school districts,
and the communities where these crisis events and emergency situations took place.

Grounded Theory

In my review of emergency and crisis event literature, it can be seen that contingencybased, situational leadership methods have been used in formulating and implementing
successful responses to a variety of non-school emergencies and crisis events such as the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City (Martinko, 2009), a fireworks factory
explosion in Enschede, the Netherlands (Noordegraaf, 2011) or natural disasters such as
catastrophic floods in Queensland, Australia (Debussy, 2012) and wildfires in California
(Fairhurst, 2009). Contingency-based leadership theory is widely accepted, and the effectiveness
of contingency-based, situational leadership in non-school situations is grounded in the evidence
gathered from many different case studies.
Through data and information obtained from my study participants, we see that
contingency-based, situational leadership methods have also been used to formulate a successful
crisis event response to school- and school district-related emergencies and crisis events. Each
participant in this study devised and managed a successful crisis or emergency situation
response, using the same contingency-based principles and leadership techniques employed by
leaders mentioned in my literature review.
I have shown that two elements - delegation of authority, and a comprehensive written
crisis management plan each played an essential role in the emergency/crisis responses of
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participants in this study. Building upon the evidence demonstrated and grounded in the cases
contained within my review of the literature, I propose to expand upon this grounded theory; by
stating that contingency-based situational leadership has been shown to be an effective
methodology for responding to school- and school district-related crisis events and emergency
situations.
According to Yin (1994), case study results are not statistically generalizable, and may
not in and of themselves establish the study’s external validity. However, outcomes and
information derived from these cases may be analytically generalizable to a broader theory. This
is accomplished through the replication of findings.
The crisis event responses devised and employed in each case contained within this study
generated a positive outcome. I believe that the consistently successful resolutions produced by
each organization’s response to a major crisis or significant emergency situation demonstrates
that contingency-based, situational leadership can be highly effective when utilized by school
district superintendents and school presidents during school- and school district-related crisis
events or emergencies.
In combination with evidence grounded in my review of non-school crisis response
literature and based upon additional evidence found in the course of my study, as well as
previous theory supported by demonstrations regarding the effectiveness of contingency-based
leadership in crisis situations, I therefore propose to extend this grounded theory by stating that
contingency-based, situational leadership methods can be considered a preferred method by
which school and school district administrators and leaders may devise and implement a
successful response to school- and school district-related emergency situations or crisis events.
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While study participants utilized both transactional and transformational methods during
emergency situations and times of crisis, it was their transformational approach to situational
leadership during normal, non-emergency periods that increased the leadership capacity of
subordinates; allowing participants to maintain their standard contingency-based leadership
approach when faced with unusual and highly atypical conditions. Based upon the evidence
found in the course of my study, contingency-based leadership methods may be considered as an
effective and preferred strategy when preparing for and responding to school or school districtrelated emergency situations and crisis events.

Implications for Professional Practice
Delegation of Authority

At the beginning of this chapter, delegation of authority was cited as a key factor that
allowed participants to devise and implement a successful emergency situation or crisis event
response. It was noted earlier that each participant had already delegated authority extensively;
well before their school or school district was faced with a major emergency situation or crisis
event.
As outlined earlier in this chapter, there are a number of benefits that may be gained
when school or school district leaders delegate at least some portion of their authority. Through
my review of the literature, it can be seen that many leaders actually do distribute decisionmaking powers to subordinates, particularly during emergencies and times of crisis. But the real
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challenge, I believe, lies in understanding precisely how to delegate authority. We need to
understand when, where, and to whom this authority should be given.
I recommend that school administrators delegate general administrative authority during
normal periods as well as times of crisis; to the extent that it is possible and practical to do so.
However, I believe it is important to know what supporting factors, resources, and systems must
be present; so that subordinates are empowered and able to effectively use the authority they
have been given. This is especially true when they and their organization are confronted by a
major emergency situation or crisis event. This knowledge by be acquired by looking at the data
and information obtained in my study; contained in the methods and actions of study
participants. School district superintendents, school presidents, and other educational
administrators may profit from the experience of study participants by applying the following
principles when delegating authority to subordinates in their own schools and school districts:

1. Know your organization: Understand how various departments and systems work, and
how these offices and departments operate in relation to each other. Know the protocols that
exist for performing various functions, as well as the human and capital resources required.
What this really means is: Know your people. What are their technical/personal strengths
and weaknesses? Most importantly; what are their ideals, goals, and value systems? These will
determine the ethos of the organization.
To establish and define these ideals, goals, and values, study participants said that they
regularly hold meetings and forums; during which organizational progress, issues, and problems
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are shared openly and discussed honestly with other administrators, staff, students, parents,
community members, and other stakeholders.
By remaining highly accessible to their subordinates and other constituents, participants
are able to listen and learn about their concerns. This also gives each school district
superintendent or school president an opportunity to receive valuable ideas and information;
input that helps shape school and school district goals and policy, as well as the overall character
of the organization’s educational community.
This type of communication also deepens the leader’s understanding of how things get
done - how work “flows” through one’s organization, while providing opportunities to learn
about the abilities and personal qualities of the people who “make things happen.” This is
essential, because it allows the chief administrator to determine just how much authority can be
delegated, as well as where and by whom this delegated authority can be used most effectively.

2. Know your community: Each participant in this study had previously invested a great
deal of time and energy into building these relationships with their community and its people;
beginning to do this years before they had to confront a significant crisis event or emergency
situation in their school districts or schools. Each of the participants in this study gave
substantial evidence on this point; describing how they had been highly active, visible, and
accessible in their schools and within their school communities.
This was achieved by working closely with students, parents, staff, and community
members on a variety of educational projects in the areas of curriculum, instruction, facilities,
finance, and social/emotional growth. These school district superintendents and school
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presidents each developed relationships with political and business leaders, service agencies and
groups, community members, alumni, and others in a deliberate, purposeful way.
Interacting cooperatively with these stakeholders to solve problems and implement
initiatives provided opportunities to identify common interests, set priorities, and define shared
core values. Because of this practice, frequent and open communication developed into genuine
cooperation and trust. This cooperation and trust, in turn, facilitated the development of
relationships between subordinates with whom authority had been delegated and others in the
community such as first responder and medical personnel who would later prove to be
instrumental in supporting and sustaining the institution’s crisis event response.

3. Right people, Right positions, Right Way: These school district superintendents and
school presidents hired, assigned, and promoted highly qualified people, but not necessarily
those who were the most technically proficient. Traits such as honesty, integrity, dedication to
organizational goals and principles, and a willingness to help and support others were vitally
important.
When delegating authority, participants each looked for people of high character; those
who were committed to doing what is morally and ethically right under all circumstances. They
understood that strength of character becomes even more critical during times of crisis, when the
potential ramifications and impact of decisions made by subordinates are often magnified.

4. Provide effective training: The evidence in this study shows that each participant also
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improved and strengthened the disaster response capabilities and competence of their leadership
team members and individual department leaders, to whom a significant amount of authority
had been delegated.
They provided regular opportunities for assistant superintendents, department directors,
and principals to practice various types of emergency situation or crisis response methods;
holding trainings and exercises during which various types of emergencies and crisis events were
simulated.
“Surprise” trainings were also conducted, during which leadership team members were
confronted with unusual or unexpected issues within the context of an emergency situation or
crisis event. Because of this, leadership team and other staff members learned to apply prior
knowledge and successfully handle problems for which they had not received specific targeted
training. These “surprise” exercises were credited with helping school and school district
administrators and staff members respond more effectively when they were confronted with an
actual emergency or crisis event.

5. Recognize people who have unique talents and abilities: Participants understood
they had certain leadership team or staff members who possessed unique or special talents and
abilities. Participants stressed the importance of recognizing these people, and of giving them the
authority and freedom to use their talents in a way that would maximize their benefit to the
school or school district, as well as to the people most in need of their help.
In professional sports, coaches and general managers are assessed according to how
effectively they are able to identify, develop, and then utilize the talents and abilities of their
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players. It is incumbent upon these leaders to utilize the skills of subordinates in a way that
produces the greatest overall benefit and success for their organization. Having worked during
the early 1990’s as an assistant coach in the NBA’s developmental Continental Basketball
Association (CBA), I had a chance to observe and learn from outstanding coaches of other CBA
teams such as George Karl, Flip Saunders, and Terry Stotts; all of whom went on to achieve
success as head coaches in the NBA.
The gold standard for NBA coaches is Gregg Popovich of the San Antonio Spurs. San
Antonio has reached the playoffs twenty-one consecutive seasons, winning five NBA
championships during this time; a level of performance unrivaled in any professional sport.
Over the years, Coach Popovich had Tim Duncan and David Robinson; both of whom came into
the league as heralded players. But unlike other coaches, who won primarily because they had
several big “stars”, “Pop” and his staff achieved most of their success with athletes who at first
were largely unknown, such as Tony Parker from France and Manu Ginobili from Argentina.
Parker and Ginobili had no prior experience with American basketball, at any level. However,
Popovich and the Spurs recognized that these players possessed certain unique traits and skills.
Their specialized abilities were developed to a very high level, and utilized by Popovich
within a framework that maximized performance of the entire team. Parker became an expert at
penetrating opposing defenses with his dribble, then quickly pulling up and scoring at close
range. Ginobili grew adept at launching his body toward the basket – fearlessly weaving through
defenders, making shots from impossible angles or delivering pinpoint passes to teammates for
open looks. Both were eventually named all-stars, winning four NBA championships together.
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So too, must school administrators recognize and apply the diverse abilities and unique
talents of individual staff members to benefit the students and parents whom they serve, and their
communities. The school district superintendents and school presidents in this study each spoke
of how they identified people who had “interesting” backgrounds and unusual talents, then
delegated significant authority to such individuals - allowing them to conduct and direct a variety
of non-crisis and crisis response-related activities independently; without undue interference.
Examples of such people and their actions ranged from a university finance director
who was also an ordained minister, experienced in consoling those who had lost close friends
and relatives taking the initiative to counsel the grieving families of shooting victims at a nearby
hospital, to a school administrator who came across an abandoned municipal government dump
truck and bravely drove it through a rising hurricane storm surge - rescuing people who were
desperately clinging to bushes and trees, about to be swept away by raging water and winds.

6. Develop your people: Participants in this study provided extensive training and
professional development for their leadership team members, thereby building the leadership
capacity in subordinates. This capacity-building went beyond the specialized, focused training
these individuals had been given to prepare them for initiating and carrying out various response
actions over a range of possible crisis or emergency situations.
Each school district superintendent and school president stated that they have established
a culture of continuous learning and growth among their leadership team and other staff
members. Participants remain abreast of developing issues and potential problems in their field,
constantly seeking relevant information and data.
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In addition, they strive to make sure that other members of their leadership teams, school
board members, staff, parents, and community leaders have this information. This is achieved
through regular training and professional development provided for all district or school
administrators, school and school district staff, and school board/governing board members.

7. Foster trust throughout the organization: Participants in this study engendered
organizational trust and enhanced its development in the time before a major emergency/crisis
event by granting a great deal of autonomy to the administrators and staff members of various
departments; demonstrating a strong belief in their professional capabilities. They continued to
do so during and afterward, by shielding followers from external criticism and attacks on their
competence; protecting them from self-serving individuals who sought to take advantage of
conditions for their own personal or political gain.
Trust is created when people see that leaders are concerned for their well-being; placing
the needs and welfare of followers above their own. Trust is enhanced when followers know that
the leader believes in them, and supports them. Before, during, and after emergency situations
and crisis events, the statements and actions of study participants affirmed their approval and
support of decisions and actions taken by staff members. This strengthened the bonds between
leaders and subordinates; by demonstrating that these leaders had a high degree of faith in
followers and their abilities.
This same type of confidence and trust also extended to students, parents, and members
of each school or school district community. Throughout each emergency or crisis event
response, school and school district staff reached out to help co-workers, students, and
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community members; thereby continuing to build and amplify the trust each leader had placed in
them; as well as the trust extended to them by their colleagues.
The way in which each school president or school district superintendent communicated
frequently and openly with followers was another important factor in developing the high levels
of mutual trust that existed between participants and members of their leadership teams. This
increased trust, cooperation, and efficiency throughout the levels of each organization. High
levels of organizational trust were a primary factor that facilitated the effective delegation of
authority; which led to greater organizational crisis response effectiveness in every case.

8. Set high standards: Participants in this study each established high standards of
performance for subordinates, as well as for themselves. However, these were not created
arbitrarily or in isolation. The benchmarks utilized by each school district superintendent or
school president were based on a shared vision formed in cooperation with all stakeholders.

9. Hold people accountable: These participants ensured accountability in each case by
measuring their own performance, as well as the performance of leadership team members and
other subordinates, against the high standards they had previously established. These leaders
continuously improved upon their professional knowledge and skills while developing the
professional capacity of subordinates and other staff; in order to strengthen the entire
organization. Each school district superintendent or school president practiced leadership by
example: They set the standard through their own actions and performance that they expected
others to meet.
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Each participant in this study identified these nine practices as primary influences that
contributed toward the way in which their institutions and surrounding communities had
responded so quickly and effectively when faced with an actual emergency situation or crisis
event.

Crisis Management Plan

The second key point identified as a major factor in their school or school district’s
successful response to a particular emergency situation or crisis event is the existence of a
comprehensive written crisis management plan.
Each study participant talked about the importance of having a diverse group of people
involved in creating and writing the crisis management plan. They felt that having different
people from various fields and disciplines brought a diverse array of experiences and viewpoints
to this project, which proved to be beneficial when brainstorming ideas.
The group that created each plan attempted to anticipate a wide range of scenarios that
could possibly occur at their school(s) or school district, then considered how a response to each
scenario might be formulated and carried out. Once this crisis management plan was in place,
personnel from each school or school district met regularly to update and revise the plan.
During these meetings, members of each participant’s leadership team discussed
emergency situations and crisis events that had recently occurred in other schools and school
districts, discussing how they might prepare and respond if a similar scenario occurred at their
institution. In doing so, they assimilated and processed data from these sources. These leaders
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learned from the experiences and ideas of others, thereby improving their own crisis
management preparedness, and raising the level of their own professional competence.
Without exception, study participants cited the existence of a pre-existing institutional
crisis response plan as a prime factor in guiding their organization throughout the crisis response
process, both during and after the actual crisis event itself. During verbal one-on-one interviews,
each participant explained the importance of well-defined roles for members of their leadership
teams and other staff members; with certain functions and responsibilities outlined for these
offices, and specific crisis-response actions assigned to individual staff members.
The evidence given by study participants and subsequent analysis of school and school
district crisis event response shows the importance of a written organizational crisis response
plan. Based upon the successful crisis response outcomes obtained by participants in this study,
it is recommended that all schools and school districts should develop and implement a
comprehensive written crisis response plan. This plan should cover a wide range of possible
emergency situation or crisis event scenarios, with a variety of possible response actions for each
and contingencies for different variations of the problems that might arise during the
implementation of such actions.
Additionally, this study shows that judicious delegation of authority can enhance the
effectiveness of crisis response plans and actions; when authority for making decisions is placed
in the hands of knowledgeable, competent individuals who understand what needs to be done in
various situations. In addition to having a comprehensive, detailed written crisis response plan,
it is recommended that school presidents and school district superintendents delegate authority
for making certain decisions during emergency situations or times of crisis to specific offices and
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individuals, and that this delegation of authority should be contained within the written crisis
plan document.
Study participants also credited their successful crisis event response to periodic review
of crisis management procedures, and “live” crisis response drills that covered various types of
possible crisis event situations. It is recommended that schools and school districts should
periodically review and update their crisis management plans to reflect current best practice, and
that they should regularly provide staff and students with the opportunity to rehearse various
crisis response actions through both pre-scripted and “surprise” mock emergencies and crisis
events.
Because most emergency situations and crisis events occur unexpectedly and unfold in a
manner that can be highly unpredictable, situational, contingency-based leadership methods have
been shown to be an effective method of response. It is therefore recommended that school
superintendents, school presidents, and other administrators should model, develop, and
encourage the use of situational, contingency-based leadership techniques by members of their
institution’s leadership team. Providing the type of “live” practice and rehearsal just described
should assist in further developing the situational, contingency-based leadership abilities of
subordinates – the people who will have primary responsibility for developing and implementing
an effective, coordinated response during an actual school/school-related emergency or crisis
event.
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First Responders and External Agencies

Along with the leadership actions of educational administrators and staff, it is important
to consider the fact that school-related crisis response is usually not dependent simply upon
school or school district leaders and staff members themselves. During such an event, school
district superintendents, school presidents, and their subordinates must often interact and
cooperate with first responder personnel and leaders from a number of outside agencies. Recent
cases reported in the national media have shown that the effectiveness of a particular crisis event
response may also depend to a large extent upon the perception and training of school security
personnel, as well as local law enforcement and/or other emergency services providers.
We know that first responder agencies operate under an Incident Command System, and
that an Incident Response Commander will direct their operations. It is important therefore, that
school district superintendents, school presidents, and those who will assist in coordinating the
institution’s crisis response know this Incident Command System, and understand how their
school or school district will implement the crisis management plan in cooperation with first
responders and outside emergency service agencies.
School district superintendents, school presidents, and other subordinate administrators
and staff members should become familiar with the Incident Command System; acquiring an
understanding of how this system functions during various emergency and crisis scenarios and a
working knowledge of the roles that school and school district personnel may be expected to
play in these different circumstances. District superintendents and school presidents should
understand how they and other district personnel such as their Chief of Security will interface
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with the Incident Response Commander; how they will work together to implement a
coordinated crisis event response.
To achieve this, school and school district administrators may wish to meet with local,
state, and federal law enforcement and first responder agencies; to learn about their training and
emergency response methods. In this way, educational leaders may become familiar with the
response protocols these departments use for various types of emergencies. District
superintendents, school presidents, and other educational personnel should know what first
responders can be expected to do when they arrive on the scene of a crisis event.
To further enhance the crisis response knowledge and abilities of administrators and their
subordinates, joint training exercises may be conducted with law enforcement agencies and first
responders so that school and school district personnel may gain hands-on experience with the
emergency response protocols they may be expected to utilize and implement during an actual
school-related emergency or crisis event. This type of “live practice”, combined with subsequent
analysis of leadership performance during “mock” emergencies, may also expand and improve
upon the situational, contingency-based leadership skills of school and school district
administrators and staff members. This may lead to improved institutional leadership
performance during both emergency and non-emergency periods.

Suggestions for Further Study

The two key factors identified through this study that participants utilized extensively in
the process of achieving a successful crisis event/emergency situation response are

221
(1.) Delegation of leadership authority among subordinate administrators and staff members
(2.) Implementation of a comprehensive written organizational crisis response plan.
The results of my study indicate that these two factors have contributed to a number of
successful crisis resolution outcomes when employed in combination with situational,
contingency-based leadership methods used in responding to school- and school district-related
emergencies and crisis events.
Because these two factors figured so prominently in each case study crisis event
response, I propose that additional study should be undertaken; to determine if delegation of
authority and comprehensive written crisis response plans are factors that consistently enhance
the effectiveness of contingency-based, situational leadership methods used in dealing with other
types of crisis event and emergency situations, particularly when handling cases that occur in
schools and school-related settings.
The individuals who participated in this study were each able to describe the emergency
situation or crisis event they experienced in great detail. However, as I engaged them in
conversation by telling them of my own school-related emergency and crisis event experiences,
they were able to reflect upon what they had said. At times, this spurred them to recall and
provide additional information. At other times, it caused them to modify or correct something
they had told me.
Although each emergency or crisis contained in this study was a major, significant event,
three of them took place a number of years ago. Only one of these occurred within the past year.
And so, I sometimes wondered if participants’ memory and recollection of these events had been
influenced or changed by the passage of time, or shaded by their own opinions and values.
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To borrow a line from William Shakespeare, “All’s well that ends well.” Because of this
natural human tendency to minimize or overlook minor setbacks and problems (or even major
ones) when the outcome of a situation is favorable, I believe it might be of value to conduct
follow-up studies; interviewing other central office administrators, district school board
members, school principals, assistant principals, and maintenance supervisors, as well as
transportation, food service, custodial, and security personnel from each participant’s district.
Doing so would provide different perspectives on the organization’s crisis response
leadership, and might reveal information not discovered by speaking only with the school or
school district’s chief executive.
It might also be useful to have additional input concerning subordinates’ perception of
how effective each participant’s delegation of authority had been during the crisis period, and
suggestions as to how organizational structure or communication could be enhanced and
improved during a future emergency or crisis event response.
By speaking with a greater number of individuals from each school or school district, it
might also be possible to gain a more accurate measure of other situational, contingencyleadership factors such as the degree to which successful crisis response leaders had the trust of
subordinate staff members, and the extent to which subordinates actually trusted and supported
each other, as well as school and school district central office administration.
I also believe there would be value in studying each participant’s philosophy and method
for delegating authority to subordinates; in order to learn the key elements that allowed
successful crisis response leaders to delegate effectively. This may also help us to understand
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why delegation of leadership powers may have been ineffective or possibly even counterproductive in certain instances; during either emergency or non-emergency periods.
Because of the importance assigned to the written crisis management plan by each
participant, it might be useful to conduct a more detailed study of these plans; examining them to
see how documents are structured and exactly what they contain. This would allow us to learn
precisely how authority for various crisis response actions had been delegated, and to which
departments and individuals. It would also reveal how resources needed for each emergency
situation or crisis response effort were allocated and managed by various offices and officials at
every institution.
Additionally, because each emergency/crisis response effort continued on well past the
time when each emergency/crisis event was over, I believe it would be useful to explore the
psychological aspect of each school or school district community’s disaster recovery in greater
depth. This would allow us to take a more detailed look at what crisis response leaders did and
said to give people encouragement and support, after the crisis itself had passed. There might
also be value in obtaining the thoughts and perceptions of emergency/crisis event victims; to gain
their impressions and assessment of how effective they believed school and school district
administrators had been in responding to the needs of constituents.
In the cases of the mass shooting, the bombing, and the hostage-taking, there had been no
advance notice or warning that such a thing was about to occur, and the organizational leader
could do nothing to stop each incident or change the outcome. And so, the actions that each
school president or school district superintendent took afterward in each case were largely
symbolic. By interviewing and speaking with victims of these incidents, as well as with family
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members, relatives, friends, and members of each affected community, we would learn whether
the symbolic actions taken participants really made a significant difference for people in the time
after the emergency or crisis event, and how it impacted their personal and collective recovery.

Limitations of the Study

The positive outcomes seen in each of my study cases gives a strong indication that
situational, contingency-based leadership methods can be very effective when utilized in
response to a major school- or school district-related emergency/crisis event. However, because
I was able to examine only four cases, I believe that further research is warranted to determine if
evidence from additional cases supports and confirms this determination and other conclusions
derived from study information and data.
And while delegation of authority and the application of a comprehensive organizational
crisis management plan were cited as essential emergency/crisis response practices, there were a
number of other factors that may have impacted and influenced the situational, contingencybased leadership actions and decisions of study participants; the extent and effects of which are
largely unknown.
As described in my Implications for Professional Practice, we should consider that
school-related crisis response is usually not dependent simply upon school or school district
leaders themselves. They often interact with, and depend upon the efforts and cooperation of
first responder personnel, as well as others such as teachers, support staff, students, and parents.
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Most schools and school districts have a security force. This was an unknown element in
my study; because no attention was given to the staffing, qualifications, or training of school and
school district security personnel; or the effect that these may have had on each emergency/crisis
event outcome Additionally, no research was conducted to find out if schools and school
districts had utilized various forms of security-related apparatus or technology such as barriers,
barricades, locking mechanisms, video cameras, motion sensors, or other devices that may have
helped or hindered the crisis response effort.
A potential weakness of this study is the fact that it only contains participants who
experienced a high degree of success in handling a crisis event or emergency situation. While
much can be learned from success, we understand that negative outcomes or failure can also
provide powerful learning opportunities.
Many people who had served as leaders of schools or school districts during a major
crisis event or emergency were asked to be a part of this research study; however I could not
compel them to participate. Only four individuals ultimately accepted my invitation. Some
people who were not successful in directing their organization’s response to a crisis may have
been reluctant to participate for fear that they would be identified, and that their reputation might
be damaged. Perhaps others did not want to recall details of crisis events or emergency
situations that were traumatic for them. Whatever their reasons, I feel that valuable information
may have been lost because these individuals did not share their stories and experiences.
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Additional Factors

The cases chosen for this study all involve significant, high-profile crisis events that have
been reported extensively in print, broadcast, and electronic media. Because I was already
familiar with many details of each event prior to selecting this research topic, it was important
for me, as a researcher, to continually be aware of this and guard against making assumptions
based upon what I already knew or believed about each situation and the individuals involved.
To achieve this, I had to consciously remember that although I had been exposed to a
significant amount of information concerning the specifics of each crisis, I hadn’t been present
when these events actually happened. I needed to continually acknowledge and remind myself
of the fact that I didn’t possess the firsthand experience and knowledge that my participants did.
I went into each participant’s interview with an open mind, ready to hear what
participants had to say without preconceptions. I also employed techniques of active listening:
reflecting back on what they said as well as the ideas and thoughts they expressed, re-stating
these to confirm accuracy while letting them know that I was listening. I consistently checked to
make sure that I understood not only their words, but also the meanings and implications of what
they were saying. I took particular note of their non-verbal cues - tone of voice, facial
expressions, hand gestures, and body language – assessing these for additional meaning and
confirmation that I had interpreted their thoughts and ideas correctly.
External factors may have also effected study participants; impacting upon their
leadership decisions and actions during a particular school-related emergency situation or crisis
event. The actions of school and school district security officers, law enforcement, first
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responders, and personnel from other outside agencies on the leadership methods of school and
school district administrators was not considered in depth during this study.
Recent cases reported in the national media have shown that the effectiveness of a
particular school-related emergency or crisis event response may depend to a large extent upon
the perception, reaction, and training of school security personnel, as well as local law
enforcement and/or other first responders.
On May 16, 2018, when a former district student appeared on school grounds with a gun
in Dixon, IL a law enforcement officer employed by the district correctly assessed the situation,
then immediately moved to neutralize the threat and apprehend the intruder. In doing so,
countless people were likely saved from serious injury or death (CBS, 2018).
However, according to an NBC television news report, on February 14, 2018 in Parkland,
FL an officer responsible for campus security did not respond to the sounds of gunfire inside a
district high school; making no effort to enter the building while remaining in a stationary
position outside the entrance doors. The inability of school security personnel to stop a former
district student or recognize the potential threat that he posed may have ultimately contributed to
the loss of seventeen lives; as the shooter was then able to move freely throughout the building
(NBC, 2018).

Final Thoughts

As I conducted the one-on-one verbal interview with each participant, our conversation
sometimes ventured into different areas; such as the challenges inherent in dealing with people in
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positions of authority outside of the school or school district, or community outreach initiatives
that went beyond the specific purpose of security or crisis response. In those moments our
relationship shifted from researcher/participant to educational colleagues, or simply people
concerned with similar issues or problems. We learned from and taught each other; my
comments spurring them to make additional remarks and their statements giving me pause to
consider my own beliefs and understandings.
During the process of sharing, telling, and re-telling of stories, I exchanged ideas and
experiences with study participants, thinking about the steps they had taken, and how each
superintendent or president’s leadership methods had led to a highly successful crisis response.
This caused me to examine my own leadership principles and beliefs, and in doing so changed
my views regarding crisis response leadership, as well as leadership in general.
Before, during, and immediately after each emergency situation or crisis event, many
things needed to be done during a relatively brief window of time. And so, preparation became
critically important. Each school’s or school district’s emergency/crisis response would most
likely not have been nearly as effective without the significant amount of effort and time
invested by each organization in planning for the possibility of such an event; weeks, months,
and years before the emergency or crisis actually happened.
I now understand that crisis and emergency situation leadership occurs not only while the
crisis or emergency is happening. It begins during normal, non-emergency periods, perhaps
months or even years before such a crisis or emergency occurs when school district
superintendents and school presidents consider how they will respond and lead; and how they
will organize their people and their institution in preparation for such an event. This is the time
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when organizational trust, the foundation for effective emergency and crisis response leadership,
must be established and nurtured.
Each school district superintendent or school president understood that responsibility to
manage the crisis did not end immediately upon cessation of the emergency or crisis event itself.
Every study participant recognized that there would be not only present, but also future
implications because of what had happened, and that there would be a long-term impact not only
for the institution and their people, but for their community as well. Effective emergency and
crisis event leadership extends beyond the event itself, into the time afterward when healing and
closure are required.
Each school district superintendent and school president maintained an on-going focus
long after the immediate crisis had passed, placing an emphasis on helping people heal not only
physically and financially; but emotionally and psychologically as well. In each case, this
required a deeper personal involvement from participants; along with a significant commitment
of institutional resources that continued for an extended period during and after the initial
recovery phase.
After the crisis event, many things still needed to be done. Physically restoring a normal
educational environment, calming people’s fears, and helping them cope in the aftermath of
tragedy were also important functions that took place under the guidance and direction of each
participant. More than simply repairing buildings or replacing material goods, each of their
stories was about strengthening and sustaining relationships: Supporting their communities, staff
members, parents, and children; while helping all of them move forward with their lives. Each
participant did so willingly; with humility and grace.
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Perhaps most significant, and certainly most impressive to me, is the fact that the
leadership style of study participants was remarkably stable; before, during, and after each
emergency situation or crisis event. The situational, contingency-based leadership philosophy
and methods that served these school district superintendents and school presidents so well
during normal, non-emergency periods remained consistent throughout every phase of their
organization’s emergency or crisis response. These same elements emerged afterward rocksolid, strong and intact - just like the leaders themselves.
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James Drake - Research Study Survey Questions

1. How many years have you worked as a school district superintendent, school CEO, or
school president?

2. Please list the school(s) or school district(s) where you have worked as a school district
superintendent, school CEO, or school president, as well as starting and ending dates for
each term of employment.

3. Without providing the name(s) of any individual(s) involved, please list the major schoolrelated emergency situation or situations that you encountered in each school or school
district where you served as superintendent, school CEO, or school president.

4. Briefly describe the leadership philosophy and style you typically employ during normal,
non-emergency periods.

5. Please rank the following leadership elements in order of their importance (1 = most
important, 6 = least important):
Authority

__________

Communication

__________

Competence

__________

Credibility

__________

Decision-making

__________

Psychology

__________
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James Drake - Research Interview Question Protocol

The conceptual framework for my research is contingency leadership theory. This theory
requires leaders to consider their own interaction preferences when working with others (task v.
relationship orientation), the nature (structure) of the work to be accomplished, along with the
levels of trust and maturity that exist among followers.
Therefore, the questions that I will ask during one-on-one interviews with study participants are
designed to elicit information and evidence that can be used to evaluate the contingency-based
leadership actions and methods displayed by participants during times of emergency or crisis in
their schools or school districts.
1. In general, what kind of a leader are you?
2. How would you categorize your leadership approach?
3. Could you tell me what that looks like?
4. How do you think your staff members would describe you as a person?
5. How would staff members describe your leadership style?
6. When you are at the first stage of trying to solve a problem, do you prefer to strategize
alone or with others present?
7. What is your preference for strategizing/implementing at later stages?
8. Do you believe in delegating authority?
9. If so, under what circumstances, and to what extent?
10. Can you give an example of how you do this?
11. Please tell me about the emergency/crisis that occurred in your school/school district.
12. To what extent did you formulate/implement the response to this emergency/crisis
yourself?
13. To what extent did you seek input from others in doing this?
14. Can you describe what this was like?
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15. To what extent, if any, did you delegate formulating/implementing the emergency/crisis
response?
16. What was your reasoning/purpose for delegating/not delegating during the
emergency/crisis?
17. During the emergency described, do you believe your staff had the competence and/or
knowledge necessary to handle the situation effectively?
18. What evidence is your response based on?
19. In general, what do believe to be the level of confidence that staff members have in each
other?
20. What is the evidence that you base this response on?
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Hierarchical Relationships between Delegation of Authority, Supporting Themes, and
Contributing Elements

Central
Concept

Supporting
Themes

Contributing
Elements

• Delegation of Authority

• Communication
• Competence
• Credibility
• Decision-Making
• Planning

•Accountability
•Community Knowledge
•Effective Training
•High Performance Standards
•Leadership Development
•Organizational Knowledge
•Organizational Trust
•Recognize Unique Talents
•Right People, Right Way

